Harold Wakefield

NEW PATHS FOR JAPAN

Introduction by
Sir Paul Butler, K.C.M.G.

Royal Institute of International Affairs

THIS BOOK is a sequel to the Chatham House Study Group Report *Japan in Defeat*, published in 1945 and now out of print. That Report, prepared before the end of the Pacific War, was intended to be a forecast of the probable reactions of the nation to defeat. These reactions are now part of the substance of history. What remains to be revealed is the manner in which the Japanese will shape their national destiny after initiative is restored to them by the withdrawal of the Allied forces of occupation.

The forecast made in *Japan in Defeat* has been justified to a remarkable extent by subsequent events, and on that account the basic study of Japanese history, character, and institutions which formed its premises is felt, when divested of its speculative component, to be of permanent value. In the first part of the present book, therefore, Mr Wakefield has revised and amended, in the light of events since the surrender, the material contained in the earlier study. He has then proceeded, in the second part, to describe wartime developments in Japan, the policies pursued by General MacArthur during the first eighteen months of Allied occupation, and the effect of these policies and of the impact of war upon the political, economic, and social life of the Japanese people.

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

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NEW PATHS FOR JAPAN

Toronto Bombay
Melbourne Wellington Cape Town
OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS

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by

HAROLD WAKEFIELD

with an Introduction by

SIR PAUL BUTLER, K.C.M.G.

Issued under the auspices of the
Institute of Pacific Relations
and the Royal Institute of International Affairs

London

ROYAL INSTITUTE
OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

[1948]

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

49239-2001

First published 1948

PRINTED IN GREAT BRITAIN
AT THE BROADWATER PRESS, WELWYN GARDEN CITY
HERTFORDSHIRE

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INTRODUCTION

by

SIR PAUL BUTLER, K.C.M.G.

THREE generations ago Japan emerged from more than two centuries of seclusion. Culturally too self-centred to realize that the progress which had passed her by had other than material value, she regarded herself as equipped forty years later to set forth upon what proved to be one of the most sensational and short-lived imperialist careers in history. In the following half-century, she became involved in five major wars and two military 'incidents'. Formosa, Korea, the Mandated Islands, Manchuria, a great part of China, and finally South-east Asia and the South-west Pacific were subjected, in rapid succession, to her control. Only for one half of that half-century did this restless Power remain at peace. Yet, during this tempestuous progress in which war, preparation for war, and natural calamities strained her energies and resources, she contrived to build up a State with the material attributes and a complete veneer of modern civilization; and to attain the acknowledged status of a great industrial Power. Surrender to the Allies in August 1945 closed the final, disastrous phase of a meteoric episode and this precocious Empire passed into instant dissolution. Japan herself made her exit from the international stage in a manner even more spectacular than that of her original appearance.

The two years which have elapsed since the end of the Pacific War have, however, made it abundantly clear that the mere fact of defeat cannot dispose of the Japanese problem, which continues to demand the urgent attention of the Governments and peoples of the democracies. Unless a regenerate Japan can be induced to regard herself as a nation among fellow-nations, and offered the reasonable and peaceful opportunities which that relationship entails, her dynamic and highly disciplined people may continue to be a source of unrest in a continent which still lacks the pillars of stability. Furthermore, the plight to which Eastern Asia has been reduced by the war and its calamitous aftermath has convinced experienced observers, many of whom might have been

reluctant earlier to admit such a contention, that the Japanese people possess qualities which, were it possible to strip off countervailing defects, would assuredly enable them to make an essential contribution to the welfare of their fellow Asiatics.

General MacArthur's administration of the Allied Occupation has achieved results which would have appeared almost incredible three years ago. He has shown great political insight in interpreting the initial instructions from the United States Government 'to use the existing form of Government, not to support it'. On the surface at least, defeat has been accepted with astonishing docility; the Japanese war machine has been destroyed; millions of Japanese combatants and civilians have been repatriated from overseas territories where their continued presence would have been a serious menace to security; hunger and disease have been held in check. Most important of all, the Japanese have been afforded the opportunity of gaining freedom of the person and of speech and thought, of protecting labour from exploitation, and of developing a democratic system of government under a new Constitution. With the conclusion of a peace treaty, however, a doorway will be opened for Japan's eventual re-admittance to international society. She can only become a respectable and useful member of that society if, after the removal of the screen provided by direct foreign control, the roots of the democratic ideal implanted by General MacArthur prove sufficiently strong to enable it to withstand the inclement weather which it is bound to encounter.

These are some of the reasons why it has been thought appropriate to revise, and to carry onward into the war and post-war periods, the survey entitled *Japan in Defeat*, which was published in 1945 under the auspices of the Royal Institute of International Affairs[1] and is now out of print. That survey was the outcome of the discussions of a small group of specialists on Japan. It represented an attempt to set the Japanese scene in perspective, giving its various features their appropriate emphasis and position; and, against this background, to suggest the consequences which then seemed likely to arise when the 'peerless national polity' of Japan had been destroyed, and her hitherto invincible forces had suffered overwhelming defeat.

The title of the present work has been suggested by the raising of the sights from the immediate impact of defeat to the future

[1] Oxford University Press.

which now confronts Japan. Part I consists, in the main, of the factual material contained in the 1945 prototype, after the excision of the comments and forecasts regarding Japan's reactions to defeat, which are now of course no longer relevant. Part II, which describes political, economic, and social happenings during the war and under Allied Occupation up to the summer of 1947, is altogether new.

Acknowledgement may appropriately be made here to the Institute of Pacific Relations, without whose financial support and encouragement *New Paths for Japan* could not have appeared. Inception of the book was, indeed, largely due to the initiative of the Secretary General of the Institute, who pointed out that, owing to the restricted issue which the paper shortage in the United Kingdom had imposed, only a few copies of *Japan in Defeat* had reached the American public. The present work is being published in an American as well as an English edition.

PART I. THE EVOLUTION OF MODERN JAPAN

CHAPTER I

The Throne and the Constitution

It is questionable whether the Emperors of Japan, since the opening of authentic history about the sixth century A.D., have ever exercised effective secular authority, except for brief intervals. In the earlier Nara and Heian periods they were frequently manipulated by noble families such as the Soga and Fujiwara but, until the establishment of the Shogunate at Kamakura in 1185, the administration was conducted at least with a semblance of imperial authority. Between 1185 and the Restoration in 1868, on the other hand, the temporal power of the Emperors was, apart from one brief and ill-starred attempt at its assertion, in complete eclipse, and even their sacerdotal functions were exercised in such deep seclusion that they ceased to influence the national spirit, except possibly during the episode of the Mongol invasions. It follows that the Emperors were afforded little or no opportunity to display outstanding abilities, even if heredity, long seclusion, and the trivial round of the mediaeval Japanese court did not preclude their development in most cases.

Notwithstanding the veneration with which they are supposed to be regarded, no nation has treated its sovereigns so cavalierly as the Japanese. Enforced abdication, often at an early age, was a common phenomenon for centuries; Emperors have been murdered; others have been exiled and died in exile; and it was the rule rather than the exception for the Kyoto court to be condemned to direst poverty. No strong protest is recorded as having been made by any class of the imperial subjects against the indignities heaped upon generation after generation of the Sons of Heaven. The history of Japan was punctuated for centuries by uprisings and revolts; one after another noble family seized power and relapsed into obscurity; vassals in their thousands died in battle or by their own hand in loyalty to a clan or factional leader.

Loyalty, so-called, and indiscipline were the alternating keynotes in this history. Sir George Sansom remarks: 'To promote

the fortunes of his own unit, the warrior would freely sacrifice a wider loyalty.'[1] He adds elsewhere that feudal discipline depended upon the power of an overlord to reward or punish. In these centuries, how did the habitually oppressed peasantry, always the mainstay of Japan, regard this situation? There were frequent peasant uprisings, sometimes reaching formidable proportions; but the stimulus to revolt was their own miseries and the oppression of overlords, not the plight of the Emperors. In general, devotion has always been to the dynasty, rather than to individual sovereigns, and the authors of rebellion have never contemplated the overthrow of the dynasty and its replacement by another, though there has been schism.

As to the priestly functions of the Emperors, notwithstanding their position as Manifest God, proclaimed in imperial rescripts as early as 700 A.D., they would seem between the eighth and the nineteenth centuries to have had little practical significance in the life of the nation. Sir George Sansom also remarks in his book that the religious was perhaps the most important aspect of the imperial functions; and that even in its darkest days, Shinto (and still less the primitive animism in which it had its roots) never completely decayed. Nevertheless, the Way of the Gods was overshadowed by Buddhism for many centuries, and perhaps maintained a precarious existence only through the Japanese propensity for compromise, manifesting itself in the synthesis of Shinto, Buddhism, and, to some extent, Confucianism.

Even allowing for this tolerant religious attitude, the Emperors themselves, by their fervent adoption of Buddhism between the sixth and the twelfth centuries, must have undermined their position as Deity and High Priest. The great shrines at Ise became essentially the family shrines of the Imperial House, and long ceased to be the repository of the national faith. This decay of the national faith, in whose pantheon the Emperors held high rank, brought the loss of temporal power as a natural consequence. The Japanese people ceased to rely, in seed time and harvest, upon the forlorn Manifest God.

It was not until the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, when the social order of the Tokugawa Shoguns was tottering to its fall, that political reformers like Norinaga Motoori and Yoshida Shoin discovered that successive dynasties of Shoguns had been

[1] G. B. Sansom, *Japan: A Short Cultural History* (London, Cresset Press, 1936), p. 341.

guilty of usurping the imperial prerogative, and reaffirmed after seven hundred years the divinity of the Emperors and the divine mission of the Japanese race. In the Restoration that followed in 1868, the imperial cause was carried to victory by the Satsuma and Choshu clans, ancient families who had never forgiven the presumption of the upstart Tokugawas or acquiesced unreservedly in their autocratic authority. The belated loyalty of these two clans paid them handsome dividends in prestige and authority which remained unchallenged until quite recent years and are still a powerful factor in the State. Instead of effecting a genuine re-establishment of imperial power, they manipulated its divine attributes to secure for their clans a power far greater and more intoxicating than that of the Tokugawas; the stakes they played for were world empire instead of dominion over an obscure feudal State.

In spite of what has been written above of the decay of Shinto during the Shogunates, there can be little doubt that the continued existence through the centuries of thousands of wayside Shinto shrines and the daily worship before the *kamidana* in countless peasant homes, kept open a channel for the revival of the spiritual and temporal influence of the divine Emperors. Even Confucianism played a part in this renewal of long-dormant tribal instincts by providing in the doctrine of Wangtao (Kingly Way) a thesis since elaborated as Kodo (Imperial Way).

The events of the years immediately preceding 1868 have been described as an 'incomplete revolution'.[1] The Emperor was brought from the shadows of Kyoto by the victorious Satsuma and Choshu clans, and restored in Tokyo to the position of temporal and spiritual head of the State which had been so long in abeyance that it had become legendary. This restoration was facilitated by the resignation of the fifteenth Tokugawa Shogun and the accession in 1867 of the Emperor Meiji at the plastic age of sixteen. It was inevitable that the young Emperor should come under the control of the two clans to which he owed his restoration, and that those clans should arrogate to themselves all substance of power in the Government and armed forces. No doubt in the first instance, imperial restoration appeared as little more than a handle for securing clan ascendancy. But the concentration of authority in these two clans was confirmed by the very high

[1] Hugh Byas, *Government by Assassination* (London, Allen & Unwin, 1934), p. 12.

level of ability and strength of character revealed by the statesmen and soldiers they produced at a great crisis of Japanese history. It is remarkable that, after two centuries of complete seclusion and a millenium of restricted intercourse with the outer world, Japan should have been able to face internal and external emergency with a galaxy of statesmen. And it is a phenomenon which may prove to have deep significance for the future. The greatest of the figures were Prince Ito and Prince Yamagata, though Marshal Oyama was to defeat the Russians at Mukden and Count Inouye, close supporter of Ito, was perhaps Japan's most successful Foreign Minister. After the conclusion of his active career, General Nogi was manœuvred by adroit propaganda into the position of a symbol of the high destiny and military valour of Japan; and his action in following his imperial master through suicide to the grave in obedience to the austere dictates of Japanese feudalism, exercised a profound influence upon the popular attitude towards the Throne and contributed to the establishment of the Meiji legend.

Prince Ito was the first and most conspicuous of those statesmen round the Throne whose enjoyment of imperial confidence was to provoke Japanese 'patriots' to successive deeds of assassination. By contrast, Yamagata was the militarist prototype, and even in co-operation the two men represented opposing policies. That Ito was, like all Japanese statesmen, an imperialist is certainly true; and the Constitution which he framed reveals him as a strong supporter of the imperial prerogative, with only very qualified faith in the application to Japan of democratic principles. In the early days of the Diet, he consistently contrived its dissolution whenever it came in conflict with his conception of the larger interests of the State; and he never hesitated to invoke censorship of press or speech. But within these limits, he possessed a sense of moderation and good timing. His ambitions and those of his school of thought were probably more limited in scope and more extended in period than those of the militarists, and he did not take the militarist view of war as an end in itself. His conviction that Japan should endeavour to pursue her national destiny without resort to war or excitement of international suspicion, may have been responsible for his strong advocacy in 1901 of alliance with Russia instead of Great Britain, notwithstanding the British atmosphere in which he had studied as a young man and his admiration for British political institutions. This detailed examination

of Ito's political faith is dictated by his great influence with the Emperor Meiji, who was accustomed to take no important decision without his advice.

If Ito formed the pattern for the succession of personal advisers to the Emperors, such as Count Chinda, Prince Saionji, Admiral Viscount Saito, Count Makino, and Mr Matsudaira, Prince Yamagata was the forerunner of a hierarchy of soldier-politicians. Among them were General Count Terauchi, first Governor-General of Korea and responsible as Prime Minister for the Siberian Expedition in 1918; General Baron Tanaka, Prime Minister and alleged author of the *Tanaka Memorial*; and finally the notorious General Tojo. Yamagata also fostered the type of political thuggery for which Japan has since become infamous, an instance being the murder of the Korean Queen in 1895. It is worth recording that the Navy usually supported more moderate civilian policies, and only joined forces with their traditional military rivals after the London Naval Conference of 1930.

Except during the abortive flowering of democratic ideals and party government in the nineteen-twenties, the forces of military aggression and reaction steadily gained ground at the expense of moderate civilian statesmanship after the death of Prince Ito in 1909. This had a number of causes, such as the Chinese Revolution in 1911, the abrogation of the Anglo-Japanese alliance in 1922, the decline of democracy in the West, the world depression, and the debasement of Japanese political morality, but the fact that Ito pre-deceased his militarist *genro* colleague by twelve years should also not be discounted. By the time the paramount influence of the two clans began to wane after the first world war, the Meiji Emperor was dead and had been succeeded by an imbecile, and it was too late for the reassertion of imperial authority. No one would question the devotion of the Emperor's personal advisers (proved as it has so often been by courageous indifference to assassination or threat of assassination), but the loyalty of the militarists followed the historic Japanese pattern, in that it usually attached to an immediate superior, or to the Army, rather than to the Emperor to whom fulsome lip-service was habitually paid. The Young Officers, who formed the spearhead of military revolt, claimed to be moved by the 'highest loyalty', and justified their insubordinate actions on the ground that the Emperor was being misled by his advisers. For instance, at his trial in 1936 for

the murder of Major-General Nagata, Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau in the War Office, Lieutenant-Colonel Aizawa declared that the rebellious Young Officers placed the Emperor above all, but the fact remains that they repeatedly attacked and murdered his most trusted advisers. And in this indiscipline they had the tacit, often indeed explicit, support of some of the highest officers in the Army, and the hysterical sympathy of a large element of the public. This resistance to supreme and hallowed authority, this devotion to a factional leader and cause, as opposed to the State and its head, is the strand which runs through recent Japanese history, as it did in past ages.

Turning now to the political influence and character of the post-Restoration Emperors, it must be recognized that the Meiji legend was to some degree of deliberate and posthumous creation. During the life-time of the Emperor Meiji the official inculcation of Emperor-worship had made very rapid headway with the masses. But the conception now generally held in Japan of this Emperor as a great and enlightened ruler, and the religious veneration paid to his rescripts and poems, has been heightened by an elaborate official build-up since his death; the task of the propagandists being much facilitated by the victorious wars against China and Russia, and the amazing advance in national prosperity and prestige achieved in his name by the statesmen of whom an account has been given above. It was patent also to intelligent Japanese that only intensive militarization and highly centralized authority had saved the nation from the fate of China or subjugation by Tsarist Russia. Nevertheless, it would be going too far to assume that, during a reign of forty-five years throughout which he was in constant consultation on affairs of great moment with talented and experienced statesmen such as Ito, Inouye, and Yamagata, the Emperor Meiji did not acquire appreciable political ability; and there are indications that he was permitted on some occasions to influence important policies.

The physical and mental disabilities of the Emperor Taisho (1912–26) did much to confirm the subjection of the Throne to militarist dictation and increased the difficulties of his personal advisers.

Coming then to the present reign, the Emperor Hirohito grew to manhood in an epoch when British political ideals were popular in Japan. In this period also (the first two decades of this century)

the influence of the personal advisers had not been seriously challenged. Japan was respected by, and valued the respect of foreign Powers, and democratic ideas seemed to be slowly gaining ground. It is probably true that the Emperor's education was designed to equip him to occupy a position more strictly constitutional than those of his predecessors. Thus the Emperor seems to be hard-working, methodical, and with a high sense of duty, but there is no indication that he possesses outstanding ability or originality of mind. In view of the relatively moderate personal influences to which he has been exposed, and the repeated and violent reaction against those influences of the militarists and extremists who instigated Japan's recent orgy of aggression and expansion, it seems reasonable to suppose that he disapproved of the policies which brought Japan into conflict with Great Britain and the United States. The Emperor is, however, a Japanese, and no doubt shared the imperialist obsessions of his subjects, even if unconvinced of his own divine attributes.

A few words about the Imperial Household Department seem here in place. The annual Civil List of 4·5 million yen remained unchanged for fifty years, but the Household Department was in fact a capitalist business organization, controlling vast forests and estates and large investments in Japanese enterprises, ranging from the Imperial Hotel in Tokyo to the Yawata Steel Works. It seems justifiable to assume that the imperial fortunes benefited financially through Japanese aggressions.

An intensive campaign was conducted after the Restoration, rising sharply in tempo after the Manchurian Incident, to establish as an article of faith in the Japanese people the myth of imperial divinity. Correspondingly, the sacerdotal functions of the Emperor were emphasized. Numerous instances of this could be cited, such as compulsory worship before the imperial portrait in schools and public offices; the tendency to give the Meiji rescripts the character of Holy Writ; the punctilious attendance of statesmen and generals (and also the public) at the imperial shrines at Ise in time of emergency or upon accepting office; and the appearance of pseudo-scientific treatises bolstering up the imperial myth. Associated with this campaign from a somewhat different angle was the establishment in great sanctity of the Yasukuni Shrine, hallowing the souls of those who have given their lives for the State and thus joined the throng of its protecting

deities. Militarists and members of reactionary societies have been particularly assiduous in detecting and denouncing acts or words remotely capable of being twisted into a sense derogatory to the Throne.

In this connection it is of interest to recall the case of Dr Minobe, the distinguished constitutional jurist, and member of the House of Peers by imperial nomination, who as far back as 1923 had published a treatise propounding the theory that although the Emperor is the embodiment of the State, his sovereignty is to be regarded as power, rather than right in the legal sense, and must be exercised under the safeguards of the Constitution. This was opposed to the orthodox view of Japanese sovereignty as residing in the Emperor, who is above and independent of the organs of State. Under this orthodox interpretation the Constitution was granted to the nation not as of right, but as an act of divine benevolence on the part of the Emperor. For many years these views had not hindered Dr Minobe from being regarded with the highest esteem by the Emperor and his fellow-countrymen, until in 1935 reactionary peers and officers of the General Staff discovered that his teachings were disloyal and made him the victim of judicial persecution.[1] Not only Dr Minobe, but those who studied under him were dismissed from teaching posts, and finally Dr Minobe was shot at and wounded.

Intelligent Japanese do not accept the tribal myths of a divine Emperor and racial mission at their face value, but, like the rest of their fellow-countrymen, they have now learnt by harsh experience to conform outwardly lest worse betide. No popular protest seems to have been raised in 1908 when Professor Kume compiled a more rational imperial chronology, in which the accession of the first Emperor Jimmu was advanced from 660 B.C. to 24 B.C. and a number of the more glaring inconsistencies in the *Kojiki* and *Nihongi* were ironed out. In recent years the professor would have laid himself open to criminal proceedings. The attitude of the semi-educated may be described as *credo quia absurdum*. To this one might add the Japanese propensity for accepting any official parrot-cry provided it is repeated with sufficient frequency. So far as the peasants and other unsophisticated classes are concerned, there is little doubt that the myths were often sincerely

[1] See A. J. Toynbee, *Survey of International Affairs*, 1935 (London, Oxford University Press, 1936), Vol. i, pp. 314–15.

accepted. In general it may be said of the Japanese that, even where belief in the tribal myths officially foisted upon them was insincere or artificial, they accepted as an article of faith the supreme importance and superiority of their race; and the Emperor at its head was the highest living being of whom they could conceive. So far as the association of the Throne with militarism is concerned, it is only in modern times that the Emperor has been built up as a military figure, and the conception of the head of the State as commander-in-chief is in the European rather than the Japanese tradition. As to imperial divinity, the word has not the same significance in Japan as in the West; it connotes connection and kinship with the life that lies behind all material manifestations, but it has little moral significance. The sacerdotal functions of the Emperor were only revived at the Restoration after remaining in abeyance for seven hundred years.

It is unquestionable that these officially fostered delusions, by feeding the inordinate vanity of a people already unbalanced and bewildered by too sudden emergence from feudalism to the status of a great Power at a critical period in history, have been one of the main causes of Japan's hectic career of aggression. They have manifested themselves in a raucous assertion of superiority and, combined with long seclusion and the barriers presented by language and geography, have brought about a dangerous sense of 'apartness' from the fellowship of mankind. They have enabled militarist reactionaries to stifle the feeble voice of democracy and national conscience, and screen their crimes behind a divine prerogative. Before Japan can become a sane and regenerate member of the family of nations, these incompatible delusions must disappear in the humiliation of military defeat and the fresh air of free speech and thought.

The function of the Emperor's personal advisers was to ensure that he received an unprejudiced view on matters of State, which might not be submitted to him except in the presence of the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal or some other senior member of his staff. Their moderating influence explains the fury with which they were attacked by the Young Officers. The present Emperor's advisers have not equalled those of his grandfather in political sagacity, and their ranks have been thinned by assassination and advancing age. In the strict sense of the term, the personal advisers included the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal, the Minister of the

Imperial Household, the Grand Master of the Ceremonies, and perhaps the President of the Privy Council; but the circle tended to widen, and came to include some other members of the Privy Council and former Prime Ministers who acquired some degree of *genro* status.

It is well to reflect, however, that the 'makers of modern Japan' were probably not flood-lighted during the last years of the Shogunate. The emergency (and to contemporary observers it may have appeared scarcely less formidable than that which confronts Japan after defeat) produced the men. It may be, therefore, that, undaunted by the catastrophe that has overtaken their country, an entirely new group of statesmen will take the stage; and since the Japanese tendency is likely to be to discard what has failed them and adopt what has proved stronger, this group may even have an extreme socialist complexion, but their brand of socialism would probably be indigenous to Japan and bear little resemblance to Western models.

This survey would not be complete without a reference to the Japanese Constitution of 1889. This was the creation of Prince Ito (himself a staunch upholder of the imperial divine status and prerogative) on the model of the archaic Prussian Constitution of 1850, at a time when the political education of the Japanese people was even more immature than at present. A most important provision was embodied in the preamble to the effect that amendment to the Constitution could only be initiated by the Emperor,[1] and the influence of reaction, in practice, precluded any amendment. Article XI invested the Emperor with supreme command of the Army and Navy; and Article XII provided that he should determine the organization and peace standing of the forces.[2] These prerogatives were much extended and abused in practice, and the system under which they were exercised through the Chiefs of Staff and Service Ministers had no express sanction in the text of the Constitution. In the opinion of Dr Takeuchi '. . . the system constitutes an important exception to, if not a violation of, the basic principles of constitutional government, and . . . a new system of civilian control of military affairs might be instituted without amendment of the Constitution.'[3]

[1] See N. Matsunami, *The Constitution of Japan* (Tokyo, 1930), p. 18.
[2] ibid., p. 134.
[3] Tatsuji Takeuchi, *War and Diplomacy in the Japanese Empire* (London, Allen & Unwin, 1935), p. 15.

In the London Naval Agreement of 1930, Mr Hamaguchi's Cabinet actually had the temerity to assert this civilian control, and the precedent might have led to the natural death of a pernicious system, had not the Manchurian Incident supervened shortly afterwards. Similarly, the 'dual system' whereby the two Chiefs of Staff (and by later extension the Service Ministers) had direct access to the Emperor, without the necessity of consulting or even informing the Cabinet, did not rest on the Constitution and had from time to time been the target of strong public criticism. Other extra-constitutional and reactionary excrescences were the system which prescribed that the Service Ministers must be generals or admirals on the active list; and the power gradually acquired by the Privy Council to override the Diet and interfere in the execution of policy.

These causes, combined with the political immaturity of the Japanese electorate (to which manhood suffrage was nominally extended in 1925), reduced the Diet to virtual impotence in the nineteen-thirties. As already noted, Dr Minobe (who was by no means alone in his criticisms of the Constitution) wrote a book in 1923 contending, in opposition to the school of imperial absolutism founded by Prince Ito, that sovereignty resides in the State, and that the Emperor is an organ of the State. That the Emperor bestowed high honours upon the author of these views, and that the public only discovered after a lapse of twelve years, and under the stimulus of nationalist propaganda, that they were disloyal, suggest that the opposition evoked was somewhat artificial. On repeated occasions during this century, the operation of the Constitution demonstrated that its revision and re-interpretation were essential if a satisfactory relationship was to be created between Japan and foreign States, and if the Japanese people were to be given an opportunity to develop the institutions of freedom.

CHAPTER II

The Armed Forces

SIR GEORGE SANSOM says of Minamoto Yoriyoshi, who flourished at the end of the eleventh century:

> 'He may be taken as the first of a line of great captains who, after displacing the civilian power and overthrowing their military rivals, were for centuries to dominate Japan. With him began a definite cult of the war-god Hachiman, and from his day there began to develop a distinct caste, with its own traditions, its own code of morals, and indeed of law.'[1]

The *samurai* developed a code of behaviour which has come to be known, particularly outside Japan, as *bushido*. The essence of *bushido,* as of every feudal code, is loyalty and courage. Japanese moral teaching, which is largely anecdotal, is full of stories of loyalty in which the *samurai* sacrifices not only himself but his family to the needs of his lord. However, throughout Japan's history there have been instances of treachery at least as striking as the instances of loyalty, but the Japanese moralists do not emphasize them.

In the thirteenth century the warrior class in Japan adopted a form of Buddhism which exactly suited their needs, and Zen Buddhism has ever since continued to influence the social and aesthetic life of the Japanese. Zen, like most important contributions to Japanese culture, came from China, and it has a tenuous connection with Indian Yoga. It makes intuition the basis of right conduct. It is difficult to discuss for the same reasons that modern surrealism is hard to discuss. When we turn our back upon logic we find difficulty in expressing ourselves at all, since words themselves are instruments of logical thought. The Zen Buddhists, in place of logical thought, offer endless eccentric stories which are intended to enlighten any one who meditates on them without attempting to reason. The system lends itself admirably to the needs of the soldier, who has neither interest in nor capacity for intricate metaphysical reasoning. The *samurai* found that Zen

[1] op. cit., p. 257.

justified him in having 'no second thought', no instant of hesitation in the flow of action from its stimulus to its completion. If he drew his sword he must use it. This training, as might be expected, sometimes developed a lofty character, inner harmony, and restrained strength, but often it gave licence to impulse and irresponsible conduct.

A *samurai* must overcome the desire for life, and Zen helped him in this. Similarly, he must not fix his thoughts on victory. Spiritual harmony must be cultivated and the soldierly skills will come with it. Even in national sports, especially fencing and archery, this mental attitude was cultivated. Not only soldiers, but the youth of the country were encouraged, in the ethical training which always accompanied national sports, to rid the mind of anxiety.[1] It is psychologically of great interest that the Japanese, who specially want to succeed and feel peculiar anguish in defeat, whether in war or tennis, should set themselves these difficult standards.

An important consequence of training to overcome the desire for life is the determination of the Japanese soldier not to surrender in war. In Japan's many civil wars surrender was rare (partly because the Japanese have usually been merciless to prisoners), but not unknown. In recent years soldiers have been taught that they must in no circumstances surrender. If taken when unconscious they must commit suicide.[2] The refusal to surrender was not entirely due to military virtue, for Japanese soldiers often committed suicide rather than fight to the end, but it is true—to use their phrase—they 'count death lighter than a feather'.

Zen has been a factor in this conquest by the soldier of the fear of death, the more advanced practitioners in this philosophy setting standards for others. A man who has overcome the strongest impulse we have, the impulse to live, will either become an exceptionally selfless character or, in losing the sense of the value of his own life, will lose all sense of the value of life itself. This happened in Japan. The *samurai* tradition produced many noble characters, but in far greater number it produced men insensitive to suffering. In recent years the Japanese Army has appreciated the

1 '"He that will lose his life, the same shall save it" is not a piece of mysticism for saints and heroes. It is a piece of everyday advice for sailors or mountaineers.'—G. K. Chesterton, *Orthodoxy* (London, Bodley Head, 1927), p. 169.

2 The final mass surrender in 1945 was in obedience to the supreme imperative, the Emperor's command.

military value of this insensibility and has deliberately brutalized its recruits. It has often been said, and it is probably true, that recruits were forced into acts of atrocity to harden them. In the relations between officers and men there was both confidence and brutality. It was common for a soldier to be beaten by the authority above him, yet at the same time the officers usually had a strong sense of responsibility for their men.

Zen was also responsible for encouraging the cult of the sword in Japan. The sword of the *samurai* is the centre of countless moral anecdotes. The Japanese are extremely proud of the quality their blades have possessed for seven hundred years or more, and they are forged in conditions of religious austerity and with Shinto ritual of purification. The Japanese always found a satisfaction in the use of the sword, particularly in the cutting off of heads and for ceremonial suicide.[1] In 1938 the most important and responsible newspapers in Japan reported as a sporting test a competition between two lieutenants in China in which each tried to be the first to kill a hundred Chinese with his sword. Near Kyoto there is a mound where there are believed to be buried some 30,000 ears and noses brought as a trophy of Hideyoshi's unsuccessful invasion of Korea at the end of the sixteenth century.

The *samurai* regarded himself as the ideal type of Japanese, and the nation as a whole accepted that valuation. His exploits are woven into history, drama, and story, and the philosophy of Zen has penetrated the aesthetic life of the nation. No assessment of Japanese military tradition can be complete unless this is taken into full account.

Although, in the feudal age preceding the Restoration of 1868, there existed in Japan no national army and navy owing allegiance to the Emperor, popular veneration for martial qualities was fostered during the centuries of isolation through the *samurai* code. With the recognition of the bearing of arms as an aristocratic privilege, the cleavage deepened between the submissive masses and the few whose title it was to command. Superiority of the military caste thus became part of the national structure long

[1] See Morgan Young, *The Rise of a Pagan State* (London, Allen and Unwin, 1939), chapter iii, 'The Japanese as head-hunters'. The use of the sword or knife for suicide, however, is much less popular in Japan than is widely supposed. Of nearly 18,000 suicides in 1936 fewer than 500 were by 'edged weapons', and the figures for earlier years are about the same. As for the incidence of suicide, an interesting comparison is with the United States, which, with twice Japan's population, had fewer than 14,000 suicides in 1943.

before clan allegiance gave place to allegiance to the Emperor, and while military exploits were still tribal rather than patriotic in character. The qualities of courage and implicit loyalty to a leader, and the duty of the warrior to sell his life dearly rather than surrender, were exalted at the same early stage into a mystical code.

The doctrines of Motoori Norinaga and Yoshida Shoin in the eighteenth and mid-nineteenth centuries thus had no novelty for the Japanese, in so far as they related to the military virtues. For the soldier, clan loyalty was to be merged in a more comprehensive national loyalty, and allegiance was to be transferred from the feudal lord to the divine successor in an eternal and unbroken line of commanders-in-chief. In their call for recognition of the imperial prerogative over the armed forces, and their emphasis on territorial expansion, these doctrines were the seed which yielded the militarism and imperialism of the post-Restoration epoch. After periods of struggle and occasional setbacks, it was destined to bear fruit in a succession of predatory adventures on the adjacent mainland; and finally to wither in an abortive and megalomaniac attempt to establish Japanese hegemony throughout Eastern Asia.

Intimate association of the armed forces with the Emperor and the national Shinto cult, and the enforcement of conscription were the means through which the *Kogun* (Imperial Army and Navy) was raised to a unique position in Japanese national life during the fifty years following the Restoration. In adopting the conscript system which had proved its efficiency in the German victory over France in 1870–1, the Meiji statesmen showed that traditional respect for material success which has been characteristic of Japan's expansionist career. Nevertheless, it would be unreasonable to ascribe this militarist innovation purely to aggressive design. Without the creation of strong imperial armaments, the Restoration Government might have found it difficult either to liquidate the lingering semi-independent pretensions of the feudal chiefs, or to preserve the national integrity in a period when European Powers were energetically expanding their territorial and other interests in Asia.

The new military system was only four years old when, in 1877, its strength was demonstrated by the victory of the Imperial Army over the rebel Satsuma clan. This served to establish the *Kogun* in popular estimation, and to secure for it recognition as an

institution more intimately linked to the imperial virtue, and consequently less subject to criticism, than other organs in the State. The Meiji Emperor's Rescript to Soldiers and Sailors of 1881, the promulgation of the Constitution in 1889, and an uninterrupted series of victories abroad, watered the soil in which this seed was sown, until the seed itself flowered in the emotion approaching worship with which the Emperor's Army and Navy came in later years to be regarded by his subjects.

The military and naval successes (or successes due directly to the possession of armed might), which followed the establishment of imperial forces on a conscript basis, convinced even the less chauvinist among the Japanese that the policy of adopting the militarist features of Western civilization had been amply justified. By grace, as it seemed, of a divine leader and a divine mission combined with transcendent racial characteristics, Japanese fighting men surpassed those of the West in courage, devotion, and efficiency. This conviction deepened as triumph over Russia followed triumph over China, as Formosa and Korea were won for the Empire, and as participation in the first world war yielded rich dividends unattended by sacrifice.

Though the prestige of the Services receded to some extent during the brief flowering of liberal ideas in the nineteen-twenties, foreign opposition to Japanese aggression in Manchuria and China stimulated a xenophobic resolution to substitute force for pacific diplomacy, and enabled the military leaders to arouse popular enthusiasm for a programme of territorial expansion which culminated in 1941 in the Pacific War. In the sixty-eight years between the introduction of conscription and the attack on Pearl Harbour, Japan had sustained no purely military reverses; and, although by the end of this period the recalcitrance of the unmartial Chinese may have aroused vague misgivings, it had become a settled Japanese conviction that military operations overseas must necessarily prove a paying proposition. Suggestions from the democratic West that imperialist nationalism was out of harmony with modern tendencies could be countered by Japanese militarists with accusations of Western 'insincerity', and their arguments gained strength from the obstacles which had been placed in the way of Japanese trade and emigration, and from the political developments abroad of the decade following Japan's resignation from the League of Nations.

The Armed Forces

For more than sixty years after the Meiji Rescript of 1881 the conception of the Emperor as the fountain-head of military virtue and as the father of the soldiers and sailors, which is the theme of that rescript, was preached incessantly in and out of the forces. It was adopted as the basis of the *seishin kyoiku* (spiritual training) of the soldier and sailor and extended to the relationship between every officer and his subordinates, with the object of convincing the latter that they had for General the earthly representative of the Godhead, and for Captain a divinely appointed leader. Without the impetus provided by this association of the Services with the divine virtue of which the Emperor was the earthly custodian, it is improbable that they would have become, as they did, an obsession of the national imagination. Such ideals could not thrive where a democratic spirit existed, but the degree to which they were sincerely held and acted upon in Japan can hardly be overestimated. It is perhaps for this reason that, although uneasiness at military encroachment upon the sphere of civil authority did exist among the intelligentsia, the bureaucracy, and in business circles in the early nineteen-thirties, there has never been in Japan the widespread popular fear of that encroachment which has constituted such a powerful deterrent to military pretensions in the Western democracies. To the same cause may be ascribed the traditional military attitudes of opposition to representative institutions, and of aloofness from the civil powers, which have been such a fertile source of reaction.

The prerogative of the Emperor as the supreme commander of the Army and Navy was defined in Articles XI and XII of the Japanese Constitution of 1889. No mention is made there of the channels through which that prerogative is to be exercised, but the general form of the Constitution, as well as contemporary evidence, indicate that its framers had no intention of placing control over military matters in the hands of the civil government. The imperial ordinances which accorded to the Chiefs of the Army and Navy General Staffs the right of direct access to the Emperor (on matters of grave importance within their competence) were contemporaneous with the Constitution. The other mainstay of military independence from civil control (the rule that the Ministers of War and Marine should be full generals or admirals on the active list) was not embodied in an ordinance until 1894; but the practice had always been followed before that

date, and, in spite of a temporary modification in 1912 to include officers on the reserve list, it has never been deviated from until Japan's collapse. The other channels of advice to the Emperor (the Board of Marshals and Admirals of the Fleet, the Supreme Military Council, and, in wartime, Imperial General Headquarters) were all composed of military and naval officers, though their deliberations were by no means confined to service affairs.

The association of the State Shinto cult, and of the Emperor as its high priest, with the armed forces was to some extent a political device designed to exalt the prestige of the latter in popular imagination. But the Shinto religion above all embodies those principles which Japanese soldiers and sailors are taught, and which are intended to be exemplified by their conduct in battle. Through the doctrines of the supreme importance of loyalty and obedience, of the insignificance of the individual life, of the undying shame of surrender, and of the immortality among the tutelary spirits of Japan reserved for those who die in battle, the fighting man has been provided with a unique ethical background. It was with the object of impregnating the national imagination with these doctrines that the Yasukuni Shrine in Tokyo was sedulously enveloped in the hallowed atmosphere of a national pantheon. This extravagant code of moral principles, which finds no parallel in other countries, protected the Japanese soldier from the moral conflicts which are apt in war to beset the believer in a universal religion. Rigid training in these beliefs, together with a life of great austerity, has produced the type of valour ('human bombs', deliberate crashing of aircraft on enemy targets, suicide in preference to surrender, and so forth) which has come to be regarded as typical of the Japanese conscript.

The close integration of the conscript forces with the national structure ensured acceptance of their ideals of military virtue by a great majority of the people. These ideals were upheld by the three million members of the Ex-Servicemen's Association and taught intensively in all schools throughout the Empire. Propaganda, either carried out directly by the military authorities (in the form of pamphlets, films and lectures, ceremonies accompanying the entrance of recruits into military life, and enshrinement of fallen heroes in the national pantheon), or indirectly by the stream of time-expired conscripts returning each year to their homes, assisted this process of indoctrination.

The Armed Forces

Frequent use has been made by the armed forces of their privileged constitutional position to impose their views on military or quasi-military matters upon Japanese Cabinets, and to secure the approval of the Diet for expenditure which they have regarded as necessary in the national interest. For some time, it is true, the Meiji Edict restricting the intervention of military men in politics was generally respected; but dissatisfaction with the maintenance by diplomatic means of Japanese prestige abroad, and sympathy with the economic plight of the peasantry, provoked an increasing degree of political agitation by military groups, and the edict was ingeniously explained away. Though the Navy has in general been more restrained than the Army in political intervention, its influence is constantly at work behind the scenes and was forcefully exerted in connection with the London and Washington Naval Treaties. It is noteworthy, however, that in most of the instances in which the constitutional conflict between the civil powers and the Services came to the surface, the issues were solved by compromise. By adopting the device of demanding in the first instance more than they actually expected to obtain, or by accepting formal modifications provided they gained the substance of their demands, the service authorities usually avoided endangering their position by such a stubborn exercise of their power as to dislocate the machinery of government.

Agitation and assassination have been the methods by which a maze of reactionary civilian leagues and officers' associations have given expression to the Army's political aspirations. It is sufficient to say here of these organizations that in general the less extreme have tended to give way to the more extreme; and that their members have combined muddled economic theory and high ideals with a practice or toleration of violence and murder which has never been equalled in the West. In fact these societies exemplify the Japanese national conviction that the 'pure heart' justifies the means. Some of their political beliefs, however, notably the advocacy of a restoration of primitive imperial rule and of the creation of a kind of peasant aristocracy, are probably representative of the desires of the inarticulate majority in the armed forces.

The design of such factions has been to discredit the Western democracies for their alleged 'insincerity', the advisers of the Throne for their short-sighted timidity, the Zaibatsu for their cupidity, and the professional politicians for their venality. This

has proved an effective appeal to the public, who have shown readiness to tolerate indiscipline and outrage on the part of members of the armed forces, provided they are concealed under an idealistic cloak, and to ignore the instances of corruption revealed from time to time within those forces themselves.

With the disappearance of the *samurai* tradition of feudal times the officer class was much diluted, and commissions in the Services were mainly held by men from small bourgeois and farming circles. The officers were paid very little and their lives were almost as austere and frugal as those of their men. These facts lent colour to a superficial notion that a spirit of democracy existed in the forces which was lacking elsewhere. This idea was mistaken, for the conditions mentioned existed within an elaborate hierarchy which was the reverse of democratic, and which was based upon the conception of a paternal relationship between each individual and his immediate inferior.

It is true that the poverty of the officers, and the extent to which they, like the men under their command, were recruited from the peasantry, induced a strong sympathy in the Army and Navy with the agrarian community. But negative control of 'dangerous thought' (which included democratic thought in the Western sense) had long been enforced in the Services as a parallel to positive spiritual training in loyalty and obedience.

Foreign observers have sometimes thought that the apparent independence of the General Staff and War Department in Tokyo, which was shown on occasions by Japanese forces in Manchuria and elsewhere overseas, was indicative of a tendency towards decentralization and of a reversion to factional allegiance in the Army. Cases of independent action undoubtedly occurred, and at crucial times. Instances are the Manchurian border warfare with the Russians between 1934 and 1939 and the earlier developments in the Manchurian Incident in 1931 and the war with China in 1937. It seems probable, however, that these incidents resulted not from any lack of unity of control, but from a recourse by the Army as a whole to the expedient (characteristic both of Japan in her dealings with foreign countries and of her Army in its dealings with the Government) of taking a desired but unorthodox step in the hope that, at the worst, only partial withdrawal would be necessary, and that, at the best, force of circumstances might render any withdrawal impossible. In the instances mentioned above,

it was no doubt convenient for the military authorities in Tokyo to be able to assure the Cabinet (and for the latter to feign belief) that the local commanders had exceeded their powers. The whole procedure was typically Japanese. So far as the Kwantung Army was concerned, frequent transfers of units and changes of command had always taken place, and the possibility of the force becoming divorced in sympathies and action from the rest of the Japanese Army was not one that had ever been seriously considered by the military leaders in Tokyo. Indeed, most of the latter themselves served for the usual short period in Manchuria.

CHAPTER III

Religious and Moral Ideas

THE strongest influences in the Chinese culture which, either directly or through Korea, brought civilization to Japan from the fourth or fifth century onward, were those of Confucianism and Buddhism. In earlier times the evidence of archaeology, language, Chinese literary sources, and social survivals indicates a simple animist religion in which a spiritual quality was attached to countless objects and natural phenomena. The Japanese still have some vestiges of animism in their feeling for commonplace objects such as a needle or sandal, and Dr Nitobe quotes a modern Shinto priest as saying: 'Anything that has served a man's use, especially when he has treasured or liked it, partakes of his spirit.'[1] The simplicity of Japan's ancient beliefs was reflected in elementary moral and intellectual ideas. The sense of sin seems to have been associated with conventional pollution and removed by ritual purification. There is sufficient evidence in their attitude to the dead to indicate belief in some form of survival, but the veneration of ancestors came later under the Chinese influence. The native Japanese religion lacks the element of fear that might be expected in a country subject to frequent and varied natural disasters; and the origins of an appreciation of nature, which remains to-day an attractive national characteristic, may perhaps be discerned in the dim past. The intellectual concomitant was an unsophisticated interpretation of creation mingled with deification of the main forces and processes of nature, and framed against a background of national mythology. In some of these myths the sun was of special significance, but the Japanese were not sun-worshippers. There was a priesthood with specialized functions, for instance some were ritualists and others 'abstainers'. On this frail web of childlike folk beliefs, with a priesthood of diviners, ritualists, and 'abstainers', came the enormous twin impact of Buddhism and Confucianism, endorsed by the dazzling prestige of Chinese civilization.

Reading and writing, art, craftsmanship, and advanced ideas of political organization accompanied the new religious and philo-

[1] *Lectures on Japan* (Tokyo, Kenkyusha, 1936), p. 150. Possibly our own sentiment for trifles that have meant much to us is not far removed from this.

sophical systems. In one important aspect, however, the intellectual revolution did not present Japan with the drastic alternative between old and new that Christianity or Mohammedanism would have brought. In China the loftiest philosophical conceptions existed side by side with a profusion of folk gods and folk superstitions; and Japan, like China and also India, chose to accommodate these extremes. It has been found possible to comprehend Confucianism, Buddhism, nationalist Shinto, and folk Shinto without any sense of incongruity.[1] There was some opposition to the introduction of Buddhism and this has recurred at intervals, but generally there has been less antagonism between Buddhism and Shinto than between different schools of Buddhism. The earliest sources in native documents for the study of Shinto, published early in the eighth century, incorporated work done under the auspices of Sogaino Umako and Shotoku Taishi, outstanding protagonists of Buddhism, who had lived about a century earlier. The laws enacted by Shotoku Taishi in 604 A.D., claiming that supremacy for the Emperor which forms the essential doctrine of nationalist Shinto, were in fact based on Confucian thought. The measure of administrative centralization attempted later in the same century—the Taikwa reforms—again rested on Chinese examples. The first known use of the word 'Shinto' occurs in the following passage from the early eighth century chronicle, the *Nihongi:* 'The Emperor believes in the Law of Buddha and reveres Shinto.'[2] The formal adjustment of Shinto to Buddhism was made early in the history of Japanese Buddhism by identifying Shinto deities with Buddhist saints. It is reflected in the following confession of faith attributed to Professor Kanitake Kume:

> 'I turn to the Shinto priest in case of public festival, while the Buddhist priest is my ministrant for funeral services. I regulate my conduct according to Confucian maxims and Christian morals. I care little for external forms and doubt whether there are any essential differences in the *Kami's* eyes between any of the religions of the civilized world.'[3]

[1] 'The modern Buddhist in China or Japan who shows respect to deities either native or Indian, can easily justify himself from the ancient scriptures.' Sir Charles Eliot, *Japanese Buddhism* (London, Edward Arnold & Co., 1935), pp. 57–8.

[2] D. C. Holtom, *The National Faith of Japan* (London, Kegan Paul, 1938), p. 14. The Emperor referred to is Yomei Tenno, 585–7 A.D.

[3] *Fifty Years of New Japan*, edited by Count Okuma (London, Smith, Elder & Co., 1909). vol. ii, p. 41.

The fact that Christianity and Mohammedanism would not accommodate themselves to this large way of thinking may account for the slow progress of Christianity in Japan and the absence of any significant Moslem community. Christian concepts of the inherent value of the individual, of the essential brotherhood of mankind, and of the existence of universal, as opposed to tribal, standards of right and wrong, were found to be in direct conflict with the Japanese conception of life. Christian teaching had been denounced as 'dangerous thought' as early as the sixteenth century. At that time Portuguese and Spanish missionaries achieved a very considerable success in Japan; several of the territorial nobility were converted with all their *samurai*. It is interesting to note that Japanese Christians at that time showed themselves to be very sincere in their faith; thousands were martyred, while their descendants secretly retained some vestiges of the faith down to modern times. Among the reasons which led the Tokugawa to forbid its teaching and to persecute its followers, was undoubtedly the fear that the whole Japanese system would be undermined. Nevertheless, in modern times the Japanese were obliged to allow foreign nations to send Christian missionaries to Japan, and Christian missions played a large part in educational and humanitarian work. The building up of State Shinto was doubtless considered to be a sufficient check on widespread conversions. It can, however, be said that Christian principles have had a considerable influence on the upper middle-class in Japan, and that in modern times their influence has been much wider than would be expected from the insignificant number of professed Christians. There were 300,000 before the late war (of whom about one-third were Roman Catholic)[1] and this is thought to be about the same as in the sixteenth century when the total population was probably only a third the size.

It is a strange fact that the earliest important accounts of Shinto beliefs that have survived, including an elaborate falsification of Japanese history in the interests of the ruling families, were published in the eighth century in the climate of Chinese thought and under Buddhist auspices. Similarly, the second major fabrication of Japan's history, reaffirming in the nineteenth century her divine origins, leadership, and mission, was not inconsistent with Confucianism, or indeed with the contemporary imperialism of

[1] *The Far East Year Book* (Tokyo, The Far East Year Book Inc.), 1941, p. 113.

Christian States. This 'invention of a new religion', as Professor Basil Hall Chamberlain called the nineteenth century fabrication, which has proved such an important incentive to aggression, was the culmination of a movement that can be plainly discerned in the eighteenth century. The Tokugawa Shoguns, under whom Japan enjoyed peace from the beginning of the seventeenth to the middle of the nineteenth century, encouraged Chinese studies congenial to the orderly and conventional society which they wished to perpetuate. Confucianism, however, while its teaching of filial piety, decorous behaviour, and closely defined obligations of every social group, suits Japanese thought, has not restrained the social energy of the Japanese. The Tokugawa attempt to maintain static political and social conditions frustrated the forces of feudal ambition, mercantile enterprise, and intellectual curiosity, while the peasantry, which might have been the mainstay of a conservative régime, was recklessly exploited in the interests of the towns and was aware of the injustice. The restlessness which resulted from the converging grievances and ambitions of these various classes naturally found both a political and an intellectual outlet. Even Confucian thought spread into speculation as to whether motive was more important than manners. Ardent nationalism was fostered by historians who looked eagerly back to the colourful time before the centuries of tedious peace. These scholars found that the Emperor was the rightful ruler, and that the Shoguns were usurping his prerogatives. Many of these nationalists were contemptuous of Chinese thought, but when the turmoil subsided and the Emperor was, in 1868, restored at least nominally to the supremacy claimed for him, the conception of a benevolent monarch with sage counsellors owed as much to Confucianism as to Shinto.

The two strands of folk belief and nationalist myth are easy for the foreigner to distinguish, but are probably inextricably intertwined for most Japanese. The tribal faith, described in the eighth-century documents and given fresh currency in modern times, has encouraged the people to work and fight devotedly for leaders who identified the country's destiny with their interests, convictions, or passions. It was a shield against disunity, and since Japan appeared to be in danger of foreign domination in the nineteenth century, the falsehood had a genuine patriotic appeal. Neither in the eighth nor the nineteenth century was the motive for the

fabrication of tribal religion simple or wholly ignoble. It was, none the less, an astounding feat to reimpose on a literate people a childlike myth expressed with naïve sexual imagery. The account of Japanese origins, taught in all schools until the surrender in 1945, is taken from the old chronicles and, subject to small variations, is as follows: The present Emperor is the direct descendant, names of intervening ancestors being exactly set down, of the Sun Goddess, who was born from the left eye of a god who stood on the 'Bridge of Heaven',[1] dipped his jewelled spear into the sea, and created the islands of Japan from the drops which fell from it. The Sun Goddess had a tiresome brother who teased her until she withdrew into a cave and darkness fell upon the world. To entice her from it, a multitude of gods gathered round the cave making merry, and when she asked why they were rejoicing, they told her they had found somebody fairer than she. Peeping out, she saw her reflection in an eight-sided mirror that was held up in front of her. She emerged and the sun shone again upon the world. The fifth in direct descent from this goddess was Jimmu, who was established by her on the throne of Japan on 11 February 660 B.C. Among other national treasures, the Sun Goddess gave Jimmu the mirror, which is alleged to be preserved at the Grand Shrine at Ise near Nagoya, the most hallowed spot in Japan.[2]

It is difficult to be sure whether the Japanese regarded the Emperor as a god in our sense of the word. The Japanese word *kami* is used for a variety of superior beings from gods in the pagan sense to the late Mitsuru Toyama, the famous organizer of patriotic terror. For eleven hundred years after the claims of the Emperor to divinity were set out, he was treated very much as the Merovingian monarchs were treated by the Mayors of the Palace, and, like the European *rois fainéants*, he was regarded as in some sense a national mascot. The dynasty is certainly ancient, having continued from the early centuries of the Christian era until now,

[1] Possible explanations: the rainbow; the boats in which early immigrants came; the current assisting the immigrants in a journey from the south.

[2] A sidelight is thrown on the modern Japanese attitude to the myth by the following incident. On the day the Meiji Constitution was promulgated, 11 February 1889, the Minister of Education, Viscount Arinori Mori, was among the visitors at the Shrine. He touched a curtain with a walking-stick. Whether he did this out of curiosity or by accident cannot be known, for he was at once stabbed and killed by a priest, who was in turn killed by the Viscount's friends. The memory of the priest is still held in honour because of his promptitude in avenging an affront to the Sun Goddess sixty years ago.

but the Japanese, adopting a faked genealogy, claim that the dynasty extends back in unbroken line for 2,600 years to the Emperor Jimmu, and from him back to the age of the gods.

In order to gauge the modern Japanese outlook, some account of Buddhism as it arrived and developed in Japan seems requisite. Buddhism as taught in India by Gautama had travelled far before it reached Japan, and in the process gathered a variety of extraneous elements into itself. The Buddhism which reached Japan is termed *Mahayana* or the Greater Vehicle, as opposed to the primitive Buddhism of Ceylon and Burma, which is known as *Hinayana* or the Lesser Vehicle. Detachment from this world and living a pure life enable the individual, through a succession of rebirths, each on a higher plane, eventually to detach himself from this existence and (according to *Mahayana* teaching) attain Buddhahood, thus entering nirvana. There is no God, the attainment of Buddhahood by the individual being the ideal. The personage to whom we usually refer as the Buddha (Gautama) is one of four pre-existent Buddhas, the fifth or messianic Buddha being yet to come.

The main contributions of *Mahayana* Buddhism are its stress on the illusory nature of the world, and its institution of saints. Such saints, or *bodhisattvas* (a *bodhisattva* in *Mahayana* is a being in the stage previous to attaining nirvana) are persons who, having attained the right to enter nirvana, refrain from so doing in order to help suffering mankind. Different sects of Buddhism teaching different aspects of the faith came to Japan from China from the sixth century onwards.

Japanese Buddhist sects, all of which have their origins in China, can be divided roughly into three groups: the esoteric sects, the Shin or Amidist sects, and the meditative, or Zen, sect. They arose in that order. The first-named, comprising the Shingon and Tendai sects, are still numerically strong. Shingon supports a university at its headquarters at Koya-san, while Tendai has a similar seat of learning on Mount Hiyei. The Shin sects are a more original Japanese contribution. The Amidist sects imported from China taught that by calling as frequently as possible upon the name of one saint, known as Amida, lord of the Western Paradise, the individual could go direct to that paradise on death. A Japanese, Shinran, improved on this by teaching that, simply by dying steadfast in the faith, the endless vista of rebirth could be

avoided and the same desired result attained. He preached this out of compassion for the uneducated, for whom he considered Buddhist doctrines too complex. Salvation by faith, therefore, entered into Buddhist conceptions, and the Amidist sects flourish exceedingly. They have devoted themselves particularly to humanitarian work among the urban poor, possibly following the Christian example.

The Zen sect of meditative Buddhism deserves special attention, since it exercises an influence out of all proportion to the numbers of its nominal adherents. Whereas the Amidist sects teach reliance on another (*tariki*)—that is to say on Amida—Zen teaches reliance on self (*jiriki*). It was introduced into Japan from China at the beginning of the thirteenth century. It does not place great reliance on the scriptures; it teaches that salvation can only be obtained by the individual through his own efforts. It despises the intellect and exalts intuition and perception. It teaches that only through intuition can the paradoxes inherent in life be understood. Its devotees, after rigorous training, attain enlightenment (*satori*), a state in which the universe with all its contradictions falls into place. Having attained enlightenment, many return to the world and to their normal occupations. Perhaps because of its reliance on what may generally be termed 'character' as opposed to 'intellect', the Zen sect has exercised a profound hold over military men. It arose and flourished during the bloody years of the feudal régime. In China, it absorbed Taoist conceptions and owed much to Indian yoga; it is the chief channel through which these philosophies reached Japan. Its consequent cult of harmony with nature runs through all Japanese thought. Its artistic influence has permeated Japanese life. Lack of symmetry and objects produced partly by the action of nature rather than by design, are exalted by it, and orthodox Japanese taste, which shuns the gaudy and prefers the 'astringent', is a product of its influence. Everything, according to Zen theory, must have the perhaps contradictory qualities of 'rust' and 'freshness'.

The cult of the sword and the *samurai* code which has become known to foreigners as *bushido* owes much to Zen, and since some of the principal moral ideas of the Japanese are included in *bushido*, it is useful to compare their ideas of chivalry with our own. Like mediaeval European chivalry, Japanese *bushido* included loyalty, and thus corresponded with the interest of the noble families in

sustaining their position in a treacherous society. Courage was valued supremely in Japan, as in Europe, and deeds of heroism and sacrifice were extolled in countless stories. The conception of the knight as the protector of the poor and weak, however, was a Christian ideal. In European chivalry there was a romantic reverence for women (by no means always honoured in practice) which has not found any counterpart in Japanese social life. European chivalry, probably again because of Christian influence, contained the seeds of progress. Finally, in the Japanese disregard for death there was a note of pessimism that was not found in Christianity but which may owe much to Buddhism. Suicide and mass immolation were common, and such episodes still stir the emotion of the Japanese. Chesterton has a passage which is suggestive in this matter when he writes of 'the mystery of (European) chivalry; the Christian courage, which is a disdain of death; not the Chinese courage, which is a disdain of life'.[1]

This leads to a discussion of the Japanese conception of the afterlife, and considering how hard it would be to describe our own, it is evident that the subject can only be approached diffidently and with uncertainty. Even Chesterton's generalization that the disdain of life is Chinese is open to question. Sir Charles Eliot, in a thought-provoking passage, says that:

> 'Probably in all the Buddhist scriptures there is no lament over the sorrows of life more strongly worded than the sentence in the English burial service: "We give thee hearty thanks for that it has pleased thee to deliver this our brother out of the miseries of this sinful world." '[2]

The very fact that this quotation, taken by itself, gives so mistaken a picture of the triumph over death at the heart of Christianity, shows how easy it has been to misinterpret Japanese conceptions through isolated quotations and examples. In an unsophisticated society, or among the unsophisticated majority of a mature society, there is a clear-cut expectation of concrete rewards to come. The happy hunting-grounds, a rousing Valhalla, or our own traditional harp and wings are examples of this. Philosophers of civilized societies have adopted an ideal of contemplation which is similar to the Buddhist nirvana. Probably the widest difference among philosophers concerns belief in the survival of the per-

[1] Chesterton, op. cit., p. 161.
[2] op. cit., p. 41.

sonality. The Japanese have considered these mysteries as deeply as other civilized people, and there is in Japan a wide range of belief about life after death, mostly adjusted to the Buddhist doctrine of rebirth with final escape from earthly existence. Simple Japanese hold views which, on logical analysis, would prove contradictory, just as simple people of other countries do, unless they belong to an authoritarian church. The Japanese feel, no doubt with widely varying shades of conviction, that the souls of soldiers killed in battle gather at the Yasukuni Shrine, just as at a Cenotaph ceremony in London many of the congregation have a sense of 'a cloud of witnesses'. A further contradiction in Japanese thought arises from their veneration of ancestors, an emotion which approaches worship. This is obviously difficult to adjust to a faith in rebirth, but the belief that salvation may be achieved direct from this life is held in the popular Shin sects. Belief in transmigration of souls into animals still exists, especially among the simpler Japanese, but it is noteworthy that the trade of butcher, formerly carried on by the *eta* class, is now a respectable one. Though the butchers show their compunction by offering prayers for the animals they slaughter, they are not weighed down by the feeling of sin they would experience if they seriously believed they might be butchering the recurring essence of a grandfather. In short, the Japanese, apart from a proportion of agnostics such as would be found in the educated classes elsewhere, believe in an after-life in which they may expect reward. In the main, it is a Buddhist conception and varies in refinement with the individual's capacity for metaphysical thinking, or with the theology of his sect. The unsophisticated Japanese also hold that the dead may become tutelary gods, and they expect the pleasures of heaven to be more solid than the philosophers do. There is some idea of hell, too, but it cannot play a large part since there is almost limitless scope for punishment through prolongation of the cycle of existence and relegation to inferior forms of life. The essential difference from Christianity lies in the absence of faith in a single, loving, and transcendent God.

CHAPTER IV

Terror as an Instrument of Nationalism

HISTORY has many instances of the use of terror as a weapon of politics, and never has this weapon been more ruthlessly wielded than in the twentieth century. One special feature of terrorism in Japan is that it has been used rather to influence and intimidate a government than in a planned effort to replace it. In other countries the weapon of terror has been used chiefly by the Government itself or by a rebellious party which seeks to take its place. The Japanese Government has, it is true, used the weapon of terror, arresting, torturing, imprisoning, and killing those guilty of thought regarded as subversive, but by the ferocious standards of some governments in twentieth-century Europe, it was a half-hearted effort. Moreover the Government itself would have been more liberal had it not been bullied into demonstrating the sincerity of its antagonism to the liberal mind. Another feature of Japanese terrorism, not easy to parallel in twentieth-century Europe, is the emotional satisfaction widely felt by the general public after a resounding murder or suicide. Political murder has caused an emotional tenseness in Japan which is different from the avid curiosity with which the British or American public absorbs the details of a well-publicized crime. Often this Japanese excitement over a political murder and trial, with petitions written in blood, cutting off of fingers to persuade the judge of a petitioner's earnestness, and similar features, has prompted the sweeping judgement that Japan loves a political murderer. This is an exaggeration. Many Japanese were ashamed and dismayed at the persistence of political murder, and at the effect of these murders in driving the country ever deeper into the entanglement of war, but these were the inarticulate ones, usually lacking the courage or assertiveness to express their views, and ill-protected from victimization if they did assert themselves.

Murder and suicide are admired features of Japanese history. Instances are so bound up with sentiment, with anecdotal teaching of ethics, with the drama and the popular tale, that no one could comprehensively denounce murder and suicide without facing

the charge that he was 'a bad Japanese'. Political murderers on trial often made capital of this, insolently demanding of their nervous judge his view of the 'peerless polity' of Japan. He was then in a dilemma, for if his answer implied approval of political murder he could hardly convict the prisoner, whereas if he condemned it, the prisoner would denounce him. In at least one case the prisoners, objecting to the judge's attitude, declined to proceed with the trial till he had been replaced.[1] By the standards of Japanese convention, a loyal and patriotic motive for murder disarmed criticism and often earned enthusiastic admiration, especially if the murderer committed suicide. Japan's most popular tale, founded on fact, is of forty-seven loyal retainers in the early eighteenth century who, overcoming great difficulties, murdered the man responsible for their lord's death and then, accepting a sentence to end their lives in the manner becoming men of the *samurai* class, committed *seppuku*. These forty-seven *ronin* have been the inspiration and model of many modern societies in Japan, and since few judges would question their righteousness, terrorists faced trial with a valuable moral advantage. A Western parallel cannot be offered, but something of the flavour of a Japanese trial can be imagined. Suppose Warren Hastings had been tried in an atmosphere of popular emotional conviction that to question anything in the conduct of Drake or Clive was wickedly blasphemous; or suppose Jameson had been accused in a court which dared not hint at criticism of Cecil Rhodes: in such faint parallels some insight may be gained into the difficulty of stamping out political crime in Japan.

Occasionally there was a death sentence. There were executions after the February 1936 mutiny, and to the surprise of most and the indignation of many, Colonel Aizawa was shot for murdering General Nagata, Director of the Military Affairs Bureau. Often, however, after a trial which swept the country with emotional excitement, the accused were given a prison term. The murderers could then expect that they would be amnestied before serving their full sentence, and would emerge from prison amid popular acclaim, with every prospect of a successful career in one of the branches of professional patriotism.

This powerful tradition of murder was a major factor in the determination of Japanese policy between the great wars. Between

[1] Morgan Young, *Imperial Japan* (London, Allen and Unwin, 1938), p. 194.

1921 and 1936, a period in which the advocacy in Japan of peaceful policies was relatively strong, five Prime Ministers or ex-Prime Ministers were murdered. The first of these was Takashi Hara, who was murdered at Tokyo railway station in 1921. In November 1930 Osachi Hamaguchi, one of Japan's strongest advocates of a prudent foreign policy, was shot in the same railway station. He did not die until the following August, shortly before the onslaught on Manchuria. In May 1932 the Prime Minister, Tsuyoshi Inukai, was murdered. In the outbreak of February 1936 two ex-Premiers, Korekiyo Takahashi, Finance Minister, and Admiral Makoto Saito, Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal, were murdered. Admiral Keisuke Okada, then Prime Minister, had an amazing escape. His brother-in-law was murdered through a mistake in identity, and the news was spread through Japan that Okada was among the victims of the mutiny, but he muffled himself up and got through the cordon of mutineers as a mourner at the bier which was supposed to contain his body. Admiral Baron Kantaro Suzuki, who became Premier in the last months of the war, was also badly wounded in the same outbreak. His assailant, thinking the Admiral about to die, gracefully burned a stick of incense, apologized to Baroness Suzuki for having inconvenienced her, and left. Another ex-Premier who had a narrow escape was Baron Kiichiro Hiranuma, who was shot and badly wounded in August 1941, but recovered. Naturally the menace was not merely to Premiers. Jinnosuke Inouye, who had recently resigned the Finance Ministry, was murdered in February 1932. Major-General Tetsuzan Nagata, Director of the Military Affairs Bureau, who tried to keep the army under control, was murdered in August 1935, and General Jotaro Watanabe Inspector-General of Military Education, was murdered in the mutiny of February 1936.

Capitalism and socialism were alike detested by the nationalists. The Zaibatsu lost two notable leaders in Kanjiro Yasuda, one of Japan's richest men, who was murdered in September 1921, and Baron Takuma Dan, one of the Mitsui chiefs, who was murdered in March 1932. Countless socialists were murdered, but as they were generally either the victims of a mob or of the police, their persecution does not always come within the special type of nationalist terror here being discussed. The most notable case of the murder of a socialist by the police is, however, a particularly

revealing example of terrorist psychology and of the public reaction to it. Sakae Osugi, one of Japan's leading socialists, was murdered in prison after the earthquake of 1923 by Masahiko Amakasu, a captain of gendarmerie. This would not have caused any trouble. The ill-usage of a socialist prisoner, even a famous one, and even if it resulted in death, would normally have entailed a perfunctory inquiry and an announcement that the prisoner had committed suicide. But Amakasu then went to the next cell, where Osugi's wife was detained. In his confession afterwards Amakasu said, 'She smiled and I killed her', and this was probably true, for many Japanese atrocities are attributable to a frenzy which can be excited by a trivial stimulus. This murder too would probably not have caused serious trouble, for women were no more highly regarded in Japan than in most other Asiatic countries. Amakasu then went to another cell, where the small adopted son of the socialist was confined, and as the child was making a commotion Amakasu killed him too. The Japanese love children and this crime was one that could not be glossed over. The trial took place in the usual atmosphere of national emotion and Amakasu was sentenced to ten years' imprisonment. He was at liberty by the beginning of 1932, when he was given the very important Manchurian post of Secretary-General of the Concordia Society. He was again heard of a few years later when he went abroad as a member of a goodwill mission. This treatment of a criminal sadist would not seem odd to most Japanese.

Perhaps it is this attitude to terrorism that chiefly distinguishes the Japanese from the people of those European countries in which terror has been a political instrument. The murder of a Japanese statesman made his colleagues embarrassed and apologetic. It was treated as a manifestation of public opinion. When Premier Keisuke Okada escaped by the skin of his teeth in the lurid outbreak of 1936, the only seemly thing for him to do was to resign in favour of men whose policy was more likely to gain the approval of the murderers. In Europe a successful *coup d'état* brings power and an unsuccessful one brings punishment, but in Japan it was felt that, having suppressed the *coup d'état*, the politicians must take the lesson to heart and form a more aggressive Government. The Diet elections usually showed that most Japanese preferred the more peaceful parties, but it was clear that the murderers had the support of a large section who approved the violence and had

the armed power to insist that the crime should be followed by another step towards the extremists' goal.

Patriotic criminals in Japan had considerable opportunities for advancement if they were successful. The case of Amakasu has been mentioned. Another example was Kenzo Adachi, who laid the foundation of a successful career by organizing the murder of the Queen of Korea in 1895. He was afterwards elected many times to the Diet, was Communications Minister in 1925 and Home Minister in 1929. He became President of a patriotic political party, Kokumin Domei, in 1932.

While the instances mentioned have been mainly those of murder, terror in Japan has had a very wide range. For every man who was killed, many were beaten or persecuted, the case of Dr Minobe already cited being a conspicuous instance. The threat of dismissal which hung over teachers who laid themselves open to suspicion of 'dangerous thought' was probably due less to the illiberalism of the administration than to the vicious watchfulness of the extremists, who would have attacked any administration lacking diligence in the matter. The terror was pervasive. It reached from the murder of a Prime Minister to the insulting of a woman who, by painting her nails, showed inadequate appreciation of the uniqueness of Japan's 'polity'.

Some of the outrages, for instance the murder of Premier Hara, were perpetrated by unbalanced individuals. The murder of Premier Inukai and the events of February 1936 were the work of the Young Officers. The attack on Inukai was supported by sabotage carried out by civilians from the town of Mito, a traditional hotbed of political extremism. These men belonged to a society called the Aikojuku (Native Land Loving Society). The murderer of Premier Hamaguchi belonged to the Aikokusha (Patriotic Society). Osugi, as related, was murdered by a captain of gendarmerie. Lieutenant-General Nagata was killed by a fanatical colonel. These officers were inflamed and incited by army leaders of whom the best known were General Jinzaburo Mazaki and General Sadao Araki. The murderers of Baron Dan and Inouye were members of the Ketsumeidan (Blood Brotherhood). Yasuda was killed by a man with a record as a patriotic thug.

This brings us to a consideration of the origins and growth of the nationalist societies which flourished like rank weeds in Japan up to the outbreak of war. Although the Restoration of 1868

brought the collapse of the feudal system and with it the disfranchisement of the privileged *samurai* class, the Japanese tendency to change the form and retain the substance resulted in many of the features of the old society being carried over into the new. Thus, the new political leadership was almost exclusively *samurai* in character, and was largely recruited from the two clans of Satsuma and Choshu, which had been responsible for the revival of imperial authority. Outside this privileged circle of power were the mass of dispossessed *samurai* of the three hundred odd clans, who chafed at their loss of privilege and at their impecunious circumstances, and for whom the new order seemed to hold out no prospects of advancement. For the only calling these men knew was that of arms and, even after the introduction of conscription, the standing army was at first too small to give employment to more than a fraction of them. To these material discontents, and to jealousy of the power of Satsuma and Choshu, opposition to the Meiji programme of social reform and to the spread of Western influence added ideological causes of unrest. From this hotbed of political agitation a shifting pattern of cliques and gangs began to emerge; and since the worst crimes are condoned in Japan so long as the fiction of the 'pure heart' is preserved, they adopted a variety of 'patriotic' cloaks for disreputable and self-seeking activities. The earliest of these cliques appeared in Fukuoka, which is incidentally the birthplace of Mitsuru Toyama, to whom must be accorded high rank in the gangster hierarchy of history. Later on, when Japan acquired a Constitution and a Diet, these organizations allied themselves with one or other of the political parties (in whose election campaigns gangster support seldom came amiss), or espoused for a consideration some dubious aspect of the cause of political emancipation. Leaders of these societies have been ever since the lords of the Japanese underworld (with its focus in the licensed quarters) and while blackmail and pimping were among their normal sources of revenue, they were usually ready to 'bump off' a politician if it was made worth their while. In their early stage the societies seem to have had little connection with the Army.

The earliest of the post-Restoration Empire-building societies was the Genyosha (Blue Ocean Society) formed in 1881;[1] but it

[1] See E. H. Norman 'The Genyosha. Origins of Japanese Imperialism', *Pacific Affairs*, September 1944, p. 246.

was destined soon to be overshadowed by a more notorious offspring, the Kokuryu-kai (picturesquely rendered in English as 'Black Dragon Society' but more accurately translated as 'Amur Society'), under the aegis of Ryohei Uchida. The fortunes of these societies and of their numerous later imitators waxed and waned with political trends at home and abroad. Their members have never shown signs of possessing either constructive political ideas or the courage for which the Japanese fighting man is distinguished.

From the outset, the societies were anti-foreign and took active, if unorthodox, interest in Japan's foreign policy (into which it was their constant endeavour to inject an aggressive element by unscrupulous and even criminal devices); they were intriguing to bring about the annexation of Korea as early as 1874 and had a part in precipitating both the war with China in 1894, and that with Russia in 1904. Neither Prince Ito nor Prince Yamagata hesitated to employ the societies in political intrigue in Korea and China, and Uchida's 'China Ronin' were conspicuous on the Asiatic continental scene for twenty years. Drug traffic, prostitution, smuggling, and blackmail have been habitually employed in Japanese imperial interests, adroitly combined with illicit private profit. Political unrest in China and India also excited their hardly altruistic sympathies, and both Toyama and Uchida befriended Chinese and Indian revolutionary leaders who sought refuge in Japan. At home they continued to dabble profitably in internal politics, and party politicians have frequently reached Cabinet rank through their support. On the other hand, the societies were wont to contract violent political antipathies and, either directly or indirectly, were involved in most of the political assassinations which have habitually disfigured Japanese political life. Notwithstanding their thinly veiled criminal record, the societies (and especially the more notorious among their leaders) were regarded with mingled fear and respect by responsible Japanese statesmen, and they secured immunity from official interference to a degree rare in Western countries. Mitsuru Toyama, for instance, was a revered and patriarchal figure. Cabinet Ministers obeyed his admonitions and he often figured in the list of guests attending imperial garden parties.

Nationalist societies and organizations have worked both as agencies for whipping up public opinion in support of militarism,

and as a means of coercing a Cabinet inclined to liberal policies at home or abroad. Employing intrigue, propaganda, espionage, and terror, these organizations have had a tremendous effect on Japanese policy during the last sixty years. The societies were of great variety. At one end of the scale, out in the open, were respectable though reactionary political bodies such as the Kokuhonsha (National Foundation Society), which had distinguished patronage and a long connection with the Tokyo Imperial University; shrouded in obscurity at the other end were terrorist groups such as the Hakuro-kai (Society of the White Wolf) and the Sekisei-kai (League of the Single Heart). Between the extremes was the vast network of the Ex-Servicemen's Associations, which, in addition to serving the purpose of similar organizations in other countries, constituted the eyes and ears of the Army in every town and village of the Empire. The Young Men's Association was an organization through which genuine educational work was done on behalf of Japanese youth. Unfortunately, however, it was subjected to intense indoctrination and became a breeding ground of violent patriotism. The Japan Youth Federation, under the leadership of Colonel Kingoro Hashimoto, the man who deliberately sank the American gunboat *Panay* in 1937, was formed in 1938 to forge from the rising generation an instrument of nationalist fanaticism. Finally there was a maze of gangs and cliques, sometimes loosely described as secret, which formed the stronghold of extreme Nipponism.

These latter entities and the terrorist groups merit the description 'secret' in so far as most of them have an inner or esoteric section, the tenets of which are known only to elected members, but in many cases their official histories and the biographies of their leaders have been published. In fact, since the Manchurian Incident in 1931, some of these societies have sought, rather than shunned, the limelight.

The tempest of aggressive nationalism which engulfed Japan after 1931 carried patriotic gangsterdom to its heyday. There came into being a spate of reactionary societies, too numerous, kaleidoscopic, and ephemeral to mention by name, though their influence in creating the background against which the China War and the attack upon Great Britain and the United States were staged must not be underrated. Civilian gangs allied themselves with extremist Young Officers in the Army and Navy; and

in some instances exclusively military societies were formed. Together, they formed a maze of interlocking organizations, the membership of which, fluctuating from month to month, defies any attempt to estimate. Trimming their sails to prevailing ideological winds, some assumed a national-socialist, others a pseudo-proletarian complexion; and the tempo of assassination and terrorism kept pace with the artificially stimulated 'national emergency'. By 1939 they had served their purpose, and presumably achieved their objectives; when the Army took charge they moved backstage.

CHAPTER V

Civil Administration, Police, and Justice

JAPAN possessed a highly centralized civil administrative system which formed in some respects a counterpoise to the power of the armed forces within the State. This system was modelled in the main on that of France, for, whereas in regard to the relations between the Throne and the Diet the example of Germany was considered most suitable for adoption by the Meiji reformers, the rights retained by the component States in the old German Empire as established in 1871 were contrary to the thorough-going centralism which they desired to substitute for the feudal structure of Tokugawa Japan. For this purpose the French system of prefectures strictly controlled from the capital by a Ministry of the Interior was preferred. The extreme centralization of government in Japan was in fact quite well suited to the country, not only because of its relatively small area, but also because of the homogeneity of the people, and there was no movement for local autonomy.

Japan proper was divided into forty-six prefectures; under these there were in 1938, 9,524 villages (*mura*), 1,711 towns (*machi*), and 146 cities (*shi*).[1] The prefectural governors were appointed and controlled by the Home Minister, though the Prime Minister also had a certain power of supervision; they were assisted by elected prefectural assemblies which were called once a year to deliberate on the annual budget of the prefecture and on the general policies of the governor. These prefectural assemblies dated from 1878; they were thus twelve years older than the national Diet. In normal times their activities were confined within fairly narrow limits and the prefectural governor, acting on instructions from Tokyo, had the deciding voice in most matters of local administration.

Cities, towns, and villages had their elected councils with mayors or headmen elected by the councils. The mayors and city councils of places such as Tokyo, Osaka, and Nagoya were of considerable importance, but they were kept strictly subordinate

[1] *The Far East Year Book*, 1941, p. 71.

to the prefectural governors and did not control the police forces within the city limits.

Control of the police was perhaps the most important factor in Japanese civil administration because they had far-reaching powers in regulating and supervising the lives of citizens, and deference was paid to them by the masses as the immediate representatives of the authority of the State. The civil police (who numbered 67,000 in 1938)[1] did not come under local authorities, but were a national force directly controlled by the Home Ministry, the Chief Police Inspector being an official of the Home Ministry directly responsible to the Minister. The police of Tokyo were specially linked with the Home Ministry and were separately organized from those of the rest of the country.

The special characteristics of the Japanese police were largely due to the historical origins of the force. Under the Tokugawa, both in the territories directly ruled by the Shogun, and in the fiefs, there was an elaborate police system, of which espionage into the private affairs of the people was a prominent feature; the remarkable stability and order achieved by the régime stands to the credit of the system, but it was undoubtedly oppressive and arbitrary in operation. In the Meiji period the system inherited from the Tokugawa was used to establish central control against local feudal recalcitrance; it was thus regarded for a long time as a semi-military organization auxiliary to the newly-formed national Army, and its military character was accentuated by the fact that after the *samurai* were disbanded as a privileged military caste, many of them took service either with the police or in the Army and brought into both forces their traditions and habits of mind. The Japanese police retained this stamp until 1945 and the centralized control to which they were subject—similar to a system of military control—intensified their military outlook.

The civil police were nevertheless to be distinguished from the gendarmerie or *kempeitai*, who formed part of the Army and were under the control of the War Ministry. The *kempeitai* had—at least in peacetime—only a very restricted scope within Japan itself, but as they were empowered to deal with cases of espionage, they were conspicuous in some episodes involving foreigners. The main activity of the gendarmerie, however, was outside Japan in territories under Japanese colonial rule or military occupation, and

[1] ibid. p. 140.

there they made for themselves a name rivalling that of the Gestapo in infamy. They used torture freely and did not appear to be bound by any rules of procedure or administrative regulations, relying on the protection of the Army against all civilian claims for redress.

The Japanese civil service was elaborately organized and formed a single system for the whole country; it was based on competitive examinations and drew much of the best talent from the universities into official life. Its most striking feature was the existence of official ranks which were attached to offices, but were partly distinct from them; the highest rank was that of *shinnin,* below which came the grades of *chokunin, sonin,* and *hannin.* This system of ranks was really an inheritance from pre-Meiji Japan, though its form was modern; as it included all those who served the Emperor in an official capacity, the ranking applies to Cabinet Ministers and Privy Councillors as well as to civil servants in the narrower sense, and this tended to merge the Government in the bureaucracy—the more so as civil servants frequently obtained Cabinet office.

Although the Japanese civil servant could thus have entered politics, the 'spoils system' was successfully kept out of the civil service by regulations which gave civil servants great security of tenure and prevented changes of administrative personnel due to political favour. This, however, had the adverse effect of inducing excessive routinism and a disposition to obstruct new measures which the bureaucracy as a whole found distasteful. The bureaucracy had a strong *esprit de corps*; it had little or no sense of responsibility to the Diet, but it was always strongly averse to control by the Army, and co-ordination between the civilian and service departments seemed to have been even more difficult to achieve in Japan than elsewhere. The Army, for their part, continually showed an exasperated impatience with the civil authorities; in their ideal, military discipline provided a pattern for all spheres of life and all problems could easily be solved if some one barked out orders and saw that everybody obeyed them. These opinions of 'our soldier friends' were regarded by the civilian bureaucrats as the illusions of unteachable children.

Japanese law was codified after the Restoration, important dates being 1880, 1898, and 1899, when the Penal Code, the Civil

Law, and the Commercial Law respectively were promulgated, and 1907, when a revised Penal Code was promulgated. These Codes, derived from European, especially French and German, theory and practice, were criticized as uncongenial to the customary law of Japan. The Government, however, was impelled to legal reform not only by its policy of learning from the West, but also because legal reform was an important condition of the revision of the 'unequal treaties' between the Western Powers and Japan, about which there was intense feeling in the country. It was realized that these powers would not agree to the abolition of extraterritorial privileges until Japan's legal system had been reformed. In fact all foreigners were brought under Japanese jurisdiction in 1899, though it was not till later that she gained full control of her tariff policy.

With the codification of law, prison conditions were improved, and here again the Japanese were influenced by Western methods. There was indeed room for improvement, for in Tokugawa times the treatment of criminals was probably even more brutal than it has been in recent years. Baron Kanetake Oura writes of the Tokugawa system:

> 'In case the accused person persisted in refusing to confess a crime he was examined by torture, of which the form most commonly resorted to was to beat him severely with an instrument shaped something like a broom. Other methods of torture were suspension from the upper part of a pillar or from a beam in the roof by an iron ring fastened to it and flogging with a stick.'

The same writer describes the method of imprisonment in Tokugawa times as 'a congregate system' whereby twelve criminals were kept together in one cell. If one of them were diseased or otherwise disliked by his fellows they often suffocated him.[1]

It is evident that the Japanese have not taken readily to modern legal and prison reform. Legal training and the competence of judges is at a satisfactory level, and where there is no motive for doing an injustice, judgement is fairly arrived at. When, however, the police want a confession they get it; and the rules for protecting the interests of the accused which, even if fully applied, would be far less satisfactory than similar rules in democratic countries,

[1] Count Okuma, op. cit., vol. i, p. 307.

are evaded.[1] In both criminal and political cases the Japanese press used often to announce a man's guilt, publish the confession the police had extorted and, as an afterthought, mention the date on which he was to be brought to trial. A particularly interesting feature is that charges are usually not explicit. Mr John Morris says that the accused usually is 'merely urged to confess to having contravened the regulations'. It is interesting to see how the old Japanese attitude is preserved here, for Sir George Sansom writes:

> 'In medieval Japan the idea of justice does not appear to have developed as an abstract conception, compounded of the right of the litigant and the duty of the judge. It was rather looked upon as something expedient but not incumbent, something granted by the ruler as a favour. This view colours all subsequent feudal administration to such a degree that later we find codes of law which, far from being widely promulgated, are in part guarded as official secrets.'[2]

There were, however, other ostensibly enlightened countries where the standards of justice were no higher than in Japan. Moreover imperial powers preserving enlightened institutions at home have often countenanced unsatisfactory practices in their dependencies. If this is overlooked the criticism of Japan becomes one-sided.

[1] John Morris, *Traveller from Tokyo* (London, Cresset Press, 1943), has chapters on Japanese police methods and Japanese criminal procedure.

[2] op. cit., p. 303.

CHAPTER VI

Attitude Towards Foreign Powers

THE notable feature of Japan's relations with the rest of the world is not that she has imitated, for all nations do so, but that, except in a few instances that are not widely known, she has not been imitated. If all the art and thought of Japan were lost to the world, only a few specialists would feel it as a loss. This is due to the inaccessibility rather than the inferiority of Japan's cultural heritage, for there is a wealth of little-known beauty in Japan's arts, and her philosophy is of greater value than is realized. Sensitive to the lack of appreciation of their culture, the Japanese have sometimes made themselves look foolish by claiming to have invented the aeroplane, to have the finest science, or the most valuable social philosophy in the world. There is, as the psychologist would expect, a disposition either to adopt foreign culture without discrimination, or to indulge in emotional denunciation of it. Fortunately there are many modest, sensible Japanese who value appropriate foreign ways and thought and adapt them to their needs.

Up to the second half of the sixteenth century—and with only slight qualification up to 1853—there was for Japan only one great foreign nation, and that was China. Because of Japan's geographical position on the margin of Asia, China filled nearly the whole of the landscape when Japan looked at the world outside her own islands; apart from China there was only the relatively insignificant Korea—which was even more imitative of China than Japan herself—the Siberian mainland inhabited by savage tribes, the empty spaces of the Pacific, and some dimly-known islands to the south. India was known through the Buddhist religion, and one or two Japanese Buddhist monks actually went there, but on the whole it figured as a kind of fairyland rather than a real country. In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries ships of European nations—the Portuguese, Spanish, Dutch, and English—reached Japan, and in the sequel certain Japanese reached Europe and reported on it, but Europe and America were so remote under the conditions of travel in that age that no

close contacts were made between Japan and Western nations. With the Tokugawa isolation policy all intercourse and knowledge of the outer world was reduced to a minimum.

In addition to the natural pre-eminence of China in the Japanese outlook on the world, there was the immense cultural debt to China—a debt involving every aspect of Japanese life and thought. The Japanese have constantly modified and adapted in their own way what they have received from China, so that the final result is very different from the parallel Chinese development, but Japanese originality has always worked on Chinese models and the Chinese influence is strong even in ideas and institutions which are regarded as peculiarly Japanese. There has recently been a tendency in Britain and America for reasons of contemporary politics to minimize the common element in the heritage of the two nations, and to exaggerate their differences. But the cultural assimilation of Japan to China in the past has been very far-reaching, and the attitude to China was one of deep respect and admiration. When St Francis Xavier first preached Christianity in Japan, he was constantly met with the objection that there could not be any value in this doctrine, as the Chinese, who were the wisest of men, did not accept it; hence, argued Xavier, it was necessary to convert China first in order to convert Japan. When subsequently Christianity spread widely in Japan and the Tokugawa administration decided to suppress it, it was from Confucianism that the arguments for the persecution were drawn.

The cultural attachment of Japan to China never involved political subjection, because the two countries were spatially too widely separated, and except for the expeditions of the Mongol Kublai Khan there was never any attempt by the Chinese to conquer Japan. A political conflict did arise, however, over the forms of diplomatic intercourse between Japan and China. The Emperor of China was in Chinese theory a world-ruler to whom other monarchs owed the homage of vassals; in Japan, however, it was felt that the dynasty of the Sun Goddess could not accept vassal status. The Japanese did not in early days claim a right of world-rule, as the Shinto myths dated from a time when the Japanese had no clear knowledge of any foreign lands at all; hence the *Kojiki* is concerned entirely with the rule of the Sun Goddess's descendants in the 'eight islands' of Japan, even the Hokkaido being then unknown. It was only at a later date that the question of

relations with other countries arose. One early Japanese Emperor in a letter to a Chinese Emperor began: 'The king of the land where the sun rises sends greetings to the king of the land where it sets.' The protocol officials of the Chinese court, however, considered such a style of address improper, and trouble over diplomatic forms continued throughout the history of Sino-Japanese relations down to the nineteenth century, so that no regular intercourse was ever established. The Ashikaga Shoguns did actually accept a formal vassalage in order to get trade privileges from China—a concession for which they have been bitterly denounced by modern Japanese historians. Hideyoshi, on the other hand, attempted to conquer China at the end of the sixteenth century; his idea was to instal the Japanese Imperial House in Peking as Emperors of China, thus combining the two monarchies.

In the eighteenth century there arose the opposition of the *wagakusha* literary school against the ascendancy of Chinese learning in Japan. These men stood for the pure Japanese language and literature against the extreme adulation of things Chinese, and they championed the native Shinto against Confucianism and Buddhism. It is from this school that the Shinto revival of the Meiji Restoration and present-day Nipponism are derived. Nevertheless, these writers owed far more to Chinese ideas than they were willing to admit, and to the charge of his opponents that his philosophy was borrowed from Taoism, Motoori could only reply that, as Lao-tzu was 'born in a dirty country not under the special protection of the Sun Goddess', he could not really have known anything about Shinto.

The effect of the spectacle of the defeats of China in the wars of 1839–42 and 1856–60, of the helplessness of Japan herself in the face of Perry's naval squadron of 1853, and of the sudden realization of the superior power and wealth of Western nations, was greatly to reduce the Japanese respect for, and sense of cultural solidarity with, China, and to cause Japan to 'go to school with the West' in order to master the economic, administrative, and military techniques of Western civilization. To some extent there was a genuine interest in, and enthusiasm for, Western institutions, ideas, and ways of living for their own sake, even if only as a fashionable craze, but the dominant motive of the Meiji reformers was certainly to learn from the West the secrets of national power; it was because the Western nations were successful and powerful

on the material plane that their culture was deemed worthy of imitation. At the same time the reformers needed something from the national tradition which could be used as a rallying point for nationalism, and this they found in Shinto and Emperor-worship. The Meiji Restoration was brought about by an alliance between the *wagakusha* and the 'Westernizers', both of which groups, though for different reasons, were contemptuous of China. The contempt for China increased as Japan by her self-modernization gained rank among the Western nations, while China remained weak, disorderly, and ineffective.

The two nations of the West in which Japan was most interested in the decisive transition period 1868–90 were Britain and Germany. In Japan's view they were the two most powerful States in the world, Britain possessing undisputed naval supremacy and the largest territorial empire, while Germany was reckoned the strongest military Power in Europe after her victory over France in 1870. Japan, therefore, got instructors for her Navy from Britain, and for her Army from Germany. Before 1870 Japan had already engaged French army instructors, but changed over to Germans when she saw the outcome of the Franco-Prussian War. The political institutions of the two countries also served as models to the makers of the Meiji Constitution; the preferred example was Germany, because the German system was the more easily adapted to the existing political order in Japan, but British political institutions also had considerable influence. Army circles always admired Germany, but the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, though concluded because of Japan's material and strategic interests, strengthened for a while the influence of British ideas. English, moreover, was the most widely learnt second language in Japan.

In the early Meiji period neither the United States nor Russia loomed as large in the Japanese world-view as Britain and Germany. The United States had indeed taken the initiative in opening Japan to foreign intercourse, but during the four decades after Perry's visit she was still absorbed in her own 'frontier', had no territorial base in the Far East, and little interest in world politics. As for Russia, she was recognized as a powerful State, but the Japanese knew that other European nations regarded her as 'backward', and 'backwardness' was what the Japanese modernizers particularly wanted to avoid. After the turn of the century,

however, the United States became increasingly important for Japan in a variety of ways; on the one hand, there was great increase of trans-Pacific trade, while on the other there was constant friction arising out of the clash of policies in China and the agitation against Japanese immigrants in America. After 1918 the United States stood out as not only the strongest naval Power in the Pacific, but as the world's leading exponent of the 'philosophy of business'. The financial and commercial classes in Japan, and those concerned with advertising, journalism, radio, and cinema were profoundly influenced by American standards and methods. There was also a widespread influence of 'Americanism', mainly in its Hollywood version, on the ways of living of the well-to-do; the *mobo* (modern boy) and *moga* (modern girl) were products of this. On the whole, in the field of ideas American influence reinforced the liberalism already emanating from Britain, but in the eyes of the Japanese the United States stood for a more uncompromisingly democratic, individualistic, and anti-traditionalist conception of life than Britain did.

Russia after the Revolution initiated world-wide Marxist propaganda in its communist form, and this soon acquired a powerful influence on university students and on peasant and labour organizations. This in turn produced fear and dislike of Russia among the propertied classes, and a reversal of policy towards Russia, with whom in 1916, just before the Revolution, Japan had concluded a secret treaty of military alliance directed against the United States of America. Moreover, for many years after the Revolution, Russia appeared weak and inefficient, and thus unimpressive to most Japanese, who were disposed to judge any system by its success in terms of material power. Since the success of Russia's planned industrialization, however, and especially since the Russian military successes at Nomonhan, and later over Germany, Japanese military and nationalist-industrial circles have had a great respect for Russian military capacity, economic planning methods, and labour discipline.

After the early Meiji period, during which 'Westernization' was carried on with the full support of the Throne and the Satsuma and Choshu oligarchy, an increasing tension developed between Japanese nationalism and the influence of imported Western ideas. It was

discovered that these ideas carried a threat to the social and political order. In modern Japanese writing, these 'dangerous thoughts' from the West are classified under the two heads of liberalism and Marxism, both of which—though opposed to each other—are held to have arisen from 'materialism' and resulting class-war in Western society, and to be incompatible with Japan's unique *kokutai* or 'national polity'. After the decade of the nineteen-twenties, when both liberalism and Marxism reached the zenith of their influence in Japan, the nationalist reaction drew strength not only from economic conditions produced by the world depression, but also from the example of Fascism and Nazism in Europe, which offered a similar opposition both to liberalism and to Marxism. Nazi ideas in particular had a strong influence in Japan because of the traditional admiration for Germany in army circles, an admiration which had been dispelled by the collapse of 1918, but was easily revived by the achievements of Hitler. Nevertheless Nazi racial doctrine was naturally unacceptable to Japan, and Japan indeed was led to evolve a racialism of her own which in the long run was antagonistic to Nazi aims.

Even after they had become generally hostile to the influence of liberalism and Marxism within Japan, Japanese ruling circles remained 'Westerners' in the sense that they attached primary importance to relations with Western nations, and felt that they belonged to the company of Western Great Powers rather than to that of Asiatic countries, none of which had managed to achieve the material progress of Japan. Thus, as regards China, Japan was one of the Treaty Powers enjoying extraterritorial rights, and had a common interest with them; she joined the European and American forces in the suppression of the Boxer troubles in 1900. She considered her colonial rule in Korea and Formosa as parallel to the colonial régimes of Western nations in Malaya, the East Indies, Indo-China, or the Philippines. After 1919 inclusion in the League of Nations as a permanent Council member gave her a new political link with the West. Nevertheless, from 1921 there were also factors tending to separate Japan from the West and throw her back on herself. First, the abrogation of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance isolated her diplomatically, for she found no substitute for it. Then the American Immigration Act of 1924 inflicted a wound on Japanese pride, the effect of which it would be difficult to exaggerate; Japan felt herself publicly classified as

racially inferior. And finally in 1933 Japan's withdrawal—in fact expulsion—from the League accentuated the trend towards a self-centred, self-reliant nationalism. The moral the Japanese drew from the League's handling of the Manchuria crisis was that the world was against them, but that they could successfully defy the world.

In 1937 Japan renewed her aggression against China and for more than four years China was the only country with which she was at war. The Japanese invasion was accompanied by all kinds of atrocities against the Chinese population. Nevertheless, there was a notable absence of national hatred towards China, and more and more Japanese propaganda developed the theme that the real enemy was 'Anglo-American imperialism' which was charged with setting China against Japan by cunning intrigues in order to exhaust both nations in mutual conflict and thus gain supremacy in the Far East. When Japan finally launched her war against Britain and the United States, propaganda was concentrated on the themes of Japan's task to liberate and defend 'East Asia' against Western imperialism and of the racial and cultural solidarity of the 'East Asiatic' peoples.

In the years immediately preceding the war, the strongest Western influences continued to be those of Germany, Russia, the United States of America, and Britain. The regimentation of Germany by Hitler was admired, especially as Nazi efficiency was exaggerated by cultural and political propaganda in which nearly every German in Japan was obliged to play an appropriate part. The free youth movement of Germany's post-war democracy had appealed to students in Japan more strongly than the Hitler Youth Movement which followed, but the authorities themselves found much in the latter worthy of imitation, and were particularly energetic in imposing labour service on Japan's students. In the summer of 1940 there was a visit from a group of Hitler Youth, and their good looks, confident bearing, and arrogant demeanour favourably impressed most of the Japanese who saw them. German philosophy, science (especially medicine), and music gave her a claim, of which the most was made by propaganda, to the regard of cultured Japanese. The measure of the potential Russian appeal was the anxiety of the Army and the Government about every manifestation of interest in Marxist ideas and the relentless persecution of Communism. Had the Soviet Government and

citizens retained the freedom of intercourse and of exchange of ideas in Japan enjoyed by the Western democracies, Communism would have become an important social and political force.

Among Japan's militarists there was a clear distinction between the technical aspects of Western civilization, which they valued, and the cultural aspects, which they detested. In practice the two aspects of Western influence could not be completely separated. The two chief organs by which Western culture was spread between the wars, especially among the urban population, were the schools and the cinema. English was taught in secondary and higher schools for more than an hour a day for boys and was also a very important subject in girls' education, until a year before the war, when English studies were reduced drastically in girls' schools and to some extent in boys' schools. The Japanese methods of teaching by translating, in which a great many examples from English and American life were given, developed an incidental knowledge of and respect for British and American institutions even though the teachers had only moderate success in imparting a knowledge of the language. In each of the higher schools there were usually (until the reduction of English teaching and the exodus in anticipation of war) two foreign teachers of English, often one American and one British. Both in the classroom and outside it these teachers had a strong influence in representing the culture of their countries. Foreign missionaries, similarly, by benevolence, integrity, and the example of their domestic life, affected the outlook of great numbers of Japanese, including many who did not become Christians. The militarists knew that the price of education in English was the introduction of a strong subversive influence both through the foreign teachers and through the sympathetic atmosphere in which the Japanese teachers, many of whom had visted England or America, conducted their work. There were complaints by the reactionary moralists that the seed sown through the teaching of English had produced a crop of weeds which seemed to flourish the more when their tops were cut off. The offence most commonly complained of was that of 'loving England and America'.

The cinema was pervasive in Japanese urban society, especially among its youth. The country people had little chance of seeing American films and in any case preferred the domestic product, but in the cities the interest in American life as reflected by Holly-

wood was intense among young people. Women were gaining an entirely new vision of the position and privileges to which their sex was entitled, and American standards of conduct and of feminine beauty were developing a powerful appeal by the time the militarists banned American films, a year or so before Pearl Harbour.

While the influence of teachers and missionaries and of films merits special mention, Western thought, science, and values in every field of art and scholarship were admired in Japan. Appreciation, for example, of classical music, especially German music, among students in Japan was very widespread and was genuine. In reorganizing her machinery of law, defence, government, and education to meet new needs, Japan had opened her gates to a cataract of foreign influence that bade fair to sweep away the foundations of her culture. By taking these risks Japan advanced in less than a century from a cultured but weak feudal nation to the status of one of the most formidable industrial and military powers on earth. The effort of adjustment was beyond her. Unable to maintain a steady progress in which the new could be adapted to the old, and knowing that her culture was being undermined by that of the Western democracies, Japan made a frantic effort of self-assertion which has cost her the independence she has cherished throughout her history.

CHAPTER VII

The Growth of Liberal Ideas

In this discussion it has been found expedient to credit a 'progressive' disposition to all sections, however temporizing or conservative, whose influence has tended to social or political advance, or has been a check on social or political regression.

After the opening of Japan in 1854, it was characteristic that many Japanese should project what they felt to be their own national humiliation on to even weaker States, and the ruling group split in 1873 on the issue of attacking Korea. The aggressive faction in the Government resigned and it was a section of this faction that rose in civil war in 1877 and was defeated. The other section, of which Count Itagaki was the most notable representative, launched the Liberal Party (Jiyuto) in 1880. Two years later Count (afterwards Marquis) Okuma headed the more moderate Progressive Party (Kaishinto). Both parties were carried along by heady draughts of Western revolutionary theory and by violent agrarian outbreaks which must have been more than the leaders bargained for. Their concern was for the establishment of a constitutional assembly which would enable them to resume their place in the governing bureaucracy. Prince Hirobumi Ito, the Emperor's chief adviser, did not yield anything of substance when in 1881 he advised the Emperor Meiji to promise a national assembly within ten years. Before that time had elapsed the turbulent parties had been dissolved and the way made clear for an understanding between the tribunes of the people and the advisers of the Emperor.

The Meiji Constitution may have appeared to genuine radicals to be no more than 'a figleaf to cover the nakedness of absolutism'. Yet the urge to representative institutions did find a partial outlet through this Constitution. The subsequent history of party politics was often disheartening to Japanese liberals, but until 1937, and possibly until 1940, constitutional advance seemed a reasonable hope for enlightened men. In the first election in 1890 half a million men held the franchise; at the twentieth election in 1937 the number was 14,500,000. The high proportion of votes polled,

often over eighty per cent, shows that the voters took their responsibilities seriously. Even in 1937 the proportion was seventy-three per cent, which suggests that the Diet was still regarded by the people as representative of popular opinion. By the Diet itself this claim was put forward as persistently in the days of its humiliation as in those of its greatest influence. Had it shown real enthusiasm for reform and the courage of its convictions, the Diet might have deflected the Gadarene progress of the country. Possibly the rise in the average age of members contributed to parliamentary decline. In the first Diet eighty-six per cent of the members were under fifty, whereas in the Diet elected in 1937 only thirty-five per cent were under fifty. The proportion of men of sixty and over was four per cent in 1890; in 1937 it was twenty-five per cent.[1]

It would stretch the term 'liberal' excessively to apply it to the leading party politicians of Japan. The measures of peace and progress they advocated were not impressive by the standards of successful democracies, but in the circumstances of Japan these policies were so far from moderate that the politicians hazarded their lives in pressing on as far as they did. Baron Kijuro Shidehara pleaded for an enlightened China policy when he was Foreign Minister from 1924 to 1926 and from 1929 to the end of 1931. The murder of five Prime Ministers or ex-Prime Ministers between 1921 and 1939, mentioned in an earlier chapter, would suggest that the 'patriots' did not share the view that the politicians were of no account in hindering aggression.[2] Elections early in 1936 and again in the spring of 1937 showed that public opinion supported those politicians, particularly in the Minseito (Social Mass Party) who wanted a prudent policy for Japan; and sometimes, as when the Anti-Comintern Pact was signed in November 1936, the Diet plainly showed its disapproval of dangerous foreign policy. Had the Diet contained a larger proportion of men in the younger age groups it might have taken greater risks in opposing the military, and a fruitful alliance of the moderate working-class movement and the liberals might have developed.

[1] The steady decline in the number of Diet members under fifty is shown by the following figures from the *Year Books*. First Diet (1890) 86 per cent; fifth (1902) 82 per cent; tenth (1912) 62.5 per cent; fourteenth (1920) 45 per cent; fifteenth (1924) 52 per cent; sixteenth (1928) 46.5 per cent; seventeenth (1930) 40 per cent; eighteenth (1932) 39 per cent; nineteenth (1936) 31 per cent; twentieth (1937) 35 per cent. This was the last election before the one manipulated by General Tojo in April 1942.

[2] Hara, Hamaguchi, Inukai, Saito, and Takahashi. See Chapter iv.

While the parliamentarians can be described as 'liberal' only if the most charitable allowance is made for their environment, many of them were associated with genuine liberalism in the minds of Japan's foreign well-wishers because their influence was against war, and because they had the support of many authentic Japanese liberals in academic and business circles. The West was only too anxious, both from commercial self-interest and from love of peace, to retain an impression of the Japanese as a plucky people with quaint and graceful customs living in a land of cherry blossom, and sufficiently progressive in representative government to cope with troublesome militarists. After 1931, and even to some extent after 1937, the liberals of the Japanese literary and commercial worlds were able to reassure the increasingly uneasy democracies. The disillusionment was not complete till December 1941.

An example of the literary liberal who, without ill-intent, misled many Western observers, was Dr Inazo Nitobe. Early in the century he wrote for foreign consumption an attractive book on *bushido* which introduced that ambiguous concept to the West and promoted a romantic vision of Japanese chivalry and tradition. Dr Nitobe became popular abroad as a representative of Japanese liberalism and he was used after 1931 as an apologist in America for the crimes of Japan against China. He undertook the task willingly and with sincerity, for patriotism clouds the judgement even of liberals. One line of persuasion was to present Japan's action as a move against Russia and Communism. 'While the whole world is agitated about Manchuria, Russia is quietly moving eastward like a huge glacier.'[1] In other talks Nitobe advanced a variety of arguments in defence of Japan's war on China in Manchuria, but the most revealing passage was this: 'In the present imbroglio with China, liberal ideas in Japan would have exercised far more influence if the matter had been left to be settled between the two countries . . . The Liberals were not in favour of military operations in Manchuria; but when menace came from abroad, they turned against it in defence of their country's honour, giving up the pettier conflict with their militaristic fellow countrymen.'[2] This was an appeal often heard in the years that followed. Western critics were begged to be patient and to avoid embarrassing 'the moderate influences'. Dr Nitobe,

[1] Nitobe, op. cit., p. 249. [2] ibid., pp. 268–9.

Dr Toyohiko Kagawa, and others were humane men. Dr Nitobe was beaten for his opinions and Dr Kagawa was imprisoned, but they loved their country and persuaded themselves that it was at least partly justified.

Many liberals laboured under a difficulty it is hard to describe. It arises from the fact that the best and the worst in Japanese culture is woven into one design. Militarism, cruelty, and a perverted idea of loyalty are bound up with a tradition of heroic patriotism, a sensitiveness to beauty, and a feeling for its fragility that makes a poignant appeal to the cultivated liberal mind. In their youth many liberals were emotionally satisfied with splendid passages from the history of Western revolt, but when they grew older they probably felt a need to integrate liberalism with Japan's aesthetic tradition. The militarists had much to offer to tempt the emotions of a man in such a mood, while the politicians whom he would have liked to admire were ageing, often involved in corruption or shabby deals, and ever temporizing. A liberal in this perplexed mood might be moved to the soul by the beauty of an old *No* drama though the beauty would be entwined with the brutal *samurai* tradition. This tempted many middle-aged liberals to chauvinism or at least weakened the desire to influence public affairs in the direction of peace.

The radical movement in Japan, both on the industrial and on the political side, had a history of mushroom organization, dissension, and repression. In 1932, however, a step forward was taken. In the industrial field a Japan Labour Union Council was formed which brought together moderate trade unions in a body that included seventy per cent of organized labour[1]; and in the same year the Social Mass Party was formed. The two wings were able to co-operate. The Social Mass Party had a sensible policy of social reform that attracted middle class support, with the result that in Feburary 1936 the party obtained 18 seats in the Diet and a year later doubled this representation. The number of members in the Diet was 466, so that the Social Mass Party had about 8 per cent in 1937.

The middle class support, however, was perhaps the Achilles' heel of the promising party. Small men of business were often hostile to the Zaibatsu, and were ready to leave the Mitsubishi-

[1] Mitsu Kohno, 'Japan's Proletarian Movement', *Contemporary Japan* (Tokyo, March 1937).

dominated Minseito for a mild labour party, but 'People of this class are likely to swing to the banner of fascism unless ably guided by the Social Mass Party.'[1] In fact the party had already shown strong nationalist sympathies and it placed itself behind the Government's war effort against China. Approval of the Government's domestic measures of regimentation was a short step from this, and in 1940 the Social Mass Party was among the first to dissolve and to place itself at the disposal of the 'New Structure' which Prince Konoye was planning.

The trade union movement struggled into existence amid a variety of difficulties, and even at its most successful periods barely 8 per cent of the industrial workers were organized. It was hard to develop a sense of solidarity in a proletariat used to the paternal relationship of the employer to his workers, and with ideas of social obligation nourished by centuries of Confucian thought. Other difficulties were the stream of labour from the countryside into industry, the importance of women's labour, and particularly of indentured women's labour in the cotton industry, and the high annual intake of juveniles, fruit of Japan's population policy. The unions were inexperienced and lacked unity of aim. The industry of the country was largely organized in small units (often controlled by the great monopolists) and in recorded disputes between 1923 and 1936 the average number of workers involved was less than a hundred.[2] This made the construction of strong unions difficult while tending to the creation of short-lived organizations under opportunist leadership. Unions existed on sufferance of police and Government, and the more firm and disciplined a strike the more unscrupulous would be the official and semi-official measures taken to undermine it.

An episode in 1924 gave the unions encouragement. There had for years been agitation for the workers to choose, through their organizations, the workers' delegate to the International Labour Conference at Geneva. The Government had refused to accept the unions as representative, but in 1924, partly to create a good impression abroad, they conceded that the delegate should be chosen by unions having a membership of not less than one thousand. Bunji Suzuki, a moderate but genuine representative of Japanese labour, thereupon went to Geneva. The strengthening of

[1] ibid.

[2] *Japan-Manchoukuo Year Book* (Tokyo, The Japan-Manchoukuo Year Book Co.), 1938, p. 216.

organized labour, of which this recognition was a symptom, was shown in improved union membership. At the end of 1923 membership was 125,000, while at the end of 1924 it was 230,000. Membership then rose more slowly, but in 1936 reached 420,000. The trade union movement was significant, therefore, on account of its possibilities of growth, particularly in sympathy with the promising Social Mass Party, but both wings of the labour movement collapsed under pressure of aggressive nationalism. The unions were dissolved with the political parties and a labour organization, designed as a totalitarian instrument, replaced them. Apparently strikes continued to break out, however, and Japanese prisoners-of-war at the communist school in Yenan reported a number of strikes in 1941 which were, according to these accounts, on a considerable scale.

Among progressive experiments the co-operative movement was of interest. There was nothing radical about it, for it was established by the Co-operative Societies Law in 1909, and was from the first under government patronage. The societies were leniently treated in taxation and the extension of credit to them was facilitated. By 1932 the membership was 5 million and it rose to 6,750,000 in 1938. The societies not only made advances and received deposits, but organized the purchase and sale of the products of agriculture, fishery, and forestry, and dealt in agricultural supplies, notably fertilizer and fodder. The magazine of the Co-operative Central Union had a circulation of 1,500,000 copies in 1937.[1] Though this movement had official encouragement, it also had the earnest support of such men as Dr Kagawa, the Christian socialist, and Sidney Webb (the late Lord Passfield), who saw in co-operation one of the most hopeful of Japanese developments and wrote a cordial preface to a Japanese book on the subject in 1923.[2] At this time credit societies were more important than purchasing or marketing societies, while consumer stores of the kind that provide the main pillar of the movement in Britain were mainly middle-class arrangements to get cheap goods, and were of little account. Dr Kagawa and others, however, began a genuine consumers' movement among the workers which later became of some importance.

[1] Tadao Mikawa, 'Recent Strides in our Co-operative Movement', *Contemporary Japan*, June 1937.

[2] Kiyoshi Ogata, *The Co-operative Movement in Japan*, Studies in Economics and Political Science, No. 69 (London, P. S. King, 1923).

The co-operative movement obviously could have been a training in committee work and business responsibility of the utmost value in the young working-class movement of Japan. Each new credit society was started, as is usual in Japan, by an impulse from the Government, which would send lecturers to tell poor people the advantages of co-operation with special emphasis on thrift. When a branch was formed the mayor or a local landlord would usually become its president; directors were chosen, usually for three years, at a general meeting. At least half the members had to be present and a seventy-five per cent vote was needed for election. Members could be represented by proxy. This sounds well enough, but there was little interest in the meetings and often *sake* parties or other attractions were arranged to draw a satisfactory attendance. This is a familiar story in Japan, but it can at least be claimed that some education in democratic responsibility was derived from the co-operative movement, and possibilities of its future influence are obviously considerable. One further point of note is that women were allowed to vote at general meetings but made little use of the privilege. This does not necessarily mean that they lacked interest. It is likely that in some cases they were too shy to assert themselves and would have been criticized as untrue to Japanese womanhood had they done so.

The first left-wing movement was syndicalist and anarchist. In 1910, however, the anarchist leader Denjiro Kotoku was implicated (very likely falsely) with twenty-three associates in a plot to murder the Emperor. Kotoku, with ten other men and a woman, was executed. This incident was used to discredit the extremists, but they resumed their activity in the period of labour turbulence that followed the first world war. A feature of the Kobe dock strike of 1921 was a syndicalist manifesto.[1] From this time, however, left-wing leadership fell to the communists and not much more was heard of extreme socialist views other than those based on Marxism.

The Communist Party was formed in 1923 but was at once crippled by the arrest of its leaders.[2] There followed persistent efforts to organize groups for political, industrial, or agrarian activity under various names, and the communists also tried to influence the groups and parties of the moderate labour move-

[1] Morgan Young, *Japan under Taisho Tenno* (London, Allen and Unwin, 1928).

[2] Hugh Byas, 'The Communist Movement in Japan', *Contemporary Review*, February 1932. The Japanese *Year Books* date the party from 1922.

ment remaining within the law. In March 1928 a particularly comprehensive police raid was carried out which almost paralysed communist activity. In the same year the Peace Preservation Law was amended and the offence of trying to alter the 'national polity'—an offence of which all Marxists could be convicted—became punishable by death instead of by ten years' imprisonment. One reason for the Government's strong measures was the persistence in the face of every severity of left-wing study groups and organizations in the staff and student bodies of the colleges.[1] The determination of the Government is illustrated by a curiously frank passage in the 1938 *Year Book:* 'Then a special service department was created on a large scale at the central and provincial offices, and besides Shanghai even London and Berlin were included in the sphere of this regular network of espionage.'[2] This reflects the concern of the Government about the ideas and associations of the Japanese teachers and students who studied abroad in large numbers in the nineteen-twenties. The great reduction of overseas studies in the nineteen-thirties was probably due at least as much to fear of 'dangerous thought' as to the depreciation of the yen.

The attack on Communism was maintained with vigour and ingenuity after every open manifestation of it had been suppressed. Remembering how the anarchists had been discredited by charges of criminal conspiracy, responsibility for a bank robbery was fathered on the communists. Injury was also done to the party by the tactics of the police, who succeeded in getting agents into the party. When these spies were discovered, and met retribution, the affairs was represented as a vicious internal quarrel of factions. When, as sometimes happened, communists recanted under torture, their penitence was publicized. One or two important Marxists were persuaded, after years of imprisonment, to advocate a nationalist form of Communism. The aims of the Government were to weaken the party by persecution and at the same time to confuse the public mind about it and create prejudice.

[1] 'The rise of Marxism among the working class in Japan owes very much to the activities of the university professors and liberal intellectual leaders who, by translating foreign literature on socialism, communism, and allied new movements . . . propagated the knowledge of socialism in general, and especially of Marxism.' S. Harada, *Labour Conditions in Japan*. Studies in History, etc. (New York, Columbia University Press, 1928), pp. 189–90.

[2] *Japan-Manchoukuo Year Book*, 1938, section on communists in the chapter on 'Social Problems'. The context does not make the passage clearer except that the reference is apparently to a development in 1928.

These tactics were successful.[1] For example Tsunego Baba, a well known publicist who became an adviser of the Social Mass Party, wrote that the Government had the support of the nation in its measures against Communism and added, 'At first the Japanese people seemed to disregard the communist movement, but later they began to look upon it with horror as a menace to public peace, when communist gang incidents broke out.'[2]

The basis in Japan for a progressive movement at home and a peaceful policy abroad was extensive but weak. There was no trusted political organization through which prudence and goodwill could effectively express itself. The lamentable conditions of public life are exposed in a memorandum written by Prince Konoye before his suicide in the autumn of 1945.[3] The public could have no confidence in a cabinet which 'moved at the beck and call of the intangible shadow of the military command'. Unhappily not only did such peace-loving political leaders as Prince Konoye temporize, they offered what they now claim to have been insincere subscription to the principles of the militarists. Their example, supported by the promptings of patriotism and by fear of the consequences of dissent, put the force of national unity behind aggression. Yet, as this chapter has shown, there were groups and interests in Japan which, had it been possible to marshal them effectively, might have frustrated the policy of war abroad and repression at home.

[1] Max Bickerton, 'The Revolutionary Movement in Japan', *Political Quarterly*, January-March 1935. Mr Bickerton was himself arrested in Japan for communist activity and this article gives a moving account of the steadfastness and high morale of communists in Japanese prisons.

[2] *Contemporary Japan*, March 1937.

[3] Konoye's memorandum is discussed more fully in the chapter on 'War Guilt'.

CHAPTER VIII

The Influence of Education on the Japanese Character

JAPANESE national education in its modern form owed its inception to the group of shrewd and far-sighted statesmen who, in the name of the Emperor Meiji, guided the nation from feudalism to the status of a Great Power in less than half a century. In order to achieve this object, it was held necessary to replace the Confucian element in the aristocratic educational system of feudal Japan by the native Shinto faith, and to instil into the minds of the people, and above all of the rising generation, belief in and loyalty to a divine Emperor and devotion to a divine national mission. This was the specific purpose for which the Japanese educational system was created, and which it has most effectively achieved. The system has also given Japan a standard of literacy which is the highest in Asia and compares favourably with that of many Western countries.

The fifth principle of the 'Charter Oath of Five Principles', offered by the Emperor in 1868 before the Sanctuary, declares that 'knowledge shall be sought for throughout the world, so that the welfare of the Empire may be promoted.'[1] Education was to be universal, its advantages were not to be monopolized by any one class; every one was to receive elementary education at least, irrespective of class, occupation, and sex; opportunity was to be given to all according to their capacity.

It was in 1872 that the first educational code was promulgated, and in October 1890 this was followed by the famous Imperial Rescript on Education,[2] which was regarded by the Japanese as one of the fundamental precepts for the guidance of the nation. Copies of the rescript and of the portrait of the reigning Emperor were distributed to every school in the Empire. The rescript had to be read by the school principal, with every manifestation of ceremonial reverence, to the assembled staff and students on 30 October in each year, and on certain other occasions. The slightest mistake in reading was regarded as a grave misdemeanour. As to

[1] H. Keenleyside and A. F. Thomas, *History of Japanese Education* (Tokyo, The Hokuseido Press, 1937), p. 78.

[2] ibid, p. 100.

the imperial portrait, teachers and students were instructed that in case of natural disaster it must be saved before all else, and many have lost their lives in fulfilling this duty. The effect of all this upon young minds cannot easily be overestimated.

The educational system crumbled under the strain of war, and the following account describes the system as it existed up to about 1940.

Every educational institution in Japan was subject to the direct or indirect control of the Department of Education, by which text-books were issued or approved, curricula supervised, and teachers licensed. Schools were classified as follows: government schools, public schools (those established by prefectures, cities, wards, towns, or villages), and private schools. Government schools were under the direct control of the Department; public and private schools were partly under the control of the Department and partly under that of the local prefectural government.

Elementary schools were of two grades: the ordinary schools, with a six-year course, and the higher schools with a two or three-year course, the system in both cases often being co-educational. The first course was compulsory for all children of both sexes. These schools were established and maintained by the prefectural authorities with the assistance of central government subsidies. There were 25,000 elementary schools, with 11,000,000 students throughout the Empire in 1933.[1]

Secondary education was provided for boys in ordinary and technical schools under the direct control of the Department of Education; separate establishments were maintained for girls. In the ordinary school course of five years special emphasis was laid on the teaching of 'national morals'. Tuition in foreign languages, usually restricted to English, commenced in the middle-school grade. In 1935 there were 550 ordinary middle schools with about 300,000 students.[2] Special and technical middle schools (including those relating to agriculture, commerce, marine products, mercantile marine, etc.) became twice as numerous as the ordinary middle schools and had a two to five-year course of study. Parallel with these boys' schools were girls' high schools, which are discussed in later paragraphs dealing with female education.

It was in the middle school that, in normal times, the student first underwent organized military training. The Ministry of War

[1] ibid., pp. 184 and 187. [2] *The Far East Year Book*, 1941, p. 123.

provided officer instructors and the training occupied five hours a week. Not only squad drill and military operations were taught, but also rifle target practices and (for seniors) use of the machine-gun, bayonet, and hand grenade. Courses of lectures were also given by military officers and there were three field days each term under conditions approximating to active service. Once a year field exercises extending over ten days took place in conjunction with units of the army and in the presence of the Emperor.

Higher education was provided in institutions of two grades: high schools and technical high schools, and universities. The high-school course was normally of three years and was designed as preparation for the university. In the technical category were colleges of medicine, pharmacy, and dentistry, schools of foreign languages and fine arts, and an academy of music, to mention only a few. The course in these schools varied from three to five years.

Universities in Japan had one or more faculties, and provided for post-graduate study. They fell into four categories: imperial, government, public, and private universities. Imperial Universities, six in number, were established by the Government under imperial ordinance, and their high social and educational standing enabled them to take their pick of staff and students. Government universities, thirteen in number, had only one faculty each and comprised two universities of commerce, two of literature and science, seven of medicine, and two of engineering. Public universities, of which there were only two, were those established by public bodies other than the Government. Private universities, twenty-five in all, were established by individuals or organizations approved by the Government (including foreign missions). They varied greatly both in size and in standard of work, the most important of them being Waseda and Keio Universities in Tokyo.

As regards training of teachers, at least one ordinary normal school had to be established in each prefecture, with an elementary school for class practice attached. The normal-school course had two sections, of five and two years each, and a post-graduate course was also offered. Discipline was very strict, and indicated how keenly the Government realized the influence of the teaching profession. All students were obliged to live in the school dormitories, and were subject to strict supervision, especially in relation to outside activities and health. Tuition was free, though students whose means permitted might contribute if they wished.

Pupils were even given allowances in addition to free accommodation, board, text-books, etc. In this way they were placed under a sense of obligation, and in return were obliged to serve in an educational capacity for periods varying from two and a half to eight years according to the degree of state assistance accorded. It is noteworthy that normal school education in Japan has always had a quasi-military character, and pupils were taught to look upon their future profession as a duty which they owed to the State. This nationalist regimentation of Japanese school-teachers remains of high importance in the post-war era because those trained under this system must obviously continue to instruct the youth of Japan. Qualified observers feel, however, that defeat may prove to have broken the mould into which the Japanese educational system has been forced, and that many teachers will not regret the end of a reactionary system to which they must have felt latent antagonism. Subdued by rigid training and economic pressure, they could not hitherto, even if they wished, evade the prevailing nationalism. Their latent antagonism was caused partly by the idealistic outlook common to those whose work brings them into daily contact with the young; and partly by the starvation salaries paid to teachers, particularly in primary schools.

The description of women's education in Japan as it is frequently expressed by the Japanese is opportune here: 'It is better for women that they should not be educated, since their lot through life must be in perfect obedience, obedience to a father when unmarried, to a husband after marriage, and to a son when widowed.' This was the conception of women's position in feudal Japan, and it has changed depressingly little in the intervening eighty years. The Meiji Empress took a personal interest in female education, and in 1871 the first government school for girls was opened in Tokyo.[1] Once the feudal ice had been broken, other similar institutions followed rapidly (with active support from the Christian missions), but by contrast with the demand, the educational opportunities provided for women were entirely inadequate, and the general public remained apathetic. Feudal ideas about the subjection of women died hard.

By 1931 there were 975 girls' secondary schools and their students outnumbered those in boys' secondary schools.[2] This appears

[1] Keenleyside and Thomas, op. cit., pp. 234–5.
[2] *The Far East Year Book*, 1941, p. 123.

satisfactory on the surface, but the attitude of the authorities is revealed by the fact that, whereas the boys' secondary school is called a middle school, that for girls is called a high school, though the standard of the latter is lower. Furthermore, the Central Government itself has not provided a single college for women though numerous universities and colleges have been established for men. Although some universities were permitted to offer women full educational facilities, the major part of the task for providing higher education for women has been left to private initiative. There were three public women's colleges (founded by prefectural authorities) and about a dozen private ones (including colleges of medicine, dental surgery, pharmacy, and physical education). Many foreign residents in Japan have formed the opinion that Japanese women are more intelligent and open-minded than their men; they also show a less accentuated sense of racial apartness. Perhaps the emancipation and liberal education of women might have done something to check the distortion of Japanese society and all its attendant evils.

Such is the outline of Japan's educational system up to 1940. The background may be completed by the following notes on the defects of the Japanese examination system and the modifications introduced into the machinery of education since the outbreak of war.

The influence of the examination system upon the character and well-being of Japanese students was so deplorable that a note on what was appropriately described as *Shiken Jigoku* (Examination Hell) seems called for. This social evil arose firstly from the conception of education, and especially higher education, as a strictly utilitarian avenue to employment in the civil service, the professions, and business; and, secondly, from the innate aristocratic prejudices of the Japanese. That is to say, the educational background of a student must conform to the career to which he aspires. None but graduates from a recognized hierarchy of schools and universities could hope to gain admittance to the best positions in the civil service and in business. The exclusive Imperial Universities would only accept graduates from a select range of schools, and the latter could not, as a rule, accommodate more than a very small fraction of the candidates presenting themselves for entrance examination. A tremendous intellectual and physical strain was thus imposed upon the growing boy from the

middle-school period onwards, and endangered his whole development. It was an all too common cause of tuberculosis, mental collapse, and even suicide. The evil was accentuated by the Japanese family system through the ramifications of which fair competition in examinations was unblushingly circumvented.

Dr Washio, one of Japan's leading educationalists, wrote in 1930: 'The report of the Musashino Higher School (one of the few private schools preparing students for the Imperial Universities) is an illustration of this hellish competition. The school had, in its first trial, the record success of 100 per cent; but, in order to attain this result, out of the 91 students enrolled by selective examination, 27 failed in class examinations, 19 were obliged to leave the school, and 7 died from over-study. Only 38 survived at the time of graduation.'[1]

This grave social danger affected the best students all through their educational career and, as shown by the following interpellation in the Diet in March 1937, was aggravated by the situation confronting them after graduation: 'The number of graduates turned out annually by universities and colleges is 30,000, and of that number 17,000 obtain employment. I note an increase in the number of graduates unable to get jobs. This is deplorable from the standpoint of national thought.'

After the impact of the strong nationalist revival, the educational and military authorities believed it imperative to provide supplementary educational (perhaps 'indoctrinational' would be the correct term) opportunities for boys and girls going out into the world direct from the elementary schools. With this object, youth schools were organized in connection with the Young Men's Association, which is itself an offshoot of the Young Men's Clubs of feudal days. This association, with headquarters in Tokyo and branches throughout the country, was an allegedly spontaneous cultural organization of Japanese youth, and in 1937 claimed over 15,000 branches and 2,500,000 members. The youth schools afforded a five-year course in cultural and technical subjects with special emphasis on 'morals' and physical training, government control being ensured by means of subsidies; such schools numbered over 16,000 with a membership of about 2,000,000. They were controlled by the Bureau of Social Education in the Department of Education, which was also responsible

[1] *Japan Advertiser* (Tokyo), 3 September 1930.

for itinerant and other libraries throughout the country. Through these libraries even the smallest villages were provided with literature officially considered suitable for the moral welfare of the peasants. Parallel to the youth schools were the youths' training schools, which were subsidized by the Army and provided a pre-conscriptional military course. The most extreme of Japan's youth organizations, however, was the Japan Youth Federation, directed by the notorious reactionary, Colonel Kingoro Hashimoto. The tenets of this organization were frankly reactionary, militarist, and anti-foreign.

As already stated, the Japanese educational system was created as an instrument of national policy. By its means the people were to be welded into a single unit round the central core of the Throne, each individual trained to think and act alike. The desired pattern of citizen was determined by the Government and mass-produced by the educational machine. It is interesting to note, however, that the pattern has not always been precisely the same. In the Taisho period of 1912–26, there was an almost naïve attempt to inculcate pacific and pious sentiments in the mind of youth. Text-books abounded in verses about cherry-blossom, apostrophes to mother-love, and the blessings of peace. The so-called Showa Restoration caused all this 'sob-stuff' to be expunged and replaced by biographies of ancient Japanese warriors, with their detestable distortion of 'loyalty' and 'obedience', and by the theme of Manchuria as a national life-line. Text and illustrations constituted an appeal to militant patriotism, with pictures of marching troops, children saluting the flag, aeroplanes, tanks, bombs, and warships. Typical extracts are: 'The Japanese must realize what Japan has bestowed upon the world. This will enable us to control the whole world after the overthrow of the proud and high-flown nations'; or again, 'Some day, having swept away all rottenness and subjugated all arrogant and insolent countries, Japan shall be King of the World and Lord of the Universe.'

This tone was even more pronounced in text-books devoted to 'national morals'. Nominally two hours weekly were assigned to this subject in all institutions, but in practice it pervaded every subject. 'Morals', in Japanese terminology, are entirely divorced from religion, the teaching of which was forbidden in schools. But this did not apply to State Shinto, which was officially pronounced above all religion, and thus exempt. The teaching of

morals was, in fact, designed to produce not good men and women, but good Japanese imbued with the 'Japanese spirit'. The basis of the whole science of 'morals' was the Imperial Rescript on Education mentioned above, in which two virtues were enshrined as characteristic of the Japanese, loyalty and filial piety. For the rest, this famous document consisted of a string of platitudes.

In 1935, the Army openly assumed charge of the training of the nation's youth. The preceding five years had been notable for the campaign against 'dangerous thoughts', an expression not (as might be supposed) restricted to communist ideas, but extending to any intellectual deviation from the officially prescribed path. This grim period was yet, from another aspect, the brightest of contemporary Japan. The spirit of free inquiry blew like a fresh breeze through the high schools, universities, and into society. Sales of what may be termed 'anti-traditionalist' literature assumed very large proportions. How many were stirred by this nascent liberation of thought is unknown; but the *Japan Times* reported in 1936 that more than 59,000 persons had been arrested during the preceding three years for various 'thought' offences. Only a minority of those arrested had been actually outspoken in unorthodox opinion; the attitude was generally one of negative discontent with existing conditions and positive remedies were seldom advocated. That torture was often employed by the police to induce 'confession' is only too well authenticated. Some died under their sufferings. Many of the victims (professors, students, and workers; women as well as men), knowing that they could expect no mercy from the police if arrested, worked undauntedly for a better state of society. Their names constitute Japan's unrecognized roll of honour, and their courage a hopeful sign for the future.

Army control of education was followed by a spate of organizations for control of thought. Thought supervisors and thought inspection commissions began to operate in the schools. The committee-mentality of Japan ran riot in a series of organizations such as the Committee for the promotion of Japanese Learning, New Council on Innovation in Education and Learning, Committee for the Promotion of Students' Welfare. The object of all this ponderous machinery was to enmesh the student in the tentacles of tribalism.

Simultaneously, the Departments of Education and War brought into play all the resources of propaganda. Pamphlets, in issues of a million or more, rolled from the army printing presses with significant titles such as *Principles of National Defence and the Strategy of Economic War, How to Prepare for Long-term Hostilities,* and so forth. They were distributed not only in schools and colleges, but in every village throughout the land, and their sole object was to stimulate a desire for war. Officers toured the country, lecturing in schools, temples, village halls, and factories. Motorized film units brought visual propaganda to every village, a typical production being entitled *Japan Stands Alone,* in which Japan was depicted as the protector of the Orient against Western aggression. In addition to the routine annual pilgrimages to the Meiji and Yasukuni Shrines in Tokyo and that of the Sun Goddess at Ise, school principals were instructed to organize expeditions to local Shinto shrines. The plaza before the Imperial Palace was daily thronged with school children 'worshipping the Emperor from a distance'.

The Japanese are by nature a gregarious race and delight in groups, societies, and clubs. In the task of youth indoctrination, the Ex-Servicemen's Association and the Japanese Women's Society for National Defence both played outstanding parts. The former was especially valuable to the authorities, since even the smallest village boasted a unit. Members took the lead in organizing patriotic festivals, lecturing school children on loyalty, guiding the Boy Scouts, drilling the students of the youth schools, and (most important of all) in supervising the 'thought atmosphere' of every household in their vicinity.

Within the schools themselves, especially those of higher grade, the Army became increasingly aggressive, much to the resentment of many of the school authorities. In every class students were encouraged to spy upon their fellows, and even upon the teachers. Frequently the appointed lecturer on 'morals' was constrained to make way for a young army officer and, sitting among his pupils, to learn the correct methods of instruction. College libraries were scrutinized for evidence of un-Japanese thought; hundreds of volumes, hitherto thought harmless enough, were removed and replaced by others corresponding more closely to the prevalent ideology. In the field of sport, anything savouring of 'individualism' was eliminated, for this was considered the most

insidious heresy with which Japanese youth had been infected by the West. The crowds at university baseball league matches in Tokyo, sometimes numbering thirty or forty thousand, were forbidden to shout or cheer. A modest clapping was the only sign of approval permitted; and games began and ended by the teams lining up and all, spectators included, bowing solemnly in the direction of the Imperial Palace.

The youth against whom this tremendous paraphernalia of indoctrination was directed might well be pictured as an incipient rebel, impregnated with all the horrors of democracy. On the contrary he is, as a rule, a docile and well-behaved soul. This is due to his environment, for it may be doubted whether there exists any society in the world so patterned, so ritualized, as that of Japan. Undoubtedly, the Japanese is abnormally emotional, and it is perhaps because of this fact that Japanese social life is so codified, for this provides the child with rules of correct behaviour in all circumstances. The effect on character development is disastrous, since it entails the repression of the child's emotional nature. The apparent stoicism of Japanese youth is a façade to a tumultuous soul which, when restraints break down, may express itself in terrible extremes, such as suicide and murder in the individual, and in panic savagery in the mass, as illustrated by the murder of Koreans after the earthquake of 1923. The Japanese student must thus be regarded as emotionally unstable, and the innumerable repressions enforced upon him increase this weakness of character. The regulation of his home environment is merely a preparation for a more rigid school career. Hemmed in by comprehensive rules of conduct, he lives in fear of breaking them, and the punishment most dreaded in his school life is ridicule. This makes him extremely sensitive, ever on the watch for fancied insults, and accounts for the gregarious instinct which is one of his most striking characteristics. He feels safe only in a crowd of similar pattern, and dreads the necessity for independent decision lest he be laughed at for making a mistake. In class-work, too, conformity to pattern is the objective, and originality, however brilliant, is discouraged and suppressed by ridicule.

CHAPTER IX

The Women of Japan

SPEAKING in very general terms, the position of women in Japan, prior to the outbreak of war in the Far East, had improved very little from either the social or domestic point of view. Women in the ranks of the aristocracy continued to be bound by the traditions, customs, and rules of etiquette which have regulated the way of life of the Japanese from time immemorial. The lower classes continued to subscribe to the belief that this is a man-made world and that women's place in it is to minister to man's needs, subscribe with blind faith to his ideas, obey his commands, and bear his children. It was only among the wives and daughters of leading men in the governmental, professional, and commercial spheres, who came into contact with foreigners, that new ideas were beginning to creep in and women were coming to appreciate the possibilities of a different and freer life for the womanhood of Japan.

Gradually these ideas, in very restricted form, began to infiltrate into the home life of many Japanese in this class, often without much opposition from the male head of the family, who had also fallen under the spell of Western influence and ideas. Wives and daughters began to enjoy greater freedom of movement in their social activities. Foreign meals appeared in Japanese homes and frequently a section of the house was redecorated in the European or American style. Up to the outbreak of war, however, few foreigners were visitors in Japanese homes and they were usually entertained in public restaurants. The Japanese, on the other hand, were often quite willing to visit and be entertained in the private homes of foreigners.

There is little doubt that Japanese women in the upper middle-classes were beginning to enjoy this new order, such as it was, and there is equally little doubt that, but for the rupture of international relations, the movement towards a more democratic and less restricted way of life for women would have found growing expression in many Japanese homes as time went on. The idea that man was a superior being from another world was beginning

to lose a lot of ground. It is not inconceivable that the aristocratic as well as the lower classes might eventually have succumbed in varying degrees to the spell of these ideas; but, of course, they received no understanding or sympathy from the militarists.

Only in the upper middle classes were Japanese girls, generally speaking, given any say in the choice of husbands, and this, again, was undoubtedly due to the spread of Western ideas in this section of the community. To take an example, the parents would select a husband for their daughter, but if she did not approve another choice would be made. Or again, if the daughter found some one she liked, the parents would frequently give their consent if the prospective bridegroom was not ineligible in other respects. In all other sections of the community, again speaking in general terms, marriages were purely family arrangements. Usually the girl had no opportunity of meeting young men of her own age and, consequently, was rarely in a position to weigh up in her own mind the possible merits or demerits of a prospective husband. Neither the independence movements started by women in the nineteen-twenties nor the spread of Western ideas had any effect in moderating the system of divorce whereby the husband could divorce the wife virtually at will, while the wife possessed no corresponding rights when she wished to dispose of a husband. The legal term 'by mutual consent' employed to denote the termination of a marriage, was often an entirely meaningless one and a particularly cruel one as well, when the husband was almost invariably given the custody of any children should he desire it. Only in exceptional circumstances, when the husband was a criminal, for example, would the judge give the wife the custody of her children.

During the nineteen-twenties a number of feminist societies or committees were formed with the object of securing the emancipation of women, more or less on Western lines, with the right to vote, and so on. Recruits for the movement were drawn almost exclusively from the ranks of the younger upper middle-class women, who alone had either the time or the opportunity for indulging in such activities. To some extent the movement had the passive support of a cross-section of the Westernized male elements, but it lacked vitality and never seemed to gain any appreciable momentum. Too often a girl who joined the cause with considerable enthusiasm after leaving school or college got

married and subsequently lost all interest. Little assistance came from the older married women, although in some cases the movement had their sympathy and passive support.

Despite the lack of vitality the movement continued up to the outbreak of war and in fact it succeeded in securing greater freedom for women in their social and domestic life in a number of upper-class homes. But officially or publicly it appeared to have achieved virtually nothing, partly, perhaps, because of the lack of any inspiring leadership. Against this there were signs that some male civilian elements, especially those who had established contacts with the Western world, were beginning to realize the inequality of woman's position in Japan and were tentatively considering a readjustment of their ideas in this respect.

During the late nineteen-twenties, a number of committees, composed of men and women, were formed secretly to propagate communistic ideas. Girl students and ex-students of the upper class joined the movement but police activities prevented its spread on an extensive or impressive scale. At considerable risk to themselves, male and female communist orators gave talks to groups of workmen and others, while a number of purely feminine committees devoted their time to assisting male communist leaders in a variety of ways. By 1935, however, all these committees and organizations had been rounded up by the police and a number of men and women had been imprisoned.

A large number of women of the upper classes, especially those who had contacts with foreigners, viewed with considerable alarm the activities of the militarists in shaping the destiny of Japan; these feelings were shared by many of the male civilians in this section of the community. The ever increasing spread of military influence in the schools, from the kindergarten upwards, was a sinister and terrifying factor for many mothers, who saw the all-too-obvious end in view. On the other hand, the teachings of the militarists, repeatedly and ruthlessly driven home, that war was Japan's inevitable destiny, had succeeded in convincing many who subsequently resigned themselves to this belief—unpalatable though it was to them. In any case there was nothing they could do about it.

In the schools and colleges the militarists had shown considerable skill—perhaps as much as the Nazis in Germany—in training the youthful mind to believe in Japan's 'divine' mission of setting

the world in order through an unrestricted use of the sword. Fanatics were bred in Japanese schools just as surely as they have been bred in the schools and training camps of Germany. When these young people returned home for their holidays they usually disseminated their fanatical ideas in their homes, with the result that a number of mothers and sisters became converts.

Whatever doubt or despondency may have existed prior to the war, it is clear from a variety of sources that when it eventually came a wave of intense patriotism welded the nation, both men and women, into a composite whole. This was greatly reinforced by the outstanding successes gained by the Japanese armed forces during the first months of the conflict.

When the tide turned, all the available evidence goes to show that the people of Japan of all classes were knit together in the face of imminent peril to their homeland and their Empire. The Japanese—of both sexes—have from time immemorial made something of a fetish of tragedy. Their codes have been fixed as to the manner in which it should be faced, and they glory in meeting it in what is to them the correct way.

The character of Japanese women has seemed attractive to most Western observers. The typical woman, irrespective of her class, is graceful, brave, cultivated, and selflessly devoted to duty. This is centred primarily on the family and secondarily on the State. The arrogance, fury when thwarted, and selfishness which are traits of many Japanese men are rare in the women. This is a difference which probably dates from childhood. The Japanese are extremely fond of children, and excessively indulgent to them, and the boys' character is often the worse for this. The girls are also very kindly treated, and receive endless affection, but they have the discipline of an unquestioned subordination to their brothers. Consequently they are seldom 'spoilt' in the sense of behaving badly when they cannot get their way. Their 'spoiling' takes rather the opposite form of training them to be too self-effacing and docile.

CHAPTER X

The Economic Background

BETWEEN the Restoration of 1868 and 1936, on the eve of the China war, Japan was transformed from a primitive agricultural country into one of the leading industrial countries of the world, and it was largely through industrialization and the expansion of foreign trade that an increase in her population from about thirty-three millions to over seventy millions during this period was possible. By 1936 she had become the chief producer of cheap manufactured goods to meet the growing needs of Asia, and the cotton industry, the first to develop on a large scale, had outstripped that of Great Britain. In Korea and Formosa she had acquired valuable colonial territories and she was rapidly developing the resources and markets of Manchuria. The earlier stages in this process of rapid industrialization, though historically of great interest, are outside the scope of a survey concerned with the future rather than the past. It is, however, necessary to glance at the developments of the period immediately preceding 1936, because the great changes that occured in those years are of significance for the appraisal of Japan's future. In 1929 her industry and export trade had been largely concentrated upon textiles, mainly raw silk and cotton. The prolonged depression, which began in 1930 in the traditional raw silk trade (and the consequent depression in agriculture), compelled her to find new manufactured exports in substitution for silk, and new sources of employment to take up the labour displaced from the farms and the reeling mills. So, by 1936, she had widely extended the range of her industries. Many trades which had been growing very slowly during the nineteen-twenties advanced rapidly in the next decade. In particular there was a marked growth in the heavy industries, partly under the influence of rearmament and the financial policy associated with it. Much of the economic development of the time can be attributed to the immense increase in technical efficiency achieved during the years of depression. This yielded striking results after 1931 when the handicap of an over-valued currency was removed and when

the policy of reflation brought a stimulus to the economy as a whole.

Some of the changes deserve to be examined. By 1936 the index of industrial production had risen to 149, and by 1937 to 167 (monthly average 1931–3 being 100).[1] The rise was largely associated with the expansion of the capital goods industries; whereas the index for consumer goods averaged 125 in 1936, and 137 in 1937, for capital goods it stood at 172 in 1936, and 198 in 1937.[2] Ingot steel production increased from about 2 million tons before the depression to between 5 and 6 million tons in 1936;[3] and there was a marked expansion of the chemical (including rayon), engineering, metal goods, cement, glass, and several other industries, hitherto of minor importance. In 1928–9 Japan imported about two-sevenths of the finished steel she required and hardly exported any. By 1936 her finished steel imports had fallen by two-thirds, while her own output had more than doubled. She was then exporting, mainly to the colonies and Manchuria, about 900,000 tons, three times her import tonnage.[4] Apart from special steels, she had become almost independent of foreign supplies. In most classes of machinery, with the exception of machine tools and boilers, she had become practically self-sufficient by 1936 and was a net exporter of electrical, textile, and mining machinery, and of scientific instruments. Only in the manufacture of road vehicles was her progress slow. Nor was this striking progress limited to the heavy industries. Since 1929 Japan had become one of the world's greatest producers of continuous filament and staple fibre, and a large exporter both of yarns and fabrics. By 1936 her output of woollen and worsted fabrics had greatly expanded and a large export trade had been worked up. The growth of the cotton industry continued and Japan far outstripped Great Britain in the quantity of her piece-goods exports. A host of minor industries also expanded and their products began to enter into the export trade in large amounts.

[1] E. B. Schumpeter, 'Government Policy and Recovery in Japan', in *The Industrialization of Japan and Manchukuo*, edited by E. B. Schumpeter (New York, Macmillan, 1940), p. 27, footnote.

[2] E. B. Schumpeter, 'Industrial Development and Government Policy', in *The Industrialization of Japan and Manchukuo*, p. 800.

[3] G. C. Allen, 'Japanese Industry, its Organization and Development to 1937', in *The Industrialization of Japan and Manchukuo*, p. 597.

[4] E. F. Penrose, 'Japan, 1920–1936', in *The Industrialization of Japan and Manchukuo*, pp. 260–1.

Japan's foreign trade figures reflect clearly these great changes in her economy. By 1936 finished manufactured goods made up three-fifths of her total exports compared with about two-fifths in 1928, while over 70 per cent of the imports now consisted of raw materials and foodstuffs.[1] Yet the advance of Japan's foreign trade, though striking, still left her with a relatively small share of world trade, and the rise in her proportion of that trade between 1929 and 1937 was much less than might be supposed. Thus, her proportion of total world exports grew from 2·94 per cent in 1929 to 3·46 per cent in 1937, and her proportion of total world imports from 2·80 per cent to 3·90 per cent. What created the impression of a country that was making dangerously rapid inroads into world markets was, first, the fact that the development occurred when world trade as a whole was stagnating, and, secondly, the fact that her exports no longer depended heavily on raw silk[2] (a non-competitive and semi-manufactured product), but had changed to directions which brought her into conflict with the staple industries of the West. It is true that the low price of many Japanese exports created new markets in Asia, but some part of them undoubtedly affected Western manufacturers.

The development of the heavy industries owed much to state policy, to national expenditure on rearmament and to the very large Japanese investments in Manchuria. Yet too much should not be made of the temporary and 'artificial' character of this advance. These factors merely accelerated a natural trend. Thus, the industrial and commercial development of the period 1932–6 may be attributed to:

(*a*) the improvement in technical efficiency during the preceding period of deflation;
(*b*) the chronic depression in the silk trade which compelled a transference to manufacturing industries; and
(*c*) the reflationary policy associated with rearmament and heavy investment in Manchuria after 1932, which enabled Japan to achieve the 'full employment' of her resources.

Before the world depression a rise in the standard of living was certainly taking place and in 1929 real wages in the cities were

[1] *The Far East Year Book*, 1941, p. 452.

[2] The proportion of raw silk in Japan's exports was over 40 per cent in 1922 and nearly 40 per cent in 1928. In 1931 it was barely 32 per cent and by 1936 had fallen to 15 per cent. E. B. Schumpeter, op. cit., p. 831.

probably some 60 or 70 per cent above the pre-war level. During the depression itself money wages fell very steeply, but the cost of living declined even more. Consequently, those industrial workers who continued in full employment became better off. But the real incomes of the peasants and small tradesmen declined heavily. Reflation after 1931 failed to raise the general level of money wages appreciably because the continued depression in the agricultural and silk industries effectively countered the financial influences that were making for a rise in industrial wages. Marked disparities between movements in different industries did, however, make their appearance. For instance, money wages in the heavy industries rose steeply, while elsewhere they remained stationary or declined. In the meantime the cost of living increased, and so real wages, outside the metal and engineering group, were probably rather lower in 1937 than in 1931, or even than in 1929.

The failure of the real incomes of a large part of the community to rise at a time when industrial production was growing rapidly cannot be explained solely by the influence of the agricultural depression on wages. Another reason is the fact that the rise in industrial output was substantial only in capital goods. Japan was building up equipment for war, for industrial use at home, and for investment in Manchuria and her colonies, rather than producing goods for immediate consumption. In the second place, Japan's terms of international trade deteriorated after 1931; she was thus obliged to offer a progressively larger quantity of exports for a given number of imports. Another cause was the rise in population from 64 millions in 1930 to well over 70 millions in 1936.[1] Finally, the rise in prices after 1931 meant a redistribution of the national income in favour of the profit-earner. For all these reasons, no significant improvement in the general standard of life among her working population accompanied the great industrial expansion of 1929–37, and since 1937 there has certainly been serious deterioration. We can conclude that, at any rate between the world depression and the China war, Japan added greatly to her war potential and capital equipment without bringing about a fall in the standard of life.

The industrial and military effort was, of course, reflected in Japan's public finance. By the end of 1931 she had exhausted the

[1] *Far East Year Book*, 1941, p. 44.

financial expedients available to her in an attempt to meet the conditions of the world depression by 'orthodox' methods. The continued disequilibrium in the balance of payments, the steep reduction in the gold reserve, and the social and political disturbances for which deflation was to some extent responsible, all discredited those methods; and when Great Britain left the gold standard in September 1931, Japan soon followed her example and sought new means of escape from her financial difficulties. From 1932 to 1936 a policy of reflation, associated with the name of the Finance Minister, Mr Korekiyo Takahashi, was pursued. This meant, in practice, an increase in governmental expenditure (financed largely through borrowing), easy credit conditions, and a reduction in the exchange value of the yen. Takahashi seems to have anticipated that, after several years of reflation, it would be possible to return to a system of balanced budgets; but the demands of the military for still further increases in the expenditure on armaments proved too strong for him. His resistance to their demands led to his assassination and the deficits continued.

Takahashi's policy, viewed from a purely financial standpoint, was very successful as long as he was there to administer it. It certainly assisted in the economic recovery of Japan from depression, while at the same time both cumulative inflation and vexatious controls over economic processes were avoided. State expenditure rose from 1·5 thousand million yen in 1931–2 to 2·3 thousand million yen in 1936–7, and the annual budgetary deficit, financed by loans, ran between 600 and 750 million yen during this period. The internal national debt rose from 4·5 thousand million yen in 1930 to 9·3 thousand million yen in 1937[1] but this increase was not serious in view of the simultaneous rise in the national income and as the initial debt figure was proportionately small. The upward movement of wages and prices during the period was quite moderate.

The bond issues of the Government were absorbed for the most part by the commercial banks and the savings banks. The banks had little difficulty in taking up the bonds, because the high industrial profits led industrial borrowers to pay off outstanding bank loans (or to raise share or debenture capital to finance their extensions) and so the banks were left with idle resources for investment

[1] See *The Financial and Economic Annual of Japan* (1931–7), compiled by the Department of Finance, and printed by the Government Printing Office, Tokyo.

in government bonds. The foreign exchange rate remained stable between 1932 and 1936. There seems no reason for believing that it was deliberately undervalued (as has been said) during these years. If the rate failed to rise in spite of the buoyant export trade, this can be largely attributed to heavy investment in Manchuria.

The elimination of Takahashi in 1936 meant the abandonment of his cautious and enlightened policy, which was, of course, inconsistent with the ambitious aims of the Army. Armament expenditure increased and with it the budgetary deficits. The result was that prices took a sharp upward turn at the end of 1936, while the yen showed signs of weakness. In the early months of 1937 it was necessary to impose tighter controls over exchange dealings and over imports. There is no doubt that 1936 was a critical year, from an economic no less than from a political point of view. When Takahashi began his reflationary policy a large proportion of Japan's resources were unemployed or under-employed. It was therefore possible, by increasing state expenditure, to draw these resources back into employment without provoking a rise in wages and so in prices. By 1936, however, this process had been completed and further increases in government expenditure, financed by loans, meant a real danger of inflation, which could only be countered by the imposition of controls over the disposition of resources.

The war that began in 1937 accentuated industrial trends already present. But that year marks another important dividing-line in Japanese economic history. Between 1931 and 1937 the progress of the heavy industries took place without any decline in the textile industries (except silk) and the miscellaneous consumption goods industries; for during these years Japan could draw upon still under-employed resources together with those freed from agriculture and the raw silk trade. By 1937, however, her resources were fully employed, and further development in the heavy industries could only be achieved at the expense of other trades. Restrictions were consequently imposed on the production and importation of goods regarded as inessential for the prosecution of the war. A striking change occurred in the destination of the exports of Japan Proper and in the sources of her imports, as the following table demonstrates.[1]

[1] *Far East Year Book*, 1941, p. 456.

	EXPORTS		*IMPORTS*	
	To Yen Bloc	*To Foreign Countries*	*From Yen Bloc*	*From Foreign Countries*
	%	%	%	%
1936	24·4	75·6	14·3	85·7
1939	48·8	51·2	23·4	76·6

(Yen Bloc includes Manchuria, Kwantung Leased Territory, and Occupied China)

It is necessary to glance at certain prominent features of Japan's economic organization. On one side we have numerous very small firms and workshops in fierce competition, and on the other side not merely some very large technical units but also an extreme concentration of economic power in a few business groups, particularly those known as the Zaibatsu.[1] This dichotomy is not difficult to explain. Japan is a country with a large and rapidly increasing labour supply; but her capital resources are relatively small and are not widely diffused. It has, therefore, paid her, when technical conditions permit, to use processes that require a large proportion of labour and a small proportion of capital, and in many industries production in small units is the natural outcome of those conditions. But where, as in iron and steel, and cotton spinning, technical conditions make production in large units essential, large plants comparable to those that exist in the West have been created. And, because of certain peculiar features in her modern economic development as well as the absence of a large investing class, the ownership of these great plants has been concentrated in a few hands. Even the independence of the numerous small producers in other trades was often only apparent; for many of them were in fact dependent on the Zaibatsu for finance and marketing facilities. This association of a concentration of economic control at the centre, with numerous small technical units on the periphery, conferred on the economy the advantage of flexibility and resilience, while providing the possibility of pursuing a coherent economic policy.

The importance of the Zaibatsu in the economic development

[1] The term *Zaibatsu* (literally 'money group') is sometimes applied loosely to many large business groups, and when thus used is perhaps roughly equivalent to 'plutocracy'. But, when used more precisely, the term can be employed to indicate four business groups—Mitsui, Mitsubishi, Sumitomo, and Yasuda—though not necessarily in that order of relative importance.

of Japan can hardly be exaggerated. What distinguished them from other large capital-owning groups in Japan and elsewhere was not merely the magnitude, but also the very wide scope, of their interests. Moreover, while the giant concerns of Western nations have an international character and a political and economic outlook not necessarily always in conformity with that of the Governments of their respective countries, the Zaibatsu, though possessing interests in foreign countries, have always been closely associated with the working out of Japan's economic policy. Each of them not only controlled numerous undertakings in a very wide range of large-scale manufacturing and mining industries, but also occupied a leading place in banking, insurance, commerce, and shipping. A concentration of economic power is to be expected whenever rapid industrial and commercial development occurs in a country with a relatively primitive economic organization, especially if that development is guided and stimulated by a purposeful central authority; but there have been special circumstances in Japan to account for the emergence of these powerful groups.

When Japan was launched on her career of Westernization, the Government found it convenient to use certain of the older banking and commercial families (especially those who had helped to finance political movements that led to the Restoration) as agents for the execution of its economic policy. There was at that time no large middle class with financial resources and industrial and commercial experience. Introduction of Western methods could, therefore, best be achieved by centralizing the process in a few great business families which had already considerable experience of large-scale organization. Close connections were established between leading statesmen and particular business families. From time to time Governments, when in financial difficulties, called on the Zaibatsu for help, and in return the Zaibatsu acquired government properties, received valuable contracts, and earned large profits from underwriting government loans. Their purely financial interests thus extended *pari passu* with the expansion in their industrial scope. The several wars in which Japan took part enabled the Zaibatsu to enlarge their sphere, often at the expense of other business families, and from each period of depression that followed the post-war booms they emerged stronger than before. They also played an important part in the development of colonial resources.

The Zaibatsu were never merely passive agents of official economic policy and, as they grew in wealth and power, they were able to influence that policy to an increasing extent. They became an important group-interest, which might sometimes come into conflict with other groups which aimed at directing state policy. The growth in the power of the Diet during the nineteen-twenties gave them an opportunity, through their association with the political parties, to strengthen their influence, and Mitsui men and Mitsubishi men often occupied important ministerial offices. In this respect Japan was working to a political pattern familiar enough in the democracies, but this relationship between big business and politics seems to have been more frankly acknowledged in Japan. That the Zaibatsu rendered great services to Japan cannot be denied. On balance, moreover, their political influence was probably beneficial, since it was often opposed to that of the militarists and since, on the whole, their interests lay in economic expansion rather than territorial aggression, and in the development of parliamentary government. They were not in the least inspired by democratic ideas; but their enlightened economic self-interest, even when ruthlessly pursued, probably provided a firmer basis for peaceful international relationships than the mysticism of their opponents.

The Zaibatsu came under fire from many quarters—from the Army, which believed that the proper function of the Zaibatsu was in acting as agents of government policy, not as independent pressure-groups; from traditionalists in general, who saw in the rise of the great capital-groups a threat to ancient loyalties and ways of life; from left-wing critics who were naturally antagonistic to powerful capital interests; and from small traders and industrialists, who suffered from their competition or became subordinate to their financial power. After 1931 the Zaibatsu suffered a serious setback. The policies with which they were associated came to grief during the depression and they were discredited; and the rise of military influence over the Government forced them into the background. Many of the controls over industry instituted after 1931 were calculated to diminish their power, and, under the pressure of public opinion, they withdrew from many spheres of activity, especially from those where they most obviously came into conflict with small-scale enterprise. In the development of Manchurian resources after 1932 they at first played a minor part, and large-scale enterprise there passed under the control of new

groups, known as Shin-Zaibatsu,[1] whose capital basis was wider and whose interests were more obviously associated with those of the militarists. But the apparent retreat of the Zaibatsu was regarded by Japanese observers as a ruse since they habitually trimmed their sails to prevailing political winds. Since the military could not dispense with the Zaibatsu, they were obliged to moderate their criticism; while the Zaibatsu stood to gain by accommodating themselves to national policy since they could not for the moment exercise an independent influence on it.

In spite of the concentration of power in the Zaibatsu, and in spite of official controls over production, the Japanese economy before the war was highly competitive. This was true especially of the smaller industrialists and traders; but it extended also to large-scale industry, and even the Zaibatsu were fiercely competitive with one another. Japan had, moreover, remained on the whole aloof from international cartels, and, when her industrialists joined them, it was usually because adherence to cartel restrictions was presented as being the only alternative to import restrictions in foreign markets. Thus, when a rapidly growing section of world industry was passing under the control of monopolies, Japan still remained faithful in the main to the principle of competition. For this reason her economic system remained resilient, and her entrepreneurs adventurous, at a time when their counterparts elsewhere were busily dividing up markets into exclusive spheres of influence, or were putting one industry after another into the strait-jacket of quotas, price agreements, and restrictive patent arrangements. The labour market, also, retained its fluidity, and there were no trade union rules to hinder the adoption of new and improved processes. The weakness of labour organization in Japan had its dark side, which critics have not been slow to point out; and it is possible that, with defeat, pressure may be employed to induce Japan to adopt the provisions of the International Labour Office for working hours and minimum wage-rates.

A capacity for co-operative action has been a traditional Japanese characteristic in many fields of economic and social activity. During the nineteen-thirties the Government encouraged the development of various types of association among small producers, exporters and traders. Most of these were originally established

[1] *Shin-Zaibatsu* means new Zaibatsu. The most prominent member of this group was the Nissan firm controlled by Mr Yoshisuke Aikawa.

for the purpose of improving the efficiency of small-scale enterprises, but their extension after 1932 was due partly to their usefulness as a means for supporting the small man against the competition of large concerns, and partly to their value as instruments of official control. For instance, the Export Guilds were used in the nineteen-thirties to supervise the allocation of export quotas in industries of which the exports had been limited by agreement with foreign countries (e.g. cotton exports to India). These associations rarely succeeded in mitigating the fierce price competition which was characteristic of so much of Japanese industry.

One of the main weaknesses of Japan's economy, both for peace and war, lies in her huge and primitive agriculture.[1] The retention of this great army of agricultural workers has applied a powerful brake on her economic expansion. Although the population of Great Britain is only three-fifths that of Japan, the present occupied population in industry (excluding agriculture) and the armed forces does not greatly differ in the two countries. This is mainly because Japan has retained a traditional peasant agriculture, whereas Great Britain has chosen to develop a small, efficient agriculture. If reasonable opportunities for an expansion of Japan's foreign trade are allowed, we may expect that her agricultural population will steadily diminish. This should have important political advantages, since the peasantry are the main repository of the national myths which have led Japan astray, and it is to them that political and economic irrationalism makes its most effective appeal. If, however, these opportunities are denied to her, then she will be obliged to continue to maintain a large agriculture and to grow a large proportion of her food supply at home. Before the war, at a heavy cost in labour, she provided herself with about four-fifths of the rice, nearly nine-tenths of the wheat (allowing for exports of wheat flour) and an equally high proportion of the other grains that she required. Nearly all her rice imports were obtained from her colonies, while for wheat imports she relied mainly on Australia and Canada. Her production of fish rose steadily during the nineteen-thirties, and she not only met her own requirements but

[1] It is sometimes claimed that the existence of a large agricultural population is of assistance in times of industrial depression, since unemployed factory workers who have rural connections can in such times return to the farms and be maintained by their relatives. It should be observed, however, that this practice merely shifts the burden of depression to the shoulders of those least able to bear it, and it is likely to add to the rural discontent which has been one of the causes of pro-militarist trends in Japanese politics.

also built up a large export trade. Apart from rice, the principal imported foodstuffs were sugar and beans (procured from Formosa and Manchuria respectively). Thus, Japan, with her colonies and Manchuria, was largely self-sufficient in foodstuffs, for imports from other countries were more than balanced by exports. This does not imply that she could provide herself with most of the foodstuffs required for a satisfactory national diet, but merely that she has in the past been able to provide a large part of her consumption.

Japan Proper produced a comparatively small proportion of the raw materials which her industry required. With the loss of her colonies and control over Manchuria, she will need foreign exchange for buying the greater part of her raw material requirements for the metal, textile (other than silk), rubber, vegetable oil, and leather industries, as well as mineral oil for transport. She is better off for materials for heavy chemical manufacture, since she has supplies of sulphur, pyrites, limestone, and coal; but she has to import phosphate ore, salt, and potash. This reliance upon imports, however, will not constitute a serious weakness if she regains access to export markets; indeed, in this respect she is in a position very similar to that of Great Britain.

For power supplies Japan is quite fortunately situated. Although her coal production and resources are comparatively small (her output in 1936 was only about one-sixth of the British output) she possesses ample hydro-electric power. Between 1920 and 1936 generating capacity increased about five and a half times, and eighty per cent of the production in 1936 was by water power. Japanese production of electricity was then only slightly below that of the United Kingdom and Canada, and it has grown greatly since then.

The purely economic interests of Japan have in recent times resembled those of Great Britain in the middle of the nineteenth century. Those interests lay in maintaining conditions favourable to a general expansion of production and foreign commerce throughout the world; that is to say freedom in international exchange, vigorous price competition, both internal and external, and a high degree of mobility in the factors of production. But if, as has been said, Japan entered the political scene 'too late for Empire', she also entered the economic scene 'too late for economic liberalism'. For by the time Japan was ready to make her entry as a serious

competitor, her chief rivals had lost their faith in economic liberalism. By the nineteen-thirties, industrialists and Governments in Europe, the British Empire, and even the United States, were concerned with preserving the *status quo* in international trade, and they occupied themselves with devising schemes for the protection of established producers. Thus, the economic environment was far less favourable to Japan than to Great Britain on her emergence as a great industrial nation in the nineteenth century. In a less resilient world, moreover, the incidence of cyclical depression was more serious and more prolonged. Consequently a policy directed above all towards promoting economic expansion (the policy which alone could enable Japan to raise her general standard of welfare substantially) was less obviously in her interest than it would have been in a more favourable world environment. It was not difficult, therefore, for the militarists to argue that a policy of aggression, designed to secure for Japan special privileges over large territories in Asia, was preferable. Japan could not pursue both policies with equal success simultaneously, because preparation for war meant the diversion of resources from peace-time export industries to the heavy trades. For a time this inconsistency was obscured by causes already explained; but by 1936 it became evident at last, and it helped then to produce the final struggle between the militarists and their opponents.

CHAPTER XI

The Population Problem

THE consideration most often put forward in extenuation of Japan's aggression is that she found it difficult to provide her population with adequate standards of living. This is one version of the 'haves versus have-nots' interpretation of international friction, and was not only employed persistently by the Japanese, but was received with far more sympathy by the rest of the world than it deserved.[1]

The usual starting point for a study of this matter is the density of population, though this is not, in fact, a very important factor in judging a country's prosperity. Japan in 1938 had about 150 people to the square kilometre. This is a high figure but is paralleled by other important countries. The population density in England and Wales, in Holland and in Belgium was much higher than in Japan, and in Germany the density was nearly as great. A more substantial point is that less than 16 per cent of Japan, which is a mountainous and wooded land, is cultivable, and it would be difficult and costly materially to improve this proportion. Density per square kilometre of arable land was as follows: Japan, 1,163; England and Wales, 1,141; the Netherlands, 828; Belgium, 785; China, 504.[2] Japan's density on arable land, however, is subject to two qualifications, one favourable and the other not. On the one hand, climatic conditions are such that much of Japan's arable land yields two crops a year; on the other hand, Japan has to support a high proportion of its population on the land. Over 40 per cent of the population was engaged in agriculture before the war, whereas in Belgium and the Netherlands the proportion was only about 20 per cent, and in England and Wales only about 6½ per cent. Italy had nearly as high a density as Japan and a higher proportion engaged in agriculture, but over 40 per cent of its land was arable. Eire had half its people in agriculture and had little more than 20 per cent

[1] e.g., 'If we examine these (population) statistics in terms of power politics, it is easy to comprehend even if it is impossible to approve of the ambitions of the military in Japan.' Schumpeter, 'The Population of the Japanese Empire', *in The Industrialization of Japan and Manchukuo*, p. 62.

[2] ibid.

arable, but it was far richer in pasture than Japan and had a low density.[1] The truth is that population density, even of arable land, is of little value in assessing the capacity of an area for supporting its population. The important points to consider are the size and trend of Japan's population in relation to its capacity for production. In this chapter those factors are examined as they existed before the war.

The population of Japan was probably about 33 million in 1850, having risen only about 4 millions in the preceding century. In 1900 it was 44 million, in 1933, 67 million, and in 1940, 73 million. This was, through most of the period, in accordance with the world population trend. Between 1850 and 1933 the populations of both Europe and Japan roughly doubled, despite the loss to Europe from an emigration which contributed to a five-fold increase in the population of North America. The population of the world as a whole is estimated to have advanced from 1,170 million in 1850 to 2,060 million in 1933, or about 75 per cent, while that of Asia may have risen from 750 million to 1,120 million, or about 50 per cent. The figures for the first third of the present century, however, show that the Japanese population rose 50 per cent compared with a 30 per cent increase for Europe and North America taken together. It is sometimes thought that Asia is peculiarly prolific but if world population is examined for the years 1800, 1850, 1900, and 1933, it is found that the proportion accounted for by Asia and Africa declined at every date, whereas that of Europe, North America, Central and South America, and Oceania increased at each date.[2] Having greatly advanced their populations, the Western nations have for half a century found themselves heavily influenced by a tendency for smaller families. Japan was affected later and less strongly by the same influences. During the nineteen-thirties Japan maintained an average annual net increase of about three-quarters of a million. Her population was 65·5 million in 1930 and 72·9 million in 1940, while that of the United States,

[1] *Far East Year Book*, 1941, chapter on agriculture, etc., and A. Carr Saunders, *World Population* (Oxford University Press, 1936), p. 141. The figures are for the early nineteen-thirties except in the case of Belgium, which is for 1920.

[2] Estimated world figures from Carr Saunders, op. cit., p. 42. The figures for Japan, which are approximate, are based on the table in *Nippon, A Charted Survey of Japan*, by Tsuneta Yano and Kyoichi Shirusaki, translated by Z. Tamotsu Iwado (Tokyo, Kokuseisha, 1936), p. 15, and the 1940 census returns. About 3 million has been added to the pre-Restoration figures to account for *samurai*, *eta* and others who were probably not included in population returns.

which, though no longer much influenced by immigration, maintained a bigger rate of increase than most countries in Europe, advanced only from 122·8 million to 131·7 million.

This great recent yearly increase in Japan was misleading. It concealed from superficial examination the fact that Japan was belatedly following the European fashion of later marriages and fewer children. Had this not been so, Japan might indeed have faced the Malthusian nightmare of a population rising at an accelerating rate till checked by catastrophe. In fact, on the view that Japan was impelled by the size of her population to seek living space by taking risks ending in defeat and national ruin, Malthus has been neatly vindicated. This would, however, be an unsound diagnosis, for in Japan's case population expansion was already on a descending scale. The birth-rate fell from 34·4 per thousand in 1928 to 26·7 per thousand in 1938, while the death-rate fell only from 19·9 to 17·4. Although an increasing number of women, result of earlier population increase, were reaching child-bearing age, the number of births in 1920 was 2·03 million and the highest figure ever reached, or ever likely to be reached, was 2·19 million in 1935. In 1938, no doubt reflecting the mobilization for the war against China, the number of births fell as low as 1·93 million. The number of women of child-bearing age in 1920 was about 12 million, and there were 2 million births: in 1935 the number of births rose only to 2·19 million, though the number of potential mothers had risen to 14·7 million. To be exact, there were 169·4 births per thousand females in the given age range in 1920, and only 148·7 in 1935.[1] This tendency is connected with the urbanization of Japan's population. The increase in Japan's population has been in cities, the most conspicuous feature being the growth of the large cities. The population rose by 17·5 million between 1920 and 1940, and of this advance 14·5 million was accounted for by towns of more than 100,000 inhabitants. These large towns contained about 12 per cent of Japan's population in 1920 and nearly 30 per

[1] *The Industrialization of Japan and Manchukuo*, p. 94. Child-bearing age for the purpose of these calculations is 15 to 44 (inclusive). The figures given (in thousands) are:

	1920	1925	1930	1935
Women (15–44)	11,961	12,593	13,657	14,738
Total births	2,026	2,086	2,085	2,191
Births per thousand women women (15–44)	169·4	165·6	154·9	142.6

The figures of births per thousand women for 1930 and 1935 appear inaccurate. They should be 152·7 in 1930 and 148·7 in 1935.

cent in 1940. At the other extreme, the population of the towns and villages with less than 10,000 inhabitants fell by over a million. They contained over two-thirds of the population in 1920, but only half in 1940. The fertility differential in Japan is considerable. It has been estimated that the rural birthrate was over 25 per cent greater than that of the towns in 1920 and nearly 30 per cent greater in 1935.[1] One cause of this is that later marriages are customary among townspeople. The average age of marriage for Japan as a whole was a year later in 1938 than in 1930.[2]

An estimate of a country's future population involves complicated calculations, but experts have committed themselves to interesting forecasts. Teijiro Uyeda, one of the foremost Japanese authorities, said: 'The population of Japan can never reach 100 million . . . It will stop probably at about 80 million.'[3] In another discussion, however, Dr Uyeda raised his estimate to about 88 million in 1970. The Population Institute of Japan, on the other hand, made an estimate of 105 million in 1970.[4] These forecasts were, of course, made before the war. Writing tentatively in 1946, Warren S. Thompson observes: 'It seems quite likely that Japan's population will keep on growing for several decades . . . and that it probably will reach a total of between 85 and 95 million sometime between 1975 and 1985.'[5] It is suggested by some observers that poverty may cause an upward trend in the birth-rate. If education is restored, however, as it probably will be, a continuation of pre-war trends seems more likely.

The question, of course, arises whether Japan could have maintained a reasonable measure of welfare for such a population without resort to aggression. A preliminary point needs to be made about emigration. If this affords relief, and if heavily populated countries have a right to such relief, the needs of other Asiatic countries, such as India and China, are even greater than those of Japan. Moreover, emigration from Asiatic countries with a low standard of living could, in any case, not afford an effective panacea

[1] Warren S. Thompson, *Population and Peace in the Pacific* (University of Chicago Press, 1946), p. 96. The urban areas are those with a municipal corporation and are roughly communities of over 30,000.

[2] *Far East Year Book*, 1941, p. 46.

[3] Quoted by E. F. Penrose, *Population Theories and their Application* (Stanford University Press, 1934), p. 104.

[4] This estimate and Dr Uyeda's revised forecast are quoted by Warren S. Thompson, op. cit., p. 99.

[5] ibid.

for over-population unless organized on a scale so vast as seriously to disrupt the economic and social structure of the receiving countries.

By the standards Japan herself applied she evidently did not feel that her optimum population had been achieved. Like those of many other countries, the Japanese Government exerted every effort of persuasion in encouraging large families. Praise and bonuses were awarded to parents of big families and the need for a high birth-rate was a constant theme of official exhortation. Japanese parents responded to this encouragement and, as shown above, have been tardy in following the Western fashion for late marriages and small families. Although the birth-rate remained nearly twice as high as that for England and Wales, lack of knowledge of birth control played no part in this. In few other countries could there have been a more extensive display of contraceptives than in Japanese chemists' shops. The chief reasons for Japan's high birth-rate were reverence for ancestors, strong sense of family cohesion, lack of consideration for women, and intense affection for children. All these characteristics except the last were gradually being modified, and a term to population expansion could thus be discerned.

Was Japan in such a position that each additional birth was a liability rather than an asset? This can conveniently be considered under the heads of agriculture, manufacture, and foreign trade.

The area of land under cultivation is now relatively stable and increased food production has depended on the achievement of better yields from approximately the same acreage. Taking the estimated yield per acre from 1878 to 1882 to be 100, the index rose to 146 in 1908–12 and to 166 in 1926–30. There were fluctuations; for instance the index rose to its highest in 1933, at 194, but dropped back to 142 in 1934. In 1936, 1937, and 1938, the average was 180.[1] The production of rice in Japan did not rise much in the two decades before the Pacific War. In the decade 1920–30 it averaged 295 million bushels, and in the decade 1930–40 approximately 313 million bushels. Per capita consumption of rice, however, was maintained by imports. Between 1915 and 1937 it remained fairly constant at 5·5 bushels. Thereafter, the import of less acceptable rice from South East Asia, and the adulteration of rice with other

[1] From a table quoted in *Foreign Agriculture* (Washington, United States Department of Agriculture), September 1945.

cereals, made Japanese meals less appetizing even before absolute shortage of cereals was felt. Wheat production made excellent headway. In the five years 1920–4 inclusive, the wheat crop averaged 28 million bushels; in 1925–9, 31 million; in 1930–4, 36 million; and in 1935–9, 50 million. There was also a great increase in Irish potatoes, the production of which in 1937 was double that of 1920. The more important sweet potato fluctuated, however, and tended to be lower than in the early nineteen-twenties, until its production was actually encouraged for the extraction of fuel alcohol. In fisheries Japan was the first country in the world, and it is clear that her aquatic harvest rose steadily and, according to one index, almost doubled between 1920 and 1936.[1]

The figures given indicate that agriculture has been able to make a modest contribution towards the needs of an expanding population. The contribution was improved by the remarkable development of sericulture. In the five years 1935–9, cocoon production was about 10 per cent of the (ex-farm) value of Japan's agricultural output, and in fifty years had increased 850 per cent.[2] This gradually rising agricultural production did not have to provide a livelihood for a rising farm population, for the agrarian population changed very little in the generation preceding the war against China.

Japan's capacity for offering her people a dignified standard of life depended heavily on industry. The value of agricultural output, including sericulture, was in 1938 probably less than a fifth of the value of the output of manufacturing industries, although the latter employed less than half as many people.[3] The volume of industrial production rose steadily, that of 1939 being 81 per cent above the average for 1931 and 1932.[4] Most of this advance was in capital goods, but consumer goods increased by 21 per cent. If this was not reflected in an advance in the standard of life it was because everything that could be spared was exported to pay for Japan's warlike preparations. The figures both for agriculture and industry endorse the impression gained from residence in Japan that the people had the energy and adaptability to sustain a frugal but dignified living. There was grievous poverty for many, though the poverty was less extreme and the proportion suffering from it smaller than

[1] Quoted in *The Industrialization of Japan and Manchukuo*, p. 183. The drawbacks to such an index are described on pp. 164 and 165 of the same book.

[2] *Far East Year Book*, 1941, p. 302.

[3] *Far East Year Book*, 1941, p. 359.

[4] According to the *Oriental Economist* index, published in issues up to the end of 1940.

in other Asiatic countries; and it was no more attributable to population pressure than was the similar evil tolerated by nearly every other country in the world. Faced with such considerations, those putting forward over-population as a plea in extenuation of Japan's aggression change their ground somewhat. It is suggested that Japan was capable of a vast industrial development but was obstructed by lack of access to raw materials and markets. The Japanese used to express themselves on these lines: 'You foreigners forced the doors of Japan, bringing us into a world in which we could only hold our own by developing our commercial strength. During the process of industrialization our population increased until we had in 1935 twice as many people as sixty years earlier. We were therefore in need of unfettered access to raw materials and export markets. You made us come out of our seclusion and then denied us a place in the world you had forced us to enter.'

There is hardly a vestige of substance in this contention. For the greater part of the period between the two world wars, the world was glutted with raw materials. In a consistent buyers' market, a peaceful Japan could have bought all she needed, and she had the world's third largest merchant marine to carry her trade. Vast imports of cotton, wool, oil, rubber, tin, and bauxite, for instance, fed Japanese industry between the wars until aggression against China and a menacing foreign policy brought belated restrictions on her supplies from the Western Powers. A situation might in due course have arisen in which Japan required outlets for large overseas investment, and such a programme might conceivably have met with political obstacles, but that stage was never approached. Such overseas investment as Japan did undertake, in her own possessions and under other flags,[1] was fully as much as she could cope with in the light of her domestic need for capital development. Capital expenditure in Manchuria and North China after 1931 was undertaken as part of the plan of military aggression, and at the expense of the Japanese domestic standard of living.

The great raw material imports of Japan had to be paid for, in the main, by equivalent exports, so it is clear that Japan did find markets as well as raw materials. Japan's international trade developed for half a century at a rate which invalidated the complaint that she was denied scope through the jealousy of the Western Powers. In

[1] Japan owned iron mines in Malaya, for instance.

1890 Japan had scarcely any share in international trade, but by 1914 the figures both for exports and imports exceeded 500 million yen. The first world war brought undreamed-of opportunity and the average of Japanese foreign trade for 1918, 1919, and 1920 was about 2,000 million yen. By 1936, after fluctuations, the figures reached 2,700 million yen,[1] but depreciation of the yen had naturally caused the terms of trade to take an unfavourable turn. It is instructive to compare foreign trade figures for 1928 (the year preceding the world depression) with those for 1936 (the year preceding the war with China). Taking 1928 as 100, the corresponding figures for 1936 are:[2]

Value		*Volume*		*Price Index*	
Exports	*Imports*	*Exports*	*Imports*	*Exports*	*Imports*
136·6	125·8	202·5	128·4	67·5	98·0

This shows that the great effort of making a 102·5 per cent increase in the volume of exports was approximately balanced by a mere 28·4 per cent increase in goods received. This disproportionate advance in the volume of exports compared with imports was a disadvantage accepted deliberately by the Japanese as the price of increasing, in a period of shrinking international commerce, the import of goods necessary for war preparation.

While keeping labour costs under firm control, Japan had reduced the value of the yen from 1s. 10¾d. in 1928 to 1s. 2d. in 1936, and these facts were regarded by the nations affected by Japanese competition as justification for measures of discrimination. In the bargaining that went on over quotas and tariffs, however, Japan was far from helpless. India, for instance, was as much concerned to sell raw cotton as to protect her domestic textile industry. Agreements were made with Australia, India, Burma, France, Venezuela, Turkey, Italy, Germany, and the Netherlands East Indies, so that evidently widespread need was felt for trading with Japan, while reducing the competitive elements. Latterly, the feeling aroused by Japanese competition on economic grounds was reinforced by political and ethical considerations. Some felt that economic sanctions might persuade Japan to modify her policy of aggression; others felt deeply the reproach that the Western democracies were helping to equip the Japanese armies in China.

[1] *Far East Year Book*, 1941, p. 451. [2] ibid.

This examination of Japan's population problem has necessarily extended over a wide field, and may now be summarized. Like the rest of the world, but later than most Western nations, Japan has had a big expansion of population and has reached an extremely high arable density. It was thought likely before the recent war that her population would mount from the 73 million it reached in 1940 by 20 or 30 millions in the next two or three decades and then stop rising. It had to be considered whether this weight of population obliged the Japanese to resort to aggressive imperialism for self-preservation. The evidence shows no such compulsion. A high birth-rate was consciously sought by the Government and people. Agricultural production rose appreciably, although the labour on the land did not increase, and the great success of Japan's enterprise in silk reinforced the earnings of agriculture. The increase in population was found in the cities, and manufacturing industry advanced prodigiously. This made an increase in foreign trade imperative. Raw materials were in abundant world supply, but in the confused conditions of the nineteen-twenties and thirties, Japan's encroachment on the world's markets aroused resentment on both political and economic grounds. Japan did, nevertheless, develop a large foreign trade, and her action in seizing Manchuria and monopolizing its development, and later in attacking China and the Western democracies, was as unnecessary as it was disastrous. By pursuing a peaceful policy, Japan could have resumed after the world depression the prosperity of which she had laid the foundations during the first world war, thereby providing a steadily rising standard of living for her large population.

CHAPTER XII

The Japanese Farmer[1]

In this survey the population of Japan in 1945 is assumed to be about seventy-nine millions and more than two-fifths of the occupied population is engaged in agriculture.[2] Large though the latter figure is, it is significant that it has remained stationary (or even declined) since 1930, notwithstanding the rapid growth of the total population. Thus, whereas the total employed population increased from 29·39 millions in 1930 to 32·20 millions in 1942, the number of persons engaged in agriculture and forestry fell from 14·14 millions to 13·70 millions in the same interval.[3] The predominantly agrarian character of Japan's economy has, in fact, been changing and the increase in the number of workers has been absorbed in industrial, commercial, and other non-agricultural pursuits. Up to the outbreak of war, this gradual reduction in the relative importance of Japan's agriculture was a sign of growing economic strength, and placed her in a different category from other Asiatic countries in which the continuous growth of the agricultural populations kept the standard of living at a low level.

The fourteen million men and women engaged solely in agriculture live on an area of some fifteen million acres of arable land,[4] ranging from the warm and very fertile plains of Kyushu through the cold and unproductive regions of the Tohoku to the open fields of the Hokkaido. More than half the total acreage of arable land is under rice cultivation;[5] the methods are intensive and therefore wasteful of man power, mechanization is virtually non-existent, and the lack of suitable crop rotation causes a great strain on the land, and makes heavy and frequent fertilizing imperative.

As the growing of rice, and indeed of most other foodstuffs, is a seasonal occupation, there are certain definite times in the year when the agricultural population is very busy and when the farmer

[1] When not otherwise stated, the figures in this chapter are from the chapter on agriculture in the *Far East Year Book*, 1941.

[2] Schumpeter, in *The Industrialization of Japan and Manchukuo*, p. 76.

[3] See p. 81.

[4] Schumpeter, op. cit., p. 75.

[5] *The Far East Year Book*, 1941, p. 287.

finds it necessary to call in outside help. The number of workers engaged in farming as a subsidiary occupation is large, but the seasons of their agricultural employment, mainly planting and reaping, are short, and for all but about two months in the year the farmer is self-sufficient within his family as regards labour. In fact, there are long spells, especially in the winter, when there is little for him and his family to do on the land. Before the outbreak of the war in China in 1937 seasonal unemployment among agricultural workers was a major problem in Japan. What is more, a seasonal crop means seasonal returns and the farmer found himself very short of ready cash during the winter months. To meet this seasonal distress, various cottage industries developed and a mixture of agriculture and industry has been a characteristic of Japanese economic life since very early times. Sericulture is by far the most important subsidiary occupation of the farming community, but it has never recovered from the world depression, and the development of nylon makes its future problematical. This has been a heavy blow to the farmers and is responsible for an important part of the steady drift of labour from the country to the towns.

After the outbreak of war with China, the increased demand for man-power for war purposes, both at the front and in the factories, ended agricultural unemployment, and indeed before long there was a serious shortage of labour. The solution of mechanization by which other countries, such as Great Britain, have made good their agricultural labour shortage was for various reasons not practicable, and the Japanese peasant found himself an exceedingly busy man. He also found himself much better off, since his children in the factories were sending home a good portion of their wages and he himself was getting considerably more for his rice and other crops than hitherto. The Fukagawa market price of rice in August 1938 was yen 7·0 per bushel (yen 34·7 per koku); in August 1939 it was raised to yen 7·6 per bushel (yen 37·7 per koku),[1] and in August 1944 the ex-farm price was yen 12·6 per bushel (yen 62·5 per koku). The influx of ready cash made it possible for the farmers to hoard their rice and thus force up the price. In the regions near the towns there was a flourishing black market in such commodities as eggs, chickens, and green vegetables, and though a large percentage of the profits went into the pockets of the brokers and

[1] Penrose, op. cit., p. 152.

middlemen, the farmer usually contrived to get a good deal more than the controlled price.

By December 1941, when Japan attacked the United States and Great Britain, the financial position of the Japanese peasants was much improved. While the more enlightened of them may have realized that their relative prosperity was based upon temporary and partially fortuitous circumstances, there was, and no doubt still is to-day, a feeling of security among the peasant classes not shared by workers in industry and commerce. Nevertheless, in considering the pre-war situation of Japan's rural population there is bound to be much reference to poverty and debt and to consequent social strains. To keep a true bearing on the subject, however, it must be appreciated throughout that Japan's situation is not exceptional and that the defects of her agrarian system are common also to other Asiatic countries. In general, throughout most parts of the world, the lag of country behind town in material welfare amounts almost to a social law, and the poverty of the Japanese rural population was relative, not to the standards of other Asiatic countries, but to those of her townsfolk. It is a grim fact that Japan's farmers, however hard their lot, were nevertheless among the most prosperous of Asia's peasants.

This strictly relative prosperity prevailed partly because the industrialization of Japan offered an outlet for the rural population, which as already noted remained stationary in spite of the rapid expansion of the population as a whole. Before the war there were some 5½ million farming families, which was only about a quarter of a million more than at the beginning of the century. Proportionately, however, the farming population fell during this period from about 65 to about 45 per cent of the total population. Cultivated area advanced from some 13 million acres at the beginning of the century to about 15 million acres in 1919, and has not changed much since then. The average holding was therefore only 2·7 acres, and accounted for rural poverty. All other factors were subsidiary.

It is true for instance that relief from rent would have been of great assistance to the tenant and part-tenant farmers who constituted about 70 per cent of the total, and probably this ought to have been effected. It would, however, have been far harder to contrive in pre-war conditions than in the present abnormal post-war period which has engendered relative rural prosperity

and an inflation favouring the chronically indebted farming class. Had the tenant-farmers purchased their land before the war at anything near current prices, they would have been little if at all better off. The Government, therefore, already harassed by the insatiable financial demands of the militarists, would have been faced by the alternative of either expropriating the socially and politically influential landowning class with inadequate compensation, or of financing large benefits to the peasantry by a tax on industry.

The pre-war statistics of land tenure were incomplete, but a number of important facts were known. In 1939 owner-farmers numbered 1·7 million (31 per cent of all farmers), tenants 1·5 million (27 per cent), and part-owners 2·3 million (42 per cent). The over-all total of 5 million landowners in 1939 has not changed much for at least a generation.[1] Since there were about 4 million owner-farmers and part-owners, there must have been a million non-cultivating landlords. The properties were often small-holdings rather than farms. Nearly half the landowners possessed less than 1·25 acres, and a further quarter owned less than 2·5 acres. At the other extreme there was concentration of ownership, 3,550 landowners possessing over a million acres.[2] Those with medium-sized holdings of between 25 and 125 acres numbered 46,000 and held over 2·5 million acres.[3] This suggests that under one per cent of landowners possessed nearly 25 per cent of the cultivated land.[4]

The big landed estates characteristic of parts of Europe are not found in Japan. The above figures show that even the one per cent with the largest holdings had an average of only about seventy acres each. Of the million non-cultivating landlords many were modestly situated townsmen who took pride in the ownership of a scrap of land. A substantial, though incomplete, redistribution of

[1] A. J. Grajdanzev, *Statistics of Japanese Agriculture* (Institute of Pacific Relations, mimeographed), p. 31, quoting Nogyo Nenkan.

[2] *Foreign Agriculture*, September 1945. The calculation is from figures on p. 133. The year is not given, but the figures agree best with 1934. By 1939 the number of landowners with over 125 acres had fallen to 3,000 according to the table in Grajdanzev, op. cit.

[3] ibid., the reference being again probably to 1934. The number had fallen (*vide* Grajdanzev) to 42,800 by 1939.

[4] In a note to Dr Seiyei Wakukawa's important essay on 'The Japanese Farm Tenant System' in *Japan's Prospect* (Harvard University Press, 1946), p. 168, an estimate is quoted that one per cent of landowners owned 27·3 per cent of cultivated land, while three-quarters owned a fifth. It is quite possible that a further concentration took place between 1934 and 1938 or 1939.

land could, however, have been made at the expense of the non-cultivating landlords, and those possessing over twenty-five acres. Primary considerations of finance and class interest were not the only deterrents from such revolutionary action. The landowners were an important part of the pattern in the enduring fabric of Japan's country life, and a radical redistribution of land would have had social results which would certainly have been far-reaching.[1]

The landlords, too, had a case. An onerous rent need not imply a rapacious landlord. There were about 8 million acres of wet fields and 7 million acres of dry fields.[2] Rather more than half of the former (and more productive) class of land was rented and rather less than half the latter. Rent for wet fields was paid by a quantity of rice based on the average yield over a term of years, and in practice the landlord received fully half the crop. In 1938, for instance, 320 million bushels of rice were produced in wet fields, a yield of 40 bushels per acre. Rent was about 21 bushels per acre,[3] and this was also the average rent from 1936 to 1940. At the prevailing price of about 7 yen per bushel, the money value of the rent was therefore about 145 yen per acre. The rent of dry fields, payable in cash, was about 65 yen per acre. Supposing that the aggregate acreage of both wet and dry fields (15 million acres) were to have been rented, the aggregate rental value in 1938 would have amounted to approximately 1,600 million yen. The total marketed value of agricultural produce in that year, including cocoons, tea, etc., was 4,000 million yen. It may be inferred therefore, that something like 40 per cent of the value of marketed produce of rented land was received by the landlord. This overstates the farmer's plight, however, since the farm products consumed by his household evidently do not enter into the total of 4,000 million yen.[4] It would probably be reasonable to assume that the real rent burden of the tenant-farmer did not exceed 30 per cent of his total produce.

This could not be deemed an unreasonably high return on the landowner's investment. The price of wet rice land was 2,100 yen per acre in 1938, and out of the rent of 145 yen per acre the landlord

[1] For a first-hand study of Japanese rural society, see J. F. Embree, *A Japanese Village: Suye Mura* (London, Kegan, Paul, Trubner, and Trench Ltd, 1946).

[2] Grajdanzev, op. cit., p. 17.

[3] Derived from *Far East Year Book*, 1941, p. 285. The *Yen* sign on the paddy column is a misprint, and should read *Koku*.

[4] This important point seems to have been overlooked in discussions of the rent burden.

paid 25 yen in taxes, so that the return on the investment, even had there been no outlay for flood control, depreciation of buildings, etc., was only about 5·75 per cent.[1] This return was the highest recorded for any year between 1926 and 1937.

The poverty of the tenant-farmer was nevertheless acute; and statistics prepared by the Japanese Government before the war indicate that his gross income, after deduction of rent, cost of fertilizers, and other necessary farming charges, left only the most meagre margin for those necessities of life not produced on the farm.

The varied efforts of the farmers to cope with their economic plight had far-reaching social consequences. In the first place, they ran into debt, and by 1937 the national farm debt amounted to the enormous total of 6,000 million yen,[2] or 1,090 yen per household. After 1937, however, they began to receive inflated prices for their crops and were subjected to a good deal of official exhortaton to use their surplus money to pay their debts. There is reason to believe that many complied, and that farm mortgages were greatly reduced before the end of the war.

Some farmers were able to add fishing to their arduous lives and others engaged in poorly paid crafts such as weaving straw matting. Many were assisted by sons and daughters in the cities. A farmer might himself go seasonally to the mines or factories, or he might send his daughters to domestic service or factory work in the towns. 'Sale' of daughters of farming families was also an established custom which has caused the peasant farmer of Japan to be criticized by foreign observers. Sale into geisha houses or brothels was far rarer than, and wholly different in principle from, sale into indentured employment. In the village he observed, Mr Embree notes that men who sold their daughters into prostitution were very poor and were not of families long established in the community.[3] Public opinion, though inclined to be lenient in cases of dire destitution, was severely critical when the sale price was devoted to the father's dissipation. The practice was specially prevalent in areas subject to famine. The system of indentured female labour was entirely different. The cotton mills needed the labour and the farmers needed money. The girls took readily to a

[1] Shiroshi Nasu, *Aspects of Japanese Agriculture* (Institute of Pacific Relations, 1941 mimeographed), p. 130, and *Far East Year Book*, 1941, p. 285.

[2] *Japan-Manchoukuo Year Book*, 1938, p. 345.

[3] op. cit., p. 112.

degree of regimentation in factories that would seem unbearable to peoples brought up on a higher level of personal responsibility and material well-being. The system, for good or ill, was part and parcel of the Japanese economic situation.

The farmer has always protested against his poverty in spasmodic riots, but after the first world war he turned increasingly to organization. The nation-wide rice riots of 1918 achieved almost the proportions of a revolution and may have suggested to the farmers that strength lay in united action. Organization took the form of unions, co-operatives, and guilds. The political unions were extremely energetic but were subjected to irresistible police persecution. Peasant unions, which were not as a rule associated with left-wing politics, had a membership of 330,000 in 1928, but this fell steadily to 220,000 in 1938. Co-operatives, however, increased with official support in the same period from 190,000 to 260,000. Landowners' associations also had a substantial though diminishing membership: 56,000 in 1928 and 32,000 in 1938. There were numerous disputes affecting wet rice lands, but few affecting dry fields. Between 1932 and 1939 inclusive, the disputes affected an annual average of over a hundred thousand acres out of the 8 million acres of wet fields, and half the disputes arose through an attempt by the landlord to cancel a tenancy.[1]

The picture of the peasants as a miserable, downtrodden class, which seems necessarily to emerge from a consideration of the facts of their hard life, is not a true one. Their cause had the powerful support of the Army, which derived a large proportion of its man-power, in commissioned as well as other ranks, from the country districts. It follows that the military authorities felt special concern for the welfare of a class, closely allied to the Army by family ties, which provided a superb soldiery uninfected by left-wing political indoctrination. Consequently, when agrarian disputes were not infected by 'dangerous thought', the farmers had less to fear from the police and the authorities than urban workers. The pseudo-socialism of the Army was derived from concern at the poverty of the farmers and dislike of capitalists. The contradiction in the Army's economic programme (apart from its muddle-headedness) was that a policy of keeping over 40 per cent of Japan's man-power on the land entailed in the first place a perpetuation of rural poverty, and in the second place prevented

[1] *Far East Year Book*, 1941, p. 331.

Japan from equipping herself adequately for sustained aggression against industrial Powers. The peasants formed a hardworking and cheerful community, close-knit in their village units, with sufficient education to enable them to gain appreciation of national and local affairs, and a healthy realization of their own value to society. If the war has given world-wide notoriety to the savage instincts latent in the Japanese peasant conscript brought out by active service overseas, it has also demonstrated the patriotic devotion, courage, and endurance which are characteristics of his class. The civic virtues of the peasants were bound up with an unsophisticated and unquestioning conviction of the divinity of the Emperor and the divine mission of Japan. Although the precise colour and depth of this faith have always been difficult to assess, it seems unlikely that the impact of defeat will cause its abandonment by the present generation of peasants, who cannot be expected to support with conviction any other than a monarchical régime. Shinto, in both its State and religious aspects, and Buddhism were accepted impartially and without question in rural Japan, and the village shrines and temples were genuinely the homes of the gods. Above all, in considering the Japanese standard of life, the access of the peasants to education is of decisive importance, since it prevented poverty from becoming either unbearable or demoralizing. Many a Japanese farmer could take pride in a son who held a commission in the Army, or who was completing his education at a well-known university.

PART II. THE WAR AND AFTER

CHAPTER XIII

Japan at War

THROUGHOUT the Pacific War there was a discrepancy between official statements[1] and the course of events which, when the brief period of initial success had passed, was a demoralizing factor of great importance. In the last fifteen months of the war in particular, the propaganda of falsehood was carried out with an ineptitude that is extremely hard to understand. The pattern of publicity took a stereotyped form. The importance of every island attacked by the Americans was not merely admitted but exaggerated, hopes of success were raised by tremendous claims of losses inflicted, and then came the announcement that the campaign was lost and that the fate of the Empire depended, after all, not on that operation but on the one that was about to develop. When, for example, the Americans landed on Saipan in June 1944, the strategic implications of the campaign were thoroughly explained. The public were fully informed of the threat of home bombing, and of the weakening of communications with the south which would result from the loss of the island. Naval claims were made which, if true, would have made successful defence of the island probable, and then it was announced that the garrison had been annihilated. The propaganda concerning Leyte, Luzon, and Okinawa followed a similar pattern. A further incongruity existed in the endless insistence upon the 'golden opportunity' which would arise when the Japanese had enticed the Americans into Japanese home waters. This was made the excuse for the inactivity of the Navy, which was admitted in between claims of great naval victories, and of the Air Force, when daylight sweeps of American carrier-based planes were scouring the skies of Japan unopposed. With every victory claimed by the propagandists, the dwindling number of Japanese who trusted the

[1] All radio and news agency references in this and the next Chapter, unless otherwise indicated, were monitored and, where necessary translated, by official American and British departments at the time.

communiqués thought that the 'golden opportunity' had come, and the sense of disillusion was correspondingly heavy when there followed the loss of yet another island and a fresh American advance. To take a typical instance, it was claimed that 600 American ships were sunk or disabled in the Okinawa operations in the spring and summer of 1945. Yet this outpost of Japan Proper was lost, and it was discovered that the 'golden opportunity' had been postponed until the Americans should make their landing on the mainland. It was no wonder that, after at least one of the paper victories (off Formosa), an extra ration of *sake* had to be issued to persuade citizens to celebrate the news with spontaneity.

For those who suppose that the Japanese have an undeveloped logical sense, this propaganda is understandable, but for others, who believe the Japanese mind is much the same as that of educated peoples elsewhere, it is baffling. It was not a propaganda of despair. The Japanese lied almost as heartily during the successful periods of the China War and the Pacific War as when defeated by the Russians at Nomonhan or by the Allies from the middle of 1942. A comparative study of propaganda techniques used by all the belligerents will be necessary before a full explanation can be suggested for policies whereby lying was resorted to on a scale defeating its own ends, but a tentative explanation may be offered in the case of Japan. It may have been just another aspect of the mischief resulting from the position given to the fighting Services. The Japanese warrior combines courage with bombast. He likes to dramatize himself, and there would be deep resentment if his accounts of his prowess were critically examined. In the early exploits of the suicide *Kamikaze* aircraft, instances were reported of an observer promising the pilot that he would watch his dive and tell the story of his success. No boast appears to have been too extravagant to be accorded publicity. Imperial Headquarters probably felt obliged, in the interests of military morale, to make preposterous claims in compiling its communiqués, and for the public to question these communiqués would have been to suggest that the highest military authorities were misleading the Emperor. The Board of Information, therefore, had to make the best of the fabrications of Imperial Headquarters and base its propaganda on them.

Many Japanese knew they were being dangerously misled, though scarcely any of them appreciated the extent of the gulf

between truth and propaganda. The criticism of propaganda policy, which was persistent, was directed against the Government Information Services since no one would have dared accuse the military of deceit. When Koiso formed his Cabinet, the appointment received with most satisfaction was that of Taketora Ogata as President of the Board of Information. Ogata was himself a newspaper man, and the press interpreted his appointment as showing a new determination of the Government to take the nation into their confidence. According to a Domei commentator, even the Service Ministers had come to recognize the need for such a change of policy, and in September it was claimed that an improvement had taken place in Koiso's first month as Premier. A conference of the Imperial Rule Assistance Association at the same period passed a resolution asking for greater frankness and clarity in reporting the course of the war. Ogata would no doubt have been glad to modify the disastrous propaganda of falsehood, but he could effect little, and in the spring of 1945, when Suzuki became Premier and Hiroshi Shimomura President of the Board of Information, the latter found it necessary to re-assure the public on this score. The postscript to this record is supplied by Prince Higashikuni, who for a few weeks became Premier when Japan surrendered. He promised to tell the people what was happening and to abandon the policy of concealing unpleasant facts. A leading newspaperman, who was active in Japanese propaganda during the war, formed this conclusion: 'Japan was hopelessly beaten in psychological warfare, not because of any special adroitness on the part of the United Nations, but because the United Nations base their propaganda efforts on truth, whereas Japan was unwilling to deal with the truth, almost from the outset.'[1]

The falsity of the propaganda façade was brought home, not only by the confessions of defeats which could not be concealed, but by the erosion of the economic basis of the war effort and by the ever increasing hardships suffered by the people. The principal economic difficulties may be considered first.

In making war Japan gave up any thought of economic autarchy within an inner zone composed of her Empire together with North China and Manchuria, and staked all on her ability to capture and hold the southern regions. It is often said that the Japanese based

[1] Masuo Kato, *The Lost War* (New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 1946), p. 135.

their plans on a short war[1] and the Navy in particular clearly hoped for such an outcome, but the evidence is very strong that the militarists faced the possibility of a long war, or even of a series of wars lasting many years. They did not intend to seize the southern lands, snatch an immediate advantage, and then retire: they intended to hold and develop the area economically, culturally, and politically. It follows that maintenance of communications was vital to Japan's success. Her war industries needed a flow of materials from the south, especially oil and bauxite, to sustain them. The failure of this plan had far-reaching consequences. For example, huge amounts of steel were used in shipbuilding in the effort to replace sinkings, yet the merchant marine was so far involved in the battle for the south, and so reduced by its losses, that imports of essential coking coal and of food from the Asiatic continent could not be maintained.

Japan began the war with rather more than 6 million tons of shipping of over 500 tons gross, and during the war about 4 million tons were built or captured.[2] In addition, several hundred thousand tons of wooden ships were constructed. This was achieved only by an immense effort (2·7 million tons were built in 1943 and 1944 alone)[3] which made steel scarce for almost every other purpose. Of the above total of 10 million tons of steel shipping, almost 9 million tons had been sunk or rendered unserviceable by the end of the war.[4] Catastrophe on this scale was hard to conceal entirely. The

[1] Jerome B. Cohen, 'The Japanese War Economy, 1940–1945', *Far Eastern Survey* (American Council, Institute of Pacific Relations), 4 December 1946, says that the *U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey* interrogations of Hiranuma, Kido, Konoye, and Higashikuni show that 'the Japanese leaders did not expect to fight a long war'. But these men did not want to fight a war at all. The militarists' plans made no sense if they did not intend to use the raw materials acquired to expand their economic base for a long war or for further agression. Mr Cohen's view that the Japanese realized only when it was too late that they were in for a long war appears to be based on Bombing Survey statistics purporting to show that Japan's big effort was delayed until 1943. It is asserted, for instance (*Summary Report of the United States Strategic Bombing Survey in the Pacific*, Washington, 1 July 1946, released 20 July: the text used in this study is that released in London on 14 August 1946 by the U.S. Information Service and will be referred to hereafter as *Bombing Survey Summary*), that the gross national production, adjusted for price change, rose from 41 billion yen in the fiscal year 1942 to 50 billion in 1944. Yet such a rate of accumulation is accounted for by a long, consistent effort. Some important indices of production (e.g., coal and steel) do not assist the theory that Japan made a belated effort when she realized that the war would be a long one. The sharp rise in the proportion of the national product devoted to the war obviously owes much to the *absolute* fall in consumption. Mr Cohen appears to overlook the lag between peak effort and peak achievement. A far more searching analysis of the many statistical complications involved would be needed to establish the theory that Japan banked on a short war.

[2] *Bombing Survey Summary*, p. 16.

[3] Domei in English, 6 September 1945.

[4] *Bombing Survey Summary*, p. 16.

seamen became one of the most discontented classes in Japan, and the Government admitted that their calling was as dangerous and as deserving of every consideration as that of airmen. The coal and steel output, essential if shipbuilding were to be maintained without even more drastic impoverishment of other war industries, curved downward. Coal supplies, both in domestic production and in the imports on which the steel industry relied for much of its coking coal, were higher in 1940 than in any subsequent year. Total annual supplies fell from 66 million tons in 1940 to 52 million tons in 1944, while in the first half of 1945 only a little over 16 million tons were available, almost all of it domestically produced.[1] One difficulty was the reliance on Korean labour, which became increasingly discontented. Possibly it was in a futile effort to reduce this discontent that the Government in 1945 made some half-hearted political concessions to Formosa, Korea, and Sakhalien which carried the promise of a small measure of representation in the Diet. If so, the concessions failed as an incentive to the Korean miners, whose output per head in 1945 was only half that in 1941.[2] Steel ingot production was at its peak in 1943, a million tons higher than in 1941, but in 1944 it fell off by 2 million tons, while production in the first quarter of 1945 was so poor that, even if the rate had not deteriorated further in the course of the year, the annual total would not have been half that of 1941.[3]

The costly shipping effort was insufficient to bring to Japan the materials for which she went to war. Large amounts of bauxite were imported before the blockade became complete, but by the end of 1945, had the war continued and even had Japan not been invaded, she would have had scarcely any new metal aircraft.[4] Belated efforts to find alternative means of producing aluminium failed, but had Konoye's suggestion of 1941 been adopted, and huge resources applied to the production of substitutes from material available in the inner zone, much might have been achieved. Similarly the oil imports were so disappointing that desperately expensive yet abortive experiments in production from pine-tree roots, and a vast programme of expansion in sweet potato acreage for alcohol production, were undertaken. The amount of oil imported into the inner zone during the war was far less than the stocks with which the war was started.[5] In 1945 military trans-

[1] J. B. Cohen, op. cit., p. 367. [2] ibid. [3] ibid., p. 366.
[4] ibid., p. 368. [5] ibid., pp. 369–70.

port was running on charcoal, some oil-burning shipping was idle, and the training of aircraft pilots was far below the needs of efficiency if they were expected to make more than one suicidal operational flight.

The one cry that rose above all others in Japan during the war was for aircraft. In the destruction of maritime communications, in the loss of islands, and in the raids on the homeland, the lesson was hammered home that they had measured themselves against the first industrial country in the world. Japan suffered such comprehensive damage from the air that details of the destruction have passed almost unnoticed. For example, Japan possessed the two mightiest warships afloat; they were sunk by carrier-based torpedo-launching aircraft, and this achievement has received little attention in Allied countries.[1]

Japan's aircraft industry was unable to cope with the tasks called for, and the Government as well as the hard-pressed garrisons overseas, appealed incessantly for greater production. When production was increased, quality became so irregular that pilots complained, and the responsible authorities were driven to the defensive assertion that only thirty per cent of aircraft, whether Japanese or American, could be expected to be fit for combat.[2] Lieutenant-General Saburo Endo, Chief of the Aircraft Ordnance Bureau, said on 19 September 1944 that 'We have now got students, women, volunteer corps workers, and conscripts, inexperienced people, engaged on this work.' In appealing for production a month before the surrender, the Minister of Munitions said that speed was essential, even if achieved at the expense of quality. Intended reliance upon *Kamikaze* tactics to meet invasion no doubt largely explains this view. Japan produced 65,500 aircraft during the war. The production figure for December 1941 was 550 and the monthly average for 1942, 1943, 1944, and the first seven months of 1945, was respectively about 800, 1,400, 2,300, and 1,600.[3]

The war which began with the hope of exploiting the resources of East Asia ended with Japan herself barely able to function as a political and economic unit. The situation deteriorated very rapidly

[1] Japan had two *Yamato* class battleships of 64,000 tons (*Bombing Survey Summary*, p. 16)

[2] Domei in Japanese, 23 January 1945.

[3] These figures are derived from a report to the Diet by the Minister of Commerce (Domei in English, 11 September 1945) and are almost certainly reliable for a rough picture.

from the middle of 1944. In the Diet Session of January 1945, however, although the situation in the Philippines was bad, the Premier spoke reassuringly of the resources in the inner zone. 'Japan will push ahead vigorously with a new economic programme for complete self-sufficiency in iron, light metals, liquid fuel, and coal in the Japan-Manchukuo-China economic sphere.'[1] At the beginning of February 1945, the Minister of Agriculture was still promising considerable food imports from Manchuria. Yet the last months of the war saw feverish efforts at economic and administrative decentralization and local self-sufficiency. Answering a Diet question in March, General Koiso said, 'The area by area defence structure is now being perfected.'[2] The Japanese had every reason to be apprehensive of the air attack on their railway system, which prolongation of the war would certainly have entailed. Even apart from bombing, dislocation of shipping, evacuation, and dispersal of industry had already subjected the railways to the severest strain. The *Bombing Survey* considers that a successful attack on the Hakodate rail ferry, the Kammon tunnels, and a small number of other selected railway targets 'would have reduced Japan to a series of isolated communities, incapable of any sustained industrial production'.[3]

It was, of course, the air raids which tried Japanese morale hardest, and they were particularly effective because after a long period of anxious expectation, the attack was more concentrated than it had been in Germany. Japan received only about one-eighth of the weight of bombs dropped on Germany, but devastation was on about the same scale, and at least seven-eighths of this tonnage was dropped, with increasing accuracy of aim, in the last five months of war.[4] The physically ineffectual Doolittle raid on Tokyo took place in April 1942, and the next raid was in June 1944. Thereafter numerous raids accelerated evacuation, but the real trouble did not start until 9 March 1945. The memory of this night's raid on Tokyo has probably remained with the Japanese more poignantly than that of any subsequent raid, not excepting that on Hiroshima. On that night, fifteen square miles of Tokyo were destroyed and scores of thousands were killed. Thenceforward Japan was accorded no

[1] Domei in English, 25 January 1945.

[2] Tokyo Radio, 22 March 1945.

[3] *Bombing Survey Summary*, p. 27. The Honshu-Hokkaido rail ferry, of high importance for the movement of coal, was completely put out of action by a brilliant carrier-based raid in July 1945.

[4] Inferred from the section of the *Bombing Survey Summary* entitled 'The Air Attack Against the Japanese Home Islands', p. 22 et seq.

respite. The monthly tonnage of bombs dropped on Japanese cities rose fast, reaching in July three times the March figure. It is estimated that thirty per cent of Japan's urban population lost their homes.[1] The nature of the catastrophe which befell Japan's flimsily built cities is shown by the remarkably high proportion of destroyed houses to damaged houses given in the Japanese reports. They assess the former category at 2,300,000 and the latter at 100,000.[2] The *Bombing Survey* gives a figure of 2,500,000 houses destroyed by raids and 615,000 demolished by the Japanese to make lanes for localizing fire and for escape.[3]

The two atom bombs at the time probably seemed just two among a host of catastrophes, but the special circumstances of horror have since deeply impressed the Japanese. While it is thought that only fifteen to twenty per cent of atomic casualties were from radiation sickness, the *Bombing Survey* offers the startling opinion that, even had there been no direct deaths from blast or fire, total deaths would have been nearly as high within a radius of a mile as was actually the case, since radiation sickness, its action delayed in many cases for weeks, would have been fatal within that area.[4] The effect of a sickness of this kind would be even more frightening to the Japanese than to most peoples, for they seem to have an exceptional horror of disease. Radiation sickness causes a degeneration of the bone marrow and a reduction of white blood corpuscles. Reproductive capacity is almost certainly reduced in men, and, although information about women, at the time the *Bombing Survey* was compiled, was inadequate for a conclusive opinion, two months after the Hiroshima bomb fell miscarriages, premature births, and abortions in the city had risen to four and a half times the normal rate. Inability of the Japanese Government to undertake adequate relief operations added to the suffering, but it is thought that less than ten per cent of the fatal casualties could have been saved had the best treatment then known been available.[5]

Total air raid casualties in Japan cannot be accurately known. At the Diet session in September 1945, the figure of 240,000 fatalities was given, but the *Bombing Survey* puts the figure at 330,000.[6] The

[1] *Bombing Survey Summary*, p. 25.
[2] Domei in English, 6 September 1945.
[3] *Bombing Survey Summary*, p. 28.
[4] *United States Strategic Bombing Survey*. 'The Effects of Atomic Bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki' (United States Government Printing Office, June 1946), p. 19.
[5] ibid., pp. 19–20.
[6] *Bombing Survey Summary*, p. 28.

casualties from different raids varied remarkably. Nearly half of Yokohama was destroyed in a raid lasting an hour, yet only 5,000 of the city's 900,000 inhabitants perished.[1] In the raid on Tokyo of 9 March, on the other hand, 100,000 probably died in a few hours.[2]

In spite of these disasters, the Japanese did not suffer casualties on the shattering scale experienced by some other countries. The *Bombing Survey* estimates the military fatal casualties in combat at 459,000,[3] so that with naval, merchant seamen, and air raid casualties, the national losses may not have been more than a million, or about 1·25 per cent of the population. To this would have to be added the large number of those who died of the hardships of homelessness, ill-nourishment, and ill-tended sickness, but considering the size of the population, it may be doubted if the direct and indirect impact of war entered as fully into Japanese homes as into the homes of Germany and of some of the countries which were victims of German and Japanese aggression.

One of the features of the war which the Japanese found harder to bear than Western peoples was the disruption of home life. Acquiescence in evacuation was very reluctant, many families protesting that they would rather die together. The authorities, however, succeeded in persuading or forcing great numbers to move, and by the beginning of September 1944, 640,000 had left Tokyo alone.[4] The pre-war population of Tokyo had, by the end of hostilities, been reduced by more than one half. Housing in the reception areas was usually inadequate, and there were widespread complaints about accommodation, food, health, and education.

Another anxiety in the Japanese home arose through the dislocation of schooling through evacuation, destruction of schools, mobilization of teachers and, above all, through the ruthless use of children in war work. Advanced literary education came to an end early in the war, opportunities of higher education being confined to those likely to be useful in technical fields important to the war. By the summer of 1945, with the country obsessed with

[1] *Bombing Survey Summary*.

[2] Masuo Kato, op. cit., p. 216.

[3] *Bombing Survey Summary*, p. 18. The figures are from army medical records, and consist of 316,000 in the island battles, 40,000 in Burma, and 103,000 in China; Malaya appears to have been overlooked. Tokyo Radio on 5 September 1945, reporting an announcement in the Diet, said that 320,000 had been killed in the Army, 200,000 of them in 'death charges', and 160,000 in the Navy. The full losses of the isolated garrisons, however, could hardly have then been known.

[4] Domei in Japanese, 10 September 1944.

preparation to meet invasion, schooling had come almost to a standstill.

The war brought poverty to most Japanese and, for the city dwellers especially, the problems of finding food, clothes, and, with the raids, shelter, overshadowed other anxieties and affected efficiency and public spirit. The *Bombing Survey* estimates that the pre-war average caloric intake in an already ill-balanced diet was 2,000. This fell somewhat in 1944, and was about 1,680 in 1945.[1] Further, since the farm population and heavy workers had extra rations, the maintenance of an average of the above standards implied severe under-nourishment of millions of those without privileges. Another severely felt shortage was in clothes. The men spent the war in dreary uniforms of the type which had become common before the war, while the women were mostly reduced to the hideous overalls called *mompei*. After 1944 the meagre cloth ration was withdrawn except for priority cases, and the shops were empty, not only of clothes but of almost all useful goods.

The Government could not cope with the black market. No inducement except in goods would interest the farmers who, having been impoverished for centuries, seized the fleeting chance of feathering their nests at the expense of the townsfolk. Much ill feeling arose between the farmers and the latter, who had to make arduous journeys to the country and part with much-needed possessions in order to get food. The Government tried various devices for extracting a satisfactory quota of rice from the farmers, but the latter were obstinate. They had their own hardships. They had to work extremely hard with inadequate labour and fertilizer, and the repair and renewal of essential implements was difficult to obtain. They often grumbled, too, at the burden put on them by the evacuees they had to receive and feed.

The difficulty of securing respect for economic controls was connected with the unsoundness of government finance, these two factors acting on one another. Most of the Government's expenditure was met by national savings, and to exact these it was necessary, not only to apply a measure of coercion which aroused resentment, but also to lubricate the economy with inflationary finance. Early in 1944, the Finance Minister found it necessary to promise that saving should be voluntary, and during the year a committee of the Finance Ministry studied the savings question

[1] *Bombing Survey Summary*, p. 29.

comprehensively. Its report condemned the system of savings quotas on the ground that they made the people feel oppressed, and it was added that 'canvassing through villainous measures should be curbed'. Yet, at the end of the year, the National Savings Encouragement Council was assessing savings quotas for every group and hinting at disciplinary measures against those who did not co-operate. With the expense and dislocation caused by raids, evacuation, dispersal of industry, and the deteriorating economic situation, every symptom of inflation appeared, the most striking being the course of the note issue. At the end of 1938, when the cost of the war against China was already causing concern, the issue was under 2,000 million yen. At the time of Pearl Harbour it was close on 5,000 million. Late in 1943 the rate of increase was plainly quickening, and at the close of 1944 the figure was not far short of 18,000 million yen. The year 1945 was one of economic collapse, and the issue amounted to 20,000 million in the spring and 30,000 million at the surrender.

The lies of Imperial Headquarters and of the Government struck a note of meanness which was characteristic of Japan's war effort, notwithstanding the devotion and courage which was displayed. There was a lack of confidence between Government and people, between Army and Navy, between servicemen and industrialists, between town and country, and between officials and citizens. After the first exultant moment the war was carried on in a dismal atmosphere of poverty, regimentation, and recrimination. The unity, high spirit, and comradeship which took some belligerents almost gaily through grief, hardship, and defeat, were not evident in Japan, though the world has no braver or more patriotic people.

CHAPTER XIV

Some Political Aspects of the War

THE purpose of the Japanese in the Pacific War was not world conquest, though, had the war been won, that would have become the purpose of succeeding wars. The plan was to obtain control of a large enough area to nourish Japan's industry, to fortify that area, and repel any attack on it. They based their hope largely on the temporary weakness or preoccupation of Britain, the United States, Russia, China, France, and Holland.[1] The Japanese knew they were running a great risk; but they felt that the steadfast opposition of the Western Powers to their aggression against China, culminating in the drastic economic measures taken in July 1941, and amounting to a declaration of economic war, forced on them a choice between three difficult courses. They could withdraw from China, or they could attack the southern regions, or they could remain passive and trust that the course of world events would bring their plans to fruition. The protagonists in the final debate, which took place in the summer and autumn of 1941, were Prince Konoye and General Tojo. Konoye wanted either to withdraw from most of China (though not from Manchuria) in return for removal of economic pressure; or alternatively to continue negotiations while undertaking, regardless of expense, the production of the materials needed for Japan's industry in the inner zone.[2] General Tojo felt that delay would involve the erosion of the country's economic strength. He therefore wanted an immediate diplomatic decision or an early war.

To Western minds at least, the attitude of the Navy is difficult to justify. Its leaders appreciated the severe limitations of Japan's sea power, but would not take the responsibility of advising against war. Similar reluctance was shown by these leaders in the dark days of the spring of 1945. Referring to an indecisive meeting of

[1] *Bombing Survey Summary*, pp. 1–3.

[2] Mentioned in Prince Konoye's memoir, which was prepared from his diaries just before his suicide. Unfortunately, this important document has not yet been printed in Britain and the references to it in this chapter are from a manuscript translation prepared for the Royal Institute of International Affairs. A translation in part appeared in the *Nippon Times*, 8 and 9 April 1946, and it has been discussed in the *New York Times*, 21–29 December 1946.

the Supreme War Directive Council on 6 June 1945, the Navy Chief of Staff said: 'No one expressed the view that we should ask for peace; when a large number of people are present it is difficult for any one member to say that we should so entreat.' After the Emperor, on 20 June 1945, had taken the initiative in soliciting Russian mediation, Admiral Suzuki, speaking as Prime Minister, remarked: 'Today the Emperor said what every one has wanted to say but yet was afraid to say.'[1]

Below the surface lay an interplay of traditional naval and military antagonisms which was even more clearly illustrated in the 1941 councils. The following is from Konoye's memoir:

> 'On 14 October the Chief of the Army Bureau of Military Affairs went to see the Secretary of the Cabinet and said to him, "It seems that the Prime Minister cannot make up his mind, because the Navy does not make up its mind. If the Navy really does not want war, then the Army must also reconsider the matter. But the Navy would not say that openly to the Army and only said it left the decision in the hands of the Prime Minister. It is impossible to restrain the Army by the decision of the Prime Minister only. However, if the Navy officially declares that it does not want war at this time, then it is easier for the Army authorities to restrain their subordinates."'

This adroit manoeuvre of the Army designed to shift responsibility to the sister service elicited the following pusillanimous response from a high naval official: 'The Navy could not possibly go so far as to say officially that it does not want war. What it could say at most is that it would like to leave the decision in the hands of the Prime Minister.' On the same night Tojo sent a message to the Prime Minister advising him to resign, and a few days later Tojo himself took office.[2] The war was a leap in the dark, and even the brilliant opening campaigns could not allay the misgivings of those who felt that a contest with the democracies was beyond the country's strength.

From first to last air power was the decisive weapon. At the opening of the war, Japan deployed 700 aircraft against Malaya and 475 against the Philippines. The total land-based Allied air

[1] *United States Strategic Bombing Survey*. 'Japan's Struggle to End the War' (United States Government Printing Office, July 1946), p. 7.

[2] The political background of the war decision is discussed more fully in the chapter on War Guilt.

power in the Pacific, for the protection not only of Malaya and the Philippines, but also of Hawaii, Australia, the Netherlands East Indies, and other territories, was less than 1,300. Most of these were obsolete and a great number were destroyed on the ground. About a third of Japanese pilots had had combat experience, and assuming that the least experienced pilots were in reserve (mainly in Manchuria), the proportion of battle-seasoned pilots used in the first campaigns must have been even higher. The average flying experience of the Japanese at the beginning of the war was well over 500 hours, compared with a little over 100 hours at the close of the war.[1]

The Philippines, the Netherlands East Indies, and Malaya were occupied for a Japanese loss of 15,000 killed and less than 400 aircraft,[2] but these early successes carried the seed of future difficulties. Japan recklessly used her best airmen, and she was tempted to enlarge her first design of conquest. The strategic afterthought included the Aleutians, Midway, Port Moresby, and the Solomons. The result was several costly defeats and some successes which only aggravated the supply problem.[3]

Japan's triumph lasted only a few months, although she held her main gains much longer and therefore seemed stronger than she was. Her first notable setback occurred in May 1942 when an air-sea battle was joined in the Coral Sea. There were losses on both sides, and both sides claimed a resounding victory, but it was the Japanese who turned away and American communications with Australia were preserved. In the following month Japan suffered defeat at Midway. This name has never meant much to the Japanese people, since even Imperial Headquarters could not represent it as a victory, yet it was one of the most important engagements of the war. The Japanese carrier force never recovered from the blow then sustained.

While most Japanese remained unaware of the importance of Midway and accepted the Coral Sea engagement as a fine victory, the loss of Gaudalcanal did make a deep and lasting impression. This island in the Solomon group was important to American communications with Australia, and the operation against it had to be undertaken before full preparation for counter-attack on the Japanese was complete. It was therefore a hazardous and anxious enterprise. The marines landed on 7 August 1942, and after an

[1] *Bombing Survey Summary*, pp. 3–4 and 9. [2] ibid., p. 1. [3] ibid., pp. 5–6.

obstinate six months' campaign in which the Japanese lost 20,000 (half from starvation), the island was won. While this campaign was in progress, the Australians were turning the Japanese back in British New Guinea.

The blow to public confidence resulting from the admitted loss of Gaudalcanal in the south was paralleled in May 1943 by the loss of Attu in the north. Whereas in Gaudalcanal the surviving garrison had been, as the Japanese communiqué put it, 'transferred', in Attu the garrison fought to the death and their heroic fate, exploited in propaganda, had a deep emotional effect on the Japanese. This fate was later shared by other garrisons and brought signs of a division of opinion in Japan. Some felt inspired by the demonstration of the Japanese spirit, as well they might by such extreme gallantry, while others were horrified at the thought of the garrisons and civilians trapped on doomed islands. In one Diet session Ministers had to answer questions whether civilians who died on the islands could not be deified at Yasukuni, while other questioners asked if nothing could be done to rescue the isolated garrisons. The successful evacuation of the Kiska garrison was received with obvious relief.

In 1944, Japan made a last bid for major political and strategic success. The Indian nationalist leader, Subhas Chandra Bose, had in 1943 reached Japan from Germany by submarine and gained the ready ear of Tojo and of Japanese financiers and cotton merchants.[1] Apparently Bose was able to put before Tojo a plausible design for the conquest of India. Bose cajoled or terrorized 50,000 Indians,[2] mostly prisoners of war, into joining his infamous venture, and an army of Japanese and Indians crossed the Indian frontier and invested Imphal. In the manner characteristic of Japanese propaganda, sweeping victory was recklessly forecast. The effort failed, and the exceptional difficulty of supply, solved on the Allied side largely by air transport, brought destruction upon the invading army.

The final blow to Tojo was the loss of Saipan. The capture of this island was, both from its strategic significance and its effect on Japanese politics, one of the crucial operations of the war. 'The enemy is desperate; so are we,' announced the Tokyo radio, and

[1] Japanese broadcasts of early November 1943 describe Bose's warm reception by Japan's political and business leaders.

[2] This figure is given by Masuo Kato, op. cit., p. 108.

frankly added that the capture of this island would enable the Americans both to bomb Japan heavily and to harry communications with the south. Imperial Headquarters announced the loss of Saipan on 18 July 1944, and Tojo tendered his resignation the same day. To the Allies, Tojo seemed the leading representative of Japanese militarism, a man of powerful will and of organizing ability. It may be doubted, however, if he ever seemed as large a personality to the Japanese. It is hard to recall any episode in their history when they have made an individual leader the focus of national aspirations and loyalty. Nevertheless, Tojo came nearer to such a position than any other modern Japanese, and after his fall no figure emerged with any claim at all on the enthusiasm of the people. Koiso's premiership was one of disaster relieved only by farcical claims of huge losses inflicted on the American forces. After the Prime Minister and others had represented Leyte as decisive, it was lost. Early in 1945 Manila was lost and it became clear to all (except those who credited the propaganda that General Yamashita was setting a huge trap) that the Philippines campaign was hopeless. The garrison of Iwojima was also annihilated early in 1945, and the next objective was unmistakably Okinawa, just half way between Kyushu and Formosa and administratively part of Japan. The first really devastating air-raid suffered by Japan was launched in March. At the other side of the world Germany's abortive December offensive in the Ardennes had been followed by developments portending her early and total defeat. On 5 April Koiso resigned, and two days later the aged Admiral Kantaro Suzuki formed a Ministry. In view of his advanced age, his association with policies of prudence in the 'liberal' years, and his close official connection with the Emperor, it must have been obvious to well-informed Japanese that the new Ministry would be mainly concerned to find a way of escape from the war, but few expected collapse.

Japan had, indeed, shot her bolt. Naval and air arms had each made an effort to seize a 'golden opportunity' and had failed; and without naval and air help the Army could not hold its own anywhere. The Navy suffered severely at Saipan but retained strength for one more sortie. A hazardous and imaginative attempt was made to save Leyte, in which the fleet suffered heavily but came near to inflicting great damage. Lack of air support perhaps combined with shortage of oil, however, forced the ships to withdraw with-

out destroying the transports and isolating the beach-head according to plan. The fleet played no further part in the war, and had there been an invasion it is now evident that Japan's naval action could not have extended beyond submarine operations.[1] Japan's air arm made a very remarkable effort, resorting, from the autumn of 1944, to suicide attacks against ships in the desperate hope of introducing a new factor into the scales that were tilting against Japan. A Special Attack Corps of the Naval Air Arm (there was no independent air force) was trained in the new tactics, and became known as the *Kamikaze* Corps. The word means 'divine wind' and is associated in Japanese history with the tempest which frustrated the attempted Mongol invasion of the thirteenth century. The less important Army Special Attack Corps was called *Banda,* which means 'ten thousand petals', and would remind the Japanese that the *samurai* falls like the cherry blossom at its moment of greatest beauty. Later the term *Kamikaze* appears to have been used for all suicide air attacks. These tactics had a measure of success, 18·6 per cent of over 2,500 missions striking a ship. The war-head was insufficiently heavy, however, and though twelve large carriers and fifteen battleships were hit, none of these big vessels were sunk. The American verdict is expressed in the words: 'Had the Japanese been able to sustain an attack of greater power and concentration, they might have been able to cause us to withdraw or to revise our strategic plans.' If Japan had been invaded, at least 5,000 *Kamikaze* aircraft would have been launched against the hostile fleet.[2]

It is impossible to determine when the decision to end the war was made. Men like Konoye would have been willing to compromise at any time, and by the beginning of 1945 already expected to save little more than the Throne. The *Bombing Survey* attaches great importance to the establishment of the Supreme War Direction Council in August 1944, soon after Koiso became Prime Minister.[3] This consisted of the Prime Minister and Foreign Minister, the Service Ministers, and the Chiefs of Staff, with provision for the co-option of additional members. The President of the Board of Information, for instance, appears to have attended regularly.[4] The *Survey* considers that this Council operated as an

[1] *Bombing Survey Summary*, pp. 11–12 and 15–16.
[2] ibid., p. 15.
[3] *Bombing Survey*. 'Japan's Struggle to End the War', p. 4.
[4] Domei in Japanese, 23 January 1945.

inner Cabinet, so that the service chiefs were brought into responsible association in government policy.

The separation of the service chiefs from responsibility must in any case have tended to lessen under the militarist administration of Tojo, but the creation of the Council would not appear to have prevented its disappearance under the succeeding Ministry headed by Koiso and the defeatist Yonai. It was freely said at the time of Koiso's resignation that he had failed to effect the unification of High Command and civil administration, while Koiso himself described the Council as merely a liaison body between the two authorities.[1] If it functioned as an inner Cabinet, it seems strange that in March 1945 the Prime Minister should have been given special permission to attend Imperial Headquarters conferences.

Throughout the last months of the war, the gestures of preparation for total national resistance to invasion were made. At the last war session of the Diet in June, an Emergency War Measures Act was passed which gave the authorities unlimited power. As the Premier put it:

> 'From now on government officials shall not evade their duties and responsibilities on the pretext that stipulations of law do not allow them to take prompt action. In short the Act can be described as a step to free officials as well as the nation from red tape. From now on, instead of following the law to the letter, justice and reason will be the guiding principles of administration.'[2]

The Diet resented this supersession of law and Constitution, but most members no doubt thought it a measure of desperate resistance rather than a means of controlling the country if the surrender led to rebellion. Regional Superintendents-General were among those who could exercise the new powers, and the decentralization of authority could take place at a stroke. Meanwhile, the whole nation had been organized in the People's Volunteer Corps, which had replaced the Imperial Rule Assistance Association. This corps was normally under the Home Office but could be placed, in sections or as a whole, under the military in case of need.

Japan's first serious peace overtures were made through Russia, with whom she had tried hard during the war to keep on good terms. The Japanese were somewhat reassured about the stability of

[1] ibid., 22 March 1945. [2] Domei in English, 22 June 1945.

their relations with Russia in March 1944, when an agreement was signed transferring the oil and coal concessions in North Sakhalin to Russia, and extending Japan's fishery rights in Russian waters for at least four more years. When Mr Stalin branded Japan as an aggressor in November 1944, the reaction was one of pained protest rather than indignation. In reporting the European War, the Japanese paid high tribute to Russian courage and military prowess. Early in 1945 there was interest in the future of the Neutrality Pact signed with Russia in April 1941. This was to run in any case until April 1946 and then, unless a year's notice of abrogation had been given in 1945, was to continue for a further five years. When the date approached Russia gave notice that she would not renew the pact after 1946. The Japanese took this rebuff patiently, hoping that they were at least safe from attack until the treaty expired. When Shigenori Togo became Suzuki's Foreign Minister, there was emphasis on his experience in Russia and on the fact that he was supposed to get on well with the Russians.

With the collapse of Germany even Japan's military leaders knew that peace must be sought, but although there were many conferences, every one hesitated to express this conviction. In May the Japanese Ambassador at Moscow had been instructed to sound the Russians with a view to their mediation, and on 20 June the Emperor, apparently coming out unequivocally for peace, asked when a special ambassador could be sent to Russia. There were further delays, and on 12 July the Emperor again took the initiative. Having been advised that the Russians were unlikely to intercede on terms other than unconditional surrender, he asked Konoye to go to Moscow, obtain the best terms he could and telegraph them personally to him. On the thirteenth, however, came the disconcerting news that Mr Stalin and Mr Molotov were leaving for Potsdam, and could not take the matter further until after that conference. No pains seem to have been taken to keep Japan's peace moves a close secret, and it was freely rumoured in Europe that Konoye might go to Moscow and that Japan was seeking peace through Russia.

The Potsdam Declaration, issued on 26 July, though holding out some hope for the future of Japan, was virtually a summons to unconditional surrender. The Japanese reaction was, as far as published comment went, to reject the terms. The Prime Minister said, 'I think it is no more than a rehash of the Cairo Conference.

I cannot see that it has any significance for the Japanese Government, and we shall merely disregard it and carry on resolutely with the prosecution of the war.'[1] Admiral Kichisaburo Nomura, Ambassador to the United States in 1941, described it as 'the height of impertinence'.[2] General Jiro Minami, President of the Great Japan Political Association, said, 'We have no alternative but to fight on.'[3] The press was unanimous in denouncing and ridiculing the declaration.

It was in these circumstances that the United States Government decided to use the atom bomb on Japanese cities, and that Russia decided to invade Manchuria.

In Tokyo there were despairing and emotional conferences, a last effort to safeguard the imperial institution, and on 15 August acceptance of the Potsdam terms. The *Bombing Survey* ventures the opinion that:

> 'Certainly prior to December 31, 1945, and in all probability prior to November 1, 1945, Japan would have surrendered even if the atomic bombs had not been dropped, even if Russia had not entered the war, and even if no invasion had been planned or contemplated.'[4]

[1] Domei in Japanese, 29 July 1945.
[2] Domei in English, 6 August 1945.
[3] Tokyo Radio, 28 July 1945.
[4] *Bombing Survey*. 'Japan's Struggle to End the War', p. 13.

CHAPTER XV

Japanese Politics Since The Surrender

In August 1945 the Japanese not only surrendered but, to all outward appearance, submitted to the Allies. It was decided to allow them, subject to Allied control, the self-government that had just been denied to the Germans. Had direct rule been necessary, the difficulties arising from the language barrier, both in spoken and written communication, would have been far more serious than in Germany.

General Douglas MacArthur, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (S.C.A.P.), landed in Japan at the end of August. He and his troops were received with a positive goodwill which has its roots in the psychology of the Japanese. The occupation of the country and the rapid demobilization of the Japanese Army was carried out with a smoothness and with a consistent Japanese co-operation which, whatever opinion may be held of its sincerity, has certainly lessened the problems involved. General MacArthur at once earned the confidence and admiration of the Japanese and he has retained it. The Allied troops, too, are very popular. Early in 1947 the army of occupation comprised about 120,000 United States troops and some 40,000 from the British Commonwealth, of whom about half were Australian. No other Allied Power supplied a contingent. There have inevitably been isolated complaints, some of which have proved to be well founded, but the Japanese realize how exceedingly fortunate they are in the character and attitude of the occupying troops.

On 29 August 1945 the United States Government sent to General MacArthur an initial directive setting forth the guiding principles of American policy in Japan. This has been closely followed by General MacArthur, whose authority in the administration is decisive. The main points of the document are as follows:

> The objects of the United States are to ensure that Japan cannot again endanger peace, and to encourage in her people a progressive attitude both in domestic matters and in world affairs. Japan's sovereignty is to be limited to her own islands, as specified in the Cairo and Potsdam Declarations, and she is to be

demilitarized. The country is to be occupied by Allied forces under an American commander. Every effort will be made for Allied agreement on policy, but if disagreement arises 'the policy of the United States will govern'. The Emperor and the Japanese Government are to be subject to the Supreme Commander, who will use Japanese machinery of government in so far as this furthers United States objectives. If an attempt to introduce a liberal form of government should result in civil strife, 'the Supreme Commander should intervene only where necessary to ensure the security of his forces and the attainment of all other objectives of the occupation'. Persons closely associated with Japan's aggressive past or suspected of atrocities are to be tried. Nationalist societies are to be abolished and political prisoners set free. Laws are to be passed ensuring civil rights. The Japanese are to be encouraged to study democratic institutions and, subject to the security of the occupying forces, to develop political parties. Production and research which is chiefly useful for war is to cease, and permitted industries capable of adaptation to warlike purposes are to be supervised. Trade union activity is to be favoured, and the large banking and industrial combinations are to be dissolved. Reparation is to be made through the transfer of Japan's overseas assets, and of such goods and equipment in the country as are not necessary for a peaceful economy. Eventually normal relations of international trade will be permitted, and during the Occupation there may be controlled exports and imports. The Japanese Government will be expected to restore the economy to meet the peaceful needs of the population.[1]

This was an American directive but no doubt reflected, in the main, the views of the Allies. The problem of apportioning responsibility for the control of Japan gave rise to differences of opinion which were not settled until the end of 1945. The United States was unwilling to grant her Allies more than an advisory role, whereas the latter, particularly the Soviet Union and Australia, wanted a substantial voice. An Advisory Commission was set up in the autumn, but in December 1945 this was replaced by the Far Eastern Commission. It sits in Washington and eleven countries are represented, namely the United States, the Soviet Union, the Philippines, China, France, the Netherlands, Great Britain, India, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand. The Commission may for-

[1] *Select Documents on the Surrender and Control of Japan* (Wellington, Department of External Affairs, 1947), pp. 17–23.

mulate or revise basic policies for Japan, excluding those relating to military operations and territorial adjustments. Instructions in accordance with the policies determined by the Commission are passed to S.C.A.P. through the United States Government. In practice, control by the United States Government and S.C.A.P. has not been seriously affected. In the spring of 1946 an Allied Council was set up in Tokyo with advisory and liaison functions. This is a four-Power committee, composed of the United States, the Soviet Union, China, and the British Commonwealth, under American chairmanship. It has proved a contentious organization and the inferences to be drawn from Allied disunity on a number of policies can hardly have been lost upon the Japanese.

Within the broad governing conditions here outlined, the Japanese have retained control of their administration. With the surrender came the first stirrings of life in the old political parties. They had never quite lost their identity for, though most deputies had formed a united front in the Imperial Rule Aid Political Association, and later the Great Japan Political Association, they clustered round leaders, cliques, and clubs, which had been important in party life before the war and had maintained some measure of continuity. The old parties spent the autumn of 1945 in painful readjustment under the shadow of directives from Allied Headquarters, and in the expectation of more drastic ones to come. At the same time, the communists, freed from suppression by defeat, emerged as opponents of the pre-war political order. The first clear test of the strength of these political forces came in the general election of April 1946, but the social issues in defeated Japan were too varied and too intimately involved in the people's anxiety over basic needs to be settled by the ballot-box. The radical forces, of which the communists, though the most aggressive, were by no means the only representatives, urged solutions of revolutionary implication which had an appeal reaching beyond the working and tenant-farming classes. There were mass demonstrations in which a demand for food was linked with an attack on the politicians in office. The left-wing leaders took care that the conservatives, and not the farmers or the occupation authorities, should be the object of indignation at these gatherings. They proposed that rice deliveries should be negotiated by the farmers' own committees. If a critic wondered how manufactured goods, the only acceptable form of exchange for farmers' produce, were to be produced, the answer was twofold: small and middle-sized in-

dustrialists were to be helped and encouraged in production; larger enterprises, which could not or would not furnish the wages and conditions demanded by labour, or which held back reconversion through economic and political uncertainty, were to be expropriated by their own workers. It was the hope of General MacArthur that the elections would determine the course on which Japanese representatives could steer through this sea of domestic difficulties. The partial disappointment of this hope was marked by an intervention of General MacArthur in which, while not questioning the communists' right to organize and express themselves, he made plain his disapproval of them.

The Great Japan Political Association, which included 377 out of the 466 members of the House of Representatives at the date of surrender, was dissolved in August 1945, and in the autumn the most important parties took shape. First came the Social Democratic Party (Nippon Shakaito) with a socialist policy, but weakened by cleavages of opinion between left, right, and centre. The Liberal Party (Nippon Jiyuto) was a party of moderate conservatism proposing a number of reforms, including women's suffrage. The Progressive Party (Shimpoto) was the most conservative of all groups. It had more members in the Diet than the other parties, but since most of them owed their seats to the coupon of General Tojo in April 1942, this was not a source of confidence. An important Co-operative Party was formed with an appeal to a movement which in Japan had grown under the auspices of enlightened conservatism. Though more conservative than the social democrats, the co-operators were inclined to work with them. The communist leaders, newly out of prison, proposed a preliminary platform which included abolition of the monarchy and drastic land reform. The Diet, which assembled at the close of 1945, was composed as follows:

	Opening of session	*Close of session*
Progressive Party	277	270
Liberal Party	44	46
Social Democratic Party ..	15	17
Co-operative Party	0	28
Independents and minor parties	90	48
Vacancies	40	57
	466	466

At this session measures were passed which cleared the path for political and social activity. An electoral law reduced the voting age from twenty-five to twenty and extended the franchise on equal terms to women; collective bargaining was legalized; and a first step towards agrarian reform further strengthened the position of Japan's newly privileged cultivator class. The general election was first set for January, but was postponed until 10 April. In the interval between the autumn of 1945 and the spring of 1946 there was seething trade union activity, competition for the women's vote, and a strengthening by the farmers of the position which they had gained by their possession of the fruits of a poor rice harvest.

The position of the major parties was greatly weakened by two directives of 4 January 1946, which the Japanese described as 'the MacArthur typhoon'. One ordered the abolition of nationalist societies and, in due course, well over a hundred of them were banned; the other directive excluded from public life nearly 170,000 men associated with Japan's militarist past. This necessitated a reorganization of the Government and many changes in the administrative services, both central and local. Party men who owed their seats to General Tojo in 1942 were debarred, and those affected included most progressives and co-operators in the House of Representatives, and also many liberals and social democrats. Barely fifty members of the Diet could offer themselves as candidates at the April elections. In the arena with these besmirched parties, the communists shone immaculate. Sanzo Nozaka, a communist leader who had done notable work with Japanese prisoners of war in Yenan, arrived from China to a great popular welcome on 12 January, bringing strength to the counsels of his party.

While expressing the intention to collaborate unreservedly with the occupation authorities, the communists were critical of the two fundamental decisions to establish a new constitution and to hold immediate elections. General MacArthur must have been aware of the objections to pushing ahead before the Japanese had adjusted themselves to the revolution in thought that constitutional and electoral decisions must reflect. He had, however, good reasons for his decision to press forward without delay. The existing Meiji Constitution gave an inappropriate background for democratic reforms, while the Diet had been packed by General Tojo. It would have suited the communists to retain for the time being a guilty Government existing on sufferance and answerable to no constitution

(since the discredited Meiji document would have been tacitly or explicitly suspended), but such a state of affairs might have been fatal to the healthy development of representative institutions.

The alternative to early elections and a new constitution was in all probability either detailed control of the domestic administration by General MacArthur, or workers' and farmers' control of production and distribution. The latter was already developing spasmodically with left-wing support and leadership. The workers suggested that in certain circumstances they had a right, or even a duty, to take over a plant. Rather than that the prevailing chaos should involve closure of a plant, they contended that it was preferable that the workers should assume control. From this it was a short step to the thought that, where business under private ownership could not sustain a 'fair' level of conditions for its workers, it should be taken over. The workers also claimed justification for taking over a business of which the owner had an objectionable political record. Strong feeling was expressed on both sides over this issue of workers' control. The supporters of the old management argued that reconversion was being delayed through the fear that the exuberant new unions would propose working conditions bankrupting the concern and then proceed to expropriation; and they drew attention to workers' ventures that had not proved successful. The advocates of workers' control were able, on their side, to point to a number of instances where the experiments had been successful.

The case that attracted most attention was the seizure of *Yomiuri Hochi,* one of Tokyo's million-circulation dailies and the one which had been most closely associated with militarist policy. In October 1945 the workers took it over and turned it into a left-wing organ. In a leading article on 28 October the paper said that since the owners shared responsibility for the war, the employees proposed to publish the paper themselves in the public interest. The article went on: 'What we desire is separation of capital from management through the participation of representatives of the workers.' In the months that followed the *Yomiuri* became a test issue, both for the control of the press and for workers' share in management, which other labour unions watched with great interest. In June 1946, however, Allied Headquarters issued a statement which seemed to settle the main issue against the unions by establishing the principle that 'the custodians of responsibility are the owners or the manage-

ment selected by them.'[1] The issue then narrowed to the right of the management to dismiss the union leaders, and the *Yomiuri* settled down after the upheavals to the expression of conservative policy.[2]

During the first year of Allied occupation the country was open, psychologically, economically, politically, and socially, to the revolutionary alternative to parliamentary control. The next step to isolated instances of workers' and peasants' control would have been a co-ordination of these efforts. There were many local instances of direct contact between farmers' unions and employees' unions or co-operative societies. One case was reported of a local people's council including unions of teachers and other non-agrarian groups. The *Asahi* suggested that such experiments might develop into a federation of scores of villages and towns with systematic connections between labour unions, consumers' councils, and farmers' organizations, and that 'a unified democratic front based on the initiative and power of the whole nation will progress in this manner'.[3] This movement probably began in natural and spontaneous efforts of the people to adjust themselves to a state of affairs in which the monetary machinery of exchange had broken down. It was, however, a type of democratic adjustment to catastrophe which the communists were equipped to lead, and it must have seemed both to the occupying authority and to politicians other than communists that early elections were necessary if there was to be parliamentary control of reconstruction.

The communists were at a disadvantage in this electoral campaign. Having so recently become emancipated from official repression, they had had little time to organize; and their uncompromising opposition to the imperial institution tended to antagonize the conservative rural community. Nevertheless, their programme of social and economic reform was far more constructive than those of the right-wing and centre groups, which were most insipid and betrayed a hankering after unregenerate pre-war conditions.

Great interest developed as the polling day, 10 April, approached. There were 2,700 candidates (compared with about 1,000 in 1942 and in 1937), barely 150 of whom had been members of earlier Diets. It is indicative of the prevailing political irresponsibility that half the candidates were independents or affiliated to small mushroom parties, of which there were over 200. Many of these

[1] *New York Times*, 14 June 1946. [2] *New York Herald Tribune*, 19 July 1946.
[3] *Asahi*, 26 February 1946.

candidates regarded the elections as a means of enhancing their local political reputation with a view to securing prefectural office. There were 82 women candidates and a small women's party. The major parties each had women's sections and made strenuous efforts to interest the new women voters. Registered voters numbered 37 million, of whom, presumably as a result of the exceptional displacement of the male population, 20·6 million were women and only 16·4 million men:[1] 78·5 per cent of the men and 67·1 per cent of the women voted, the percentage of all votes being 72·1 per cent of those registered. Considering that over half the register was composed of women inexperienced in politics and, according to many forecasts, not interested, this was a very high poll. In the spring election of 1942, the percentage was 83, but that was managed by Tojo at the height of his success. In 1937 the percentage was 73·3.

Never before had the Japanese electors been permitted to record their votes without official interference. In the past, prefectural governors had changed with each new Cabinet, and the governor used the police and every other means of coercion available to him to secure the return of his party. The 1946 election, however, was carried out under the close scrutiny of the Allied occupation forces. In view of these novel circumstances, it seems worth while to record the results in detail:

	Old Diet	*New Diet*[2]	*Women elected*	*Votes in millions*[3]	*Percentage*
Liberals	46	142	5	12·7	24
Progressives	270	93	6	10·0	19
Social Democrats	17	92	8	9·0	17
Co-operators	28	16	0	1·9	4
Communists	0	5	1	1·9	4
Small parties	0	38	10	17·0	32
Independents	48	78	9		
To be elected	57	2			
	466	466	39	52·5	100

[1] The discrepancy is not fully accounted for by the number of Japanese still overseas, and the excess of male over female casualties. Millions of demobilized servicemen were evidently not on the electoral rolls.

[2] Figures vary somewhat in different lists as party negotiations and manoeuvres followed the elections.

[3] The number of voters was 26·6 million but the election was by a system of plural voting. The number of supporters of each party was about half the figure shown in this column.

One of the most interesting features of the election was the success of thirty-nine out of eighty-two women candidates. Whereas only about a sixth of all candidates succeeded, nearly half of the women were elected. A possible explanation is that women voters tended to support women candidates instead of being influenced mainly by party considerations. This nascent political enthusiasm of women was, however, not maintained in the 1947 elections. Other points of note are that the average age of the members was fifty-one[1] and that the communists were under-represented in proportion to their vote. They polled a few more votes than the Co-operative Party.

The election was preceded and followed by strong personal attacks on Shidehara, the Prime Minister, who had no party affiliation, and on Hatoyama, the liberal leader, who found it difficult to explain away a reactionary past. Shidehara having resigned, Hatoyama might have formed a government either with progressive or socialist support, had not the Supreme Commander intervened, forbidding him to take office. He was replaced as liberal leader by Shigeru Yoshida, Foreign Minister in the out-going Ministry, who succeeded in constructing a Coalition Government composed of liberals, progressives, and non-party elements.

Baron Shidehara's resignation had been compelled by popular agitation led by the communists, which the Ministry under Yoshida completely failed to allay. On several occasions demonstrations took place before the Palace or in the courtyard of the Diet building. Of the many gatherings before and after the formation of the new Ministry, the 1946 May Day parade in Tokyo, in which possibly half a million demonstrators took part, afforded the most impressive exhibition of the strength of the labour movement. A manifesto issued on this occasion accused bureaucrats, capitalists, landowners, and other 'feudalistic elements' of evading the directives of S.C.A.P., especially those relating to food hoarding, election malpractices, surrender of arms, and collective bargaining. This manifesto caused an Allied dispute that could not be concealed. In discussing it Mr George Atcheson, chairman of the Allied Council, alleged that it bore signs of having been translated from a foreign language into Japanese. He objected to the Soviet member's acceptance of the allegations in the manifesto as facts, and pointed out that the document had no signatures. He added: 'I do not need to

[1] For comparison with average age of members of earlier Diets, see Part I, p. 60.

tell you that the United States does not favour Communism in the United States or Japan . . . The Communist Party is not suppressed in the United States and it has been allowed in Japan to have the same rights as other political parties.' Members of the Council, said Mr Atcheson, should not 'give support in public meetings of the Council or otherwise to any one Japanese political party'. The Japanese Communist Party responded to this rebuke to the Soviet member of the Council with the assertion that the May Day manifesto had been drafted in the Japanese language by a committee representing nine labour organizations with two million members.

General MacArthur also intervened when the constitutional process of forming a Government was hindered by threatening demonstrations. The Supreme Commander's statement referred to 'the growing tendency towards mass violence . . . under organized leadership'. He added that 'if minor elements in Japan's society are unable to exercise such self-restraint as the situation requires, I shall be forced to take necessary steps to remedy such a deplorable situation'. There was considerable satisfaction at General MacArthur's statement, for it was felt that the left-wing was trying to apply pressure similar to that which had in the unregenerate past been brought to bear on the constitutional politicans by the militarists and aggressive patriots. The wrangling which developed in the Allied Council, however, was unedifying.

As summer passed into autumn, the atmosphere in the Allied Council became increasingly tense. Russian advocacy of sweeping labour legislation was met by a pointed American suggestion that freedom of action was being asked for Japanese unions that would not be accorded to the workers' organizations in the Soviet Union. Controversy over the Japanese prisoners in Russian hands weakened the position of the communists and the Soviet representatives. The Russian representative ascribed the delay in repatriation to an alleged failure by the Supreme Commander to furnish shipping, and the argument was carried into the streets by a large procession of Japanese who demonstrated on 12 September 1946, at the Soviet Embassy. Another disquieting controversy, this time involving the British Commonwealth representative on the Council, arose over agrarian measures. Although both Mr MacMahon Ball and Mr Derevyanko, the Soviet member, favoured drastic proposals for the redistribution of land, the Japanese Government was not asked to give adequate consideration to

these proposals, and a more conservative measure was passed. The British representative also objected to the permission granted to Japanese whalers to operate in the Antarctic. This friction is likely to have an unfortunate effect on Japanese opinion. In August the Prime Minister was bold enough to give an interview in which he expressed the hope that there would be no premature end to the Allied Occupation. He said that the restoration of peace and a measure of well-being in Japan 'will take a longer occupation than most Americans realize—it is either this or Russia takes us over'.[1]

Early in 1947 Yoshida made a strong attempt to draw right-wing social democrats into a coalition, which the latter were inclined to accept, even at the cost of left-wing defection. The negotiations failed, however, mainly because of socialist opposition to the retention of Yoshida's Finance Minister, and the Cabinet was reconstructed at the end of January 1947 without significant change of political complexion. A few days later S.C.A.P. wrote to Yoshida pointing out the advisability of a fresh general election. Submitting to this injunction, the Prime Minister decided that the new elections should be held in April 1947, and should be comprehensive. In addition to both Houses in the Diet, they were extended to the principal offices of local government. The elections were preceded by a violent parliamentary controversy over a government plan to revise the electoral law. It was proposed that the number of constituencies should be increased about four-fold and the representation of each correspondingly reduced. There was, moreover, to be single instead of plural voting. These changes were thought to be in the interests of the large parties. The measure was forced through on 30 March 1947, and on the next day the ninety-second Diet, the last under the Meiji Constitution, was dissolved. A few days earlier the Progressive Party dissolved itself and re-emerged in the spirit of the age as the Japan Democratic Party. It claimed 145 Diet members.[2]

The first elections were for prefectural governors, mayors, and village headmen. The independents, mostly conservative in outlook, had the greatest success. This is the first time these local authorities have been chosen by popular vote.[3]

The elections for the House of Representatives took place on 25 April 1947. A striking and perhaps disturbing feature was the

[1] *New York Times*, 12 August 1946. [2] *New York Herald Tribune*, 1 April 1947.
[3] *New York Herald Tribune*, 7 and 9 April 1947; *New York Times*, 7 April 1947.

proportion of candidates, namely 1,251 out of 1,604, standing for the first time.[1] Purges, quick changes of favour and fortune, and the discouragement felt by many experienced men, have brought to Japan new leadership in every field of public and business life. Those who welcome the change may not sufficiently realize that it was often the fact that the new men were obscure nonentities who had kept their record clear of association with aggressive militarism; and it remains to be proved whether lack of experience will be accompanied by integrity or liberal convictions. About seventy-five per cent of the electorate voted[2] and the social democrats, as generally anticipated, became the biggest party. Together the right-wing Liberal and Democrat Parties returned more than half the members. The results were as follows:[3]

Social Democrats	143
Liberals	133
Democrats	126
Co-operators	31
Communists	4
Others	29
	466

Two noteworthy features were a set-back for women candidates and the lack of progress by the communists. Only about thirty per cent of enfranchised women went to the polls and, although the number of women standing was almost as great as in 1946, only fifteen now succeeded. The communist failure was noted with particular satisfaction by S.C.A.P., who said that communism 'had its full chance and on merits has failed'. He added that the people had overwhelmingly chosen a moderate course which would ensure preservation of freedom and the enhancement of individual liberty.[4]

The last of the elections was for the second chamber, the House of Councillors. Half the seats went to small parties or independents who were mostly of right-wing views.[5]

[1] *New York Times*, 19 April 1947. The parties put candidates forward as follows: Democrats, 338; Liberals, 328; Social Democrats, 289; Communists, 121; Co-operative Party, 112; minor parties and independents, 416.

[2] *The Times*, 28 April 1947.

[3] *The Times*, 3 May 1947.

[4] *New York Times*, 28 April 1947.

[5] The result was: Social Democrats, 46; Liberals, 41; Democrats, 33; Communists, 4; Others, 126; Total, 250.

Although there was a conservative majority in the House of Representatives, the socialist leader, Tetsu Katayama, was given the responsibility of forming a Ministry. It was clear from the experience of Shidehara and Yoshida that the conservatives could not get the popular support needed to enable them to guide the country successfully through its difficulties. The election programme of the social democrats included state control, in preparation for nationalization, of the coal, iron, steel, and fertilizer industries; and the party, whether in office alone or in a coalition with the right-wing, is likely to pursue a policy of more rigorous economic control. Some members of the party would have preferred to co-operate with the communists rather than with the right-wing, but there seems little likelihood that social democrats will take a course which, whatever advantages it might have in the industrial field, would bring scarcely any parliamentary support and would be unwelcome to S.C.A.P. The success or failure of Japan's new Ministry will be determined not in Tokyo but in Washington, and the decisions made there are likely to be powerfully influenced by the advice of General MacArthur.

The first year and three-quarters of the Occupation has brought disappointments, but it has been, none the less, a period of some achievement in the construction of representative institutions. Women have been enfranchized, two honest elections have been held, and every shade of political thought, within the wide field permitted by the Allies, has been freely expressed. Association in trade unions or any other society with legitimate aims has been encouraged. The worst agrarian abuses have been liquidated, partly by the economic revolution which almost wiped out peasant indebtedness and made the man with food to dispose of a power in the land, and partly by legislation. A constitution has been enacted which, whatever its defects, should be an encouragement to progress and a hindrance to tyranny. Few could have hoped at the time of surrender that so much could be done in less than two years to put Japan on the path leading to the right exercise of political responsibility.

One widely anticipated danger has not materialized. The demobilized Japanese Army has not proved an organized focus of political intransigence. Mr Max Bishop, acting chairman of the Allied Council, said in March 1947 that 6,400,000 servicemen had been demobilized, while over 5 million Japanese (including

civilians) had been repatriated. Of 1,400,000 remaining overseas, 1,200,000 were in Russian hands, but the repatriation of these on a monthly quota began at the end of 1946 and, even if the speed of repatriation is not accelerated, the Japanese should all be back well before the end of 1948.[1]

[1] *New York Times* and *Soviet News*, 6 March 1947.

CHAPTER XVI

The Throne in Defeat and the New Constitution

FROM April 1945 when Admiral Baron Suzuki was appointed Premier most of Japan's leaders concentrated on the preservation of the framework of the imperial institution. Even after the atom bomb and the Russian declaration of war, the war party would fain have held out for terms preserving the integrity of the Japanese islands, but when on 10 August 1945 Japan openly sued for peace, her only petition was for an interpretation of the Potsdam Declaration consonant with the retention of the Emperor's prerogative. When the Allies proved unyielding, the Japanese accepted the Declaration without this reservation, but the tenacity of the Japanese on this point was illustrated at a meeting of the Diet three weeks later. The Premier (Prince Higashikuni), describing the circumstances in which the final decisions of the war had been taken, said: 'It was decided to accept the terms of the Potsdam Declaration with the understanding that this did not comprise any demand that would prejudice the prerogatives of His Majesty as Sovereign. The War of Greater East Asia has thus been brought to an end.'[1]

The authority of the Emperor was placed squarely behind the surrender decision when he broadcast a rescript on 15 August. This was the first time his subjects had heard their Emperor's voice. Among the war-weary crowds around the loudspeakers, few imagined that Japan had decided to accept terms closely approaching unconditional surrender, and they expected to hear a declaration of war on Russia with an exhortation to fight to the last.[2] This rescript is Japan's last freely spoken word in the war, and it may yet prove an important document. It contains nothing satisfactory to the Allies except the announcement of capitulation. This was partly because the authority of the Emperor and his Ministers over the Army was precarious,[3] but it is probable that the defiant passages

[1] Domei in English, 5 September 1945.

[2] According to the extremely interesting account in *The Lost War*. Its author, Masuo Kato, is a journalist who was in a position to assess public opinion.

[3] There were sporadic insurrections. The night before the broadcast, according to Masuo Kato, op. cit., a party of insurgents had unsuccessfully searched the Imperial Household for the recording of the rescript.

also expressed the feelings of the peace party. The broadcast reiterated that the aim of the war was self-preservation and the stabilization of East Asia. It is implied in a reference to 'the devoted service of our one hundred million people' that Korea and Formosa were associated with Japan and consequently subjugated with her. Similarly, there is an apology to 'our allied nations of East Asia who have consistently co-operated with the Empire towards the emancipation of East Asia'. There is a suggestion that Japan was surrendering, not merely to save herself, but from a big-hearted concern for human civilization. To sum up, Japan, said the Emperor, had resolved 'by enduring the unendurable and suffering what is insufferable, to safeguard and maintain the structure of the Imperial State'.[1] There is no mention of surrender or defeat.[2]

With this broadcast, the task of Admiral Suzuki ended. In keeping with the policy of using the imperial prestige to secure peaceful surrender, Prince Naruhiko Higashikuni became Prime Minister for a few weeks. Princes Kanin, Asaka, and Takeda were sent to South-east Asia, China, and Manchuria respectively as imperial envoys to make sure there should be no misunderstanding of the Emperor's orders.[3] These strong measures were so effective that the Japanese had stopped fighting on most fronts by 23 August.[4] A rescript was addressed to the forces expressing the Emperor's sympathy, his grief for those who had died and his hope that the soldiers would settle down to civilian life. On 28 August Lieutenant-General Sadamu Shimomura, Japan's new War Minister, broadcast to the forces. In urging them to accept the surrender decision he admitted as 'the most grievous of all circumstances' that 'a shadow has been cast, though it be but temporarily, upon the sovereignty of His Majesty the Emperor'.[5] The formal surrender was signed aboard U.S.S. *Missouri* on 2 September, the Japanese representatives being Mamoru Shigemitsu, the Foreign Minister, and General Yoshijiro Umezu, Chief of the Army General Staff. The Emperor identified himself with the act of surrender in a proclamation which included the passage:

[1] The text was given by Domei in English on 15 August 1945.

[2] Not till his New Year rescript at the end of 1945 did the Emperor use the word 'defeat'.

[3] Domei in English, 22 and 24 August 1945.

[4] A report on the situation at the various fronts was sent from Japanese Imperial Headquarters to General MacArthur and quoted by Domei in English.

[5] Domei in Japanese, 28 August 1945.

'We have commanded the Imperial Japanese Government and Japanese Headquarters to sign on our behalf the instrument of surrender presented by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers . . . We command all our people to cease hostilities forthwith, lay down their arms, and faithfully carry out all the provisions of surrender.'[1]

On 3 September he reported the surrender to his ancestors at the family sanctuaries in the Imperial Palace, and a few days later the new Premier visited the Grand Shrine at Ise.[2] The occupation of the country by American troops took place entirely without incident.

Early in August 1945, the subjugation of Japan, though overwhelming resources were available, had seemed to the Allies a hard task, likely to be expensive in life and material. The Allied Governments by that time probably knew that the Japanese Government had no hope of doing more than qualify their defeat, and had sought the mediation of the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, the fanaticism of the Japanese was an incalculable military factor, and it still seemed possible that they would carry resistance to a point approaching national annihilation. In these circumstances, it was most reassuring to have the authority of the Emperor placed without reserve behind the decision to submit. The Allied Governments, while profiting by this exercise of imperial influence, retained complete freedom of action. The demonstration of the Emperor's authority and sincerity have, however, influenced them on the crucial issue of the imperial institution. The advantage of accepting the Emperor's co-operation, though not so pressing as in August 1945, has remained considerable. It can hardly be doubted that the Japanese leaders who had to plan Japan's course in this period of unimaginable disaster calculated the effect which the Emperor's co-operation would have, not only in the surrender crisis but in the administration of the defeated country. Their policy has plainly been to maintain the people's reverence for and Allied toleration of the Throne. Everything else has been conceded.

The position of the Emperor in the autumn of 1945 was precarious. The truth of a tribal religion is apt to be judged by the success of the tribe, and defeat was bound to bring a crisis for Shinto and for the Throne which was the focus of Shinto faith. The Japan-

[1] Domei in English, 2 September 1945. [2] ibid., 3 and 8 September 1945.

ese leaders were probably ready to advise abdication, if that were the price required to preserve the institution. Abdication is a commonplace of Japanese history, in which the Throne rather than the Emperor has been significant. While Japanese opinion was not at first clearly shown, foreign public opinion tended to be unfavourable to the Emperor. The view, widely held in America, Australia, China, and Russia, that the Occupation was in some respects too lenient, was often accompanied by a demand for drastic treatment of the Emperor.

Late in 1945 several measures were taken to strengthen the Emperor's domestic and external position. On 25 September he received two American correspondents, an unprecedented act, and gave written answers to a series of questions previously submitted. One answer was that the Emperor was in favour of a constitutional monarchy like the British.[1] The Emperor also visited General MacArthur, a dramatic act of deference that startled Japanese opinion. As the people assumed that he was interceding for them, his humility gave him a further claim on their devotion and gratitude. The hope that General MacArthur would return the visit was disappointed, but the Emperor has since repeated his visit to the Supreme Commander on three occasions.[2]

An interesting example of the way the Emperor's influence was used to sustain both morale and traditional sentiment was the direction given to the imperial New Year poetry competition. It is the custom each year for the Emperor to prescribe a subject for a brief poem in classic form. The subject chosen is always one which is associated with poignant national sentiment, such as plum blossom, the moon, a temple garden, bamboo, or a mountain stream. For the New Year of 1946 the subject was 'Snow on the Pine'. Both snow and the pine tree appeal strongly to Japanese feelings and are featured in countless pictures, poems, and dramas. The people, therefore, were invited to reflect on the long-lived evergreen pine, which may bend under the winter's burden but remains standing when the spring comes. There were 14,500 entrants and the Emperor, who himself always contributes a poem, wrote a verse exhorting his hearers to emulate the pine which bears the burden of densely falling snow.[3] At New Year

[1] *New York Times*, 25 September 1945.
[2] *The Times*, 1 June 1946; *Daily Telegraph*, 6 May 1947.
[3] *Christian Science Monitor*, 24 January 1946.

1947 the subject was 'Daybreak', and there were over 30,000 entrants.[1]

With the opening of 1946 the Emperor issued a rescript, the purport of which was a denial of his divine attributes. In this rescript the five principles of Emperor Meiji's coronation oath were reaffirmed. These are household words to the Japanese, and they have an application to the present crisis which may have reassured people that the huge changes of 1945 would not have appalled the great men under whom Japan embarked on her career of expansion. The five principles are as follows:

1. Public councils shall be organized, and all governmental affairs shall be decided by general discussion.
2. All classes, both rulers and ruled, shall with one heart devote themselves to the advancement of the national interests.
3. All the civil or military officials and all the common people shall be allowed to realize their own aspirations, and to evince their active characteristics.
4. All base customs of former times shall be abolished, and justice and equity as they are universally recognized shall be followed.
5. Knowledge shall be sought throughout the world, and thus the foundations of the Empire shall be extended.

On the question of his divinity, the Emperor asserted in this rescript that: 'The ties between us and our people have always stood upon mutual trust and affection. They do not depend on mere legends and myths. They are not predicated on the false conception that the Japanese people are superior to other races and destined to rule the world.' Until the autumn of 1945 this rescript would have been untrue. Historically, the ties between Emperor and subject had a mythical basis and there was little affection, yet the Emperor, by bringing the war to an end, collaborating with the Allies, and remaining modestly in his station as a symbol of past greatness and future hope, had gone far to make the rescript true.

Early in 1946 the Emperor began a series of tours among his people, and he had a remarkable success. In rather shabby civilian clothes, tongue-tied when he tried to be affable, and lacking every outward mark of royalty, the Emperor visited schools, factories,

[1] *New York Times*, 24 January 1947.

and markets, and exchanged hesitant sentences with simple people. Involuntary testimony to the success of these tours came from the communists, who ascribed the Emperor's peregrinations to a deliberate design to promote the reactionary cause at the elections, and so frustrate the democratic impulses of the people.[1] They urged the prohibition of 'electioneering by the Emperor and all other war criminals'. At the end of May the Russian representative upon the Far Eastern Commission criticized the freedom of travel permitted to the Emperor, and was supported by his Australian and New Zealand colleagues.[2]

In the meantime, the Emperor's status had become a focus of constitutional discussion. The need for constitutional revision was stated plainly by General MacArthur early in October 1945. A number of defects in the Meiji Constitution were pointed out, such as the autocratic power exercised in the Emperor's name and the responsibility of the Cabinet to him instead of to the Diet. In October the Japanese Cabinet appointed Dr Joji Matsumoto as chairman of a committee to submit recommendations for constitutional revision, while Prince Konoye carried out a parallel study on behalf of the Privy Council. It soon became clear that both Matsumoto and Konoye hoped to mollify the Supreme Commander with minor amendments. In an interview on 22 October, Konoye suggested (*a*) that the House of Peers should become elective, (*b*) that the responsibility of the Cabinet to the Emperor and the Diet respectively should be defined, (*c*) that the Emperor's powers should be restricted without impairing his sovereign prerogatives.[3] Early in February 1946 Dr Matsumoto completed his proposals for revision which were put before General MacArthur without consulting the Cabinet.[4] These were considered inadequate by the Supreme Commander and discussions continued until on 6 March the draft of an entirely new constitution was published under an imperial rescript. This carried the strong support of General MacArthur and the concurrence of the Prime Minister.

Mr Byrnes, then Secretary of State, took occasion to deny in March that the draft was imposed upon the Japanese by the United States Government; and on 21 June General MacArthur issued a

[1] *The Times* and *New York Times*, 1 March 1946.
[2] *New York Herald Tribune* and *Daily Express*, 30 May 1946.
[3] *New York Times*, 23 October 1945.
[4] *Jiji Shimpo* (Tokyo), 7 March 1946.

statement of somewhat similar purport, from which the following is an extract:

> 'Numerous drafts have been prepared by various political parties, education groups, publicists, and individuals of all shades of thought and opinion . . . Rarely has a fundamental charter regulative of national life been more thoroughly discussed and analysed. The government draft now before the Diet is a Japanese document, and it is for the people of Japan, acting through their duly elected representatives, to determine its form and content—whether it is to be adopted, modified or rejected.'[1]

These somewhat unusual official statements were presumably the outcome of reports in the American press that the Japanese themselves regarded the draft as an American document.[2] According to the *Christian Science Monitor,* General MacArthur realized early in February that the Japanese Government would not propose far-reaching modifications in the Meiji Constitution; and the same paper gave the following account of the manner in which the draft was prepared and presented to the Japanese. Brigadier-General Courtney Whitney, Chief of the Government Section, is said to have divided his men into groups, assigning each a part of the constitution, with instructions that the draft must be completed by Washington's birthday. About that date (22 February) General Whitney presented the draft to the Premier, Baron Shidehara, and the Foreign Minister, who were given fifteen minutes in which to familiarize themselves with its contents. They showed a disposition to demur but acquiesced when told that the Supreme Commander was determined to have his version presented to the Diet.[3]

At the time, it was not clear what part, if any, the Far Eastern Commission had played in this constitutional issue, but on 18 April 1947 the texts of several relevant policy decisions of the Commission were released to the press.[4] The first of these, approved on 20 March 1946 immediately after first publication of the draft, suggests that the Commission had some misgivings.

[1] *New York Times*, 22 June 1946.

[2] 'In ringing American tones the constitution proclaimed itself as emanating from the sovereign will of the Japanese people.' *Christian Science Monitor*, 25 June 1946.

[3] Gordon Walker in the *Christian Science Monitor*, 3 July 1946.

[4] *Department of State Bulletin*, Vol. XVI, No. 409, 4 May 1947, pp. 802–4.

After noting that the draft was to be presented to the forthcoming session of the Diet and expressing a wish to be kept informed of the progress of this and any other drafts which might be so presented, the Commission requested that General MacArthur should make it clear to the Japanese Government that it must be given an opportunity to consider the final draft, before approval by the Diet, in order to determine whether it was consistent with the Potsdam Declaration and any other controlling document. Furthermore, the Commission, noting that the Supreme Commander had announced his personal approval of the draft, expressed apprehension lest this approval should be misunderstood by the Japanese and taken to mean that this particular draft had the approval of the Powers represented on the Commission. As this was not necessarily the case, the Commission desired the Supreme Commander to intimate to the Japanese people that, irrespective of the merits of the draft, the fact that it had been prepared by the Japanese Government did not preclude favourable consideration of other proposals or drafts by the Diet.

This policy decision was duly communicated by the United States Government to the Supreme Commander, whose reactions are not recorded. However, on 2 July 1946, the Commission approved a second policy decision, likewise communicated to General MacArthur, laying down basic principles for a new constitution, but it would not appear that this document received very profound consideration in Japan, since the original draft was passed by the Diet with only very minor amendments. The text of yet another policy decision of the Commission dated 12 August 1946 suggests that their decisions may not always have been communicated very promptly to the Japanese Government by the Supreme Commander. In fact one such decision relating to the Constitution was not so communicated until after the Constitution had been passed by the Diet and received imperial approval.

The draft Constitution opened with the following preamble:

> 'We, the Japanese people, acting through our duly elected representatives in the National Diet, . . . do proclaim the sovereignty of the people's will and do ordain and establish this constitution, founded upon the universal principle that government is a sacred trust, the authority for which is derived from the people, the powers of which are exercised by the representatives

of the people and the benefits of which are enjoyed by the people; and we reject and revoke all constitutions, laws, ordinances, and rescripts in conflict herewith.'

The adjustment of the Emperor's position to the requirements of democracy is brought about in Article 1.

'The Emperor shall be the symbol of the State and of the unity of the people, deriving his position from the sovereign will of the people.'

The Emperor is given a number of important functions in Article 7, but performs them under advice, or as required by law. He has no independent initiative.

The document is at least as much a manifesto as a constitution. For instances, Article 12 reads:

'All of the people shall be respected as individuals, and their right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness shall, within the limits of the public welfare, be the supreme consideration in legislation and in governmental affairs.'

Similarly, Article 94 asserts that:

'The fundamental human rights by this constitution guaranteed to the people of Japan result from the age-old struggle of man to be free. They have survived the exacting test of durability in the crucible of time and experience and are conferred upon this and future generations as a sacred trust to be held for all time inviolate.'

There is some evidence that the framers of the Constitution lacked insight into Japanese social life, and failed to appreciate the implications of their proposals for the social and legal system. For example, Article 22 says:

'Marriage shall be based only on the mutual consent of both sexes and it shall be maintained through mutual co-operation with the equal rights of husband and wife as a basis. Laws shall be enacted concerning choice of spouse, property rights, inheritance, choice of domicile, divorce, and other matters pertaining to marriage and the family, from the standpoint of individual dignity and the essential equality of the sexes.'

Marriage in Japan was nearly always by mutual consent, though the principals did not choose each other. The family sometimes pestered one of the parties into acquiescence, but this kind of pressure cannot be legislated against. Very considerable changes in the civil code will be needed to bring it into a measure of conformity with this article of the new Constitution. Article 24 is another which seems to show lack of knowledge of Japanese institutions. It begins:

> 'Every person shall have the right to receive an equal education corresponding to his ability.'

There are few countries in which this stipulation was more substantially achieved before the war than Japan.

Chapter IV, which deals with the Diet, provides that a general election to the House of Representatives shall take place at intervals of not more than four years. The members of the second Chamber, hereafter to be called the House of Councillors, will sit for six years, half being elected every three years. The Diet is to be convened at least once a year and an extraordinary session must be called at any time when demanded by a quarter or more of the members of either House. Elections must take place within forty days of a dissolution, and the Diet must be convened within thirty days of the election. A Bill must pass both Houses. If rejected by the House of Councillors and passed again by a two-thirds majority of the House of Representatives, it becomes law. In money Bills and international agreements, in the event of rejection by the House of Councillors, the majority vote of the House of Representatives is to prevail.

The legal clauses are firm and valuable. For example, Article 28 provides that:

> 'No person shall be apprehended except upon warrant issued by a competent judicial officer, which specifies the offence with which the person is charged, unless he is apprehended while committing a crime.'

Article 29 requires that an arrested man shall be told at once the charges against him and given access to counsel, and Article 34 says that no person shall be compelled to testify against himself. Some of the privileges guaranteed in the Constitution appear incompatible with the authority of the Supreme Commander. An

instance of this is afforded by Article 19: 'Freedom of assembly, association, speech, and press and all other forms of expression are guaranteed. No censorship shall be maintained nor shall the secrecy of any means of communication be violated.' Article 21 guarantees academic freedom, which is another privilege the Japanese are unlikely to be permitted until they regain their independence. The chapter on the judiciary provides for a Supreme Court 'with power to determine the constitutionality of any law, order, regulation, or official act'. Article 25 asserts that all persons have the right to work under conditions fixed by law. The implications of this are, of course, far-reaching.

The most spectacular passage of the Constitution (acclaimed by S.C.A.P. as its major achievement but nevertheless singularly unconvincing) is the short Chapter II in which Japan renounces the sovereign right to wage war or to maintain armed forces. At first sight this may be read as a confession that the Japanese are a nation even less able than others to trust themselves with the means of making war, but this was probably not the reason for this chapter. In his address at the first session of the Allied Council for Japan on 5 April 1946, General MacArthur referred to this renunciation of sovereign rights as meriting 'the thoughtful consideration of all the peoples of the world'.[1]

The Constitution, which was the principal measure laid before the ninetieth session of the Diet, was the subject of much debate, but passed with only small amendments. Dr Tatsukichi Minobe, the famous constitutional lawyer, thought it contained inadequate safeguards against ill-considered legislation, and urged the investment of the Emperor with wider powers. Kanosuke Ushio, chairman of the constitutional committee of the Privy Council, advised the Premier to exercise the utmost care and consideration in enforcing the revised Constitution. He observed wryly, and perhaps not without justification, that some of the provisions could hardly be regarded as ideal. In the Diet debate the attitude of the Premier was significant. He used hackneyed, mischievous phrases in speaking of the Meiji Constitution, which he described as 'revered by the nation as a great charter, immutable for all ages'. The implication of his statement was that the Japanese had behaved so imprudently as to cause the peerless polity to be misunderstood, and it was now advisable to indulge the Allies by adopting the new

[1] *Nippon Times*, 6 April 1946.

Constitution.[1] The first liberal spokesman in the debate said that the Meiji Constitution was 'not undemocratic if enforced in the right manner'. The communists objected both to some features of the draft itself and to the expenditure of a large amount of the Diet's time on the subject. This view was expressed by Kyuichi Tokuda in the first speech ever made to the Diet by a communist. He said that the motive of the Government in giving the Constitution precedence over the urgent problems of food and inflation was to consolidate the power of big business, big landowners, and high officials, and to hamper the growth of democracy. Reconstruction should be carried out by the workers and peasants who had suffered from the war, not by the war-making classes. Constitutional reform should be effected after the people had learned democratic principles through experience in the solution of pressing questions.[2]

At first sight it may indeed appear illogical to have devoted months of discussion to this subject. Time, however, was found for other measures, notably an agrarian law, and in any case little could be done by legislation to improve living conditions. Amelioration depended mainly on efficient administration, relaxation of the restrictions maintained by the Allies, and food imports. The alternatives to a new constitution were either revision of the old one or its suspension. The conservatives were evidently prepared to obstruct adequate revision. The communists would have preferred to have the whole constitutional position in abeyance. They do not regard politics as a department isolated from social and economic life, and they wished to deal with problems of production and distribution partly through workers' and peasants' committees. Had these developed into proletarian control of a large part of the economy, the system would probably have been reflected in proletarian control of the Diet, possibly through a soviet system. The communists would then have been ready to have this state of affairs made lapidary in a written Constitution. The conservatives, for their part, probably prefer this new Constitution to an amended version of the Meiji document. The Throne is safeguarded at least to the extent of its continued existence, and the measures ensuring liberty and progress are such as have been shown in other countries to be compatible with respect for wealth and its privileges. The Meiji Constitution has been reverently laid aside with its mystic virtue intact. When Japan once more regains her freedom, the

[1] *Christian Science Monitor*, 26 June 1946. [2] *Nippon Times*, 26 June 1946.

Constitution upon which her imperial achievement was erected will remain at her disposal unsullied by amendment. Despite its Utopian tone and extravagant phraseology, the new Constitution gives the Japanese a chance of developing within an institutional framework which represents the most advanced standards of politics, and General MacArthur hopes that they possess the sense and capacity to take advantage of it.

The new Constitution was promulgated on 3 November 1946. On 3 May 1947, in a short and little-noticed ceremony before the Imperial Palace, it was put into effect. The Far Eastern Commission may have had doubts whether the document reflected the desires of the Japanese people, for in March it sent a directive to S.C.A.P. providing for its possible revision. The directive required that the Constitution should be reconsidered by the Diet not earlier than May 1948 and not later than May 1949.[1]

[1] *New York Times*, 28 March 1947.

CHAPTER XVII

National Re-Education

In re-educating the Japanese, destructive and constructive measures had to be taken simultaneously in the first year of peace. For example, new efforts in film production had to be encouraged, while thousands of old prints were being destroyed; civics had to be taught in schools which were, for a while, forbidden to teach history, geography, or ethics at all; religious activity was valued, but important aspects of Japan's national religion were suppressed; the newspapers were told to exemplify the principles of freedom and democracy, while at the same time being forbidden to express their opinion on many matters.

Particularly anxious thought has been given to the training of Japan's youth. Schooling has had to be restarted, for life had almost flickered out of the system of universal compulsory education of which the Japanese were justly proud. The resort to student labour in the war had been carried so far that by the spring of 1945 few institutions of non-technical education above the primary level were open, while during the summer of 1945 even the surviving schools were overshadowed by plans for a *levée en masse* to meet invasion. Thousands of schools had been destroyed and damaged, transport between home and school was difficult, many teachers were mobilized or engaged in war work, and parents were reluctant to lose sight of their children in view of the possibility of daylight raids. With the close of the war, local attempts were made to re-open the schools and measures were improvised to adjust teaching to ideas acceptable to the occupying Powers. The reliability of teachers, however, was uncertain and school books were saturated with megalomania. At the end of 1945 it was found necessary to take the drastic step of suspending the teaching of history, geography, and ethics. Text-books on these subjects and the corresponding teachers' manuals were destroyed. In a country with tribal religion such as Japan the three subjects are inextricably connected with one another. The teaching of history in schools had been distorted, not only in the account of Japan's origins, but also in the interpretation of recent events. A school history describing

the China Incident, for instance, stated that: 'On the evening of 7 July 1937, the Chinese Army launched an unlawful attack on one of our units engaged in night manoeuvres near Peking', and 'impudently continued its militaristic attitude.' In explaining the second world war a school history stated: 'To fulfil her Far Eastern designs the United States shifted from mere economic and financial aggression to military aggression.' For smaller children there was this: 'On 8 December 1941, our nation, which had patiently endured so much, rose determinedly and our magnificent Imperial Forces launched an attack aiming simultaneously at Hawaii, Malaya, and the Philippines.'[1]

S.C.A.P. hoped to have temporary text-books ready by the spring of 1946, which would be used pending the preparation of permanent texts, a task for which committees of Japanese educationists were responsible. There was no intention of unduly emasculating Japanese drafts, or of suppressing legitimate national pride. The most important requirement was that there should be no lies and no confusion of myth and history. The difficulty of text-book revision was that militarism had been woven into the fabric of the teaching system and could not be removed without impairing much that was of value. It was even thought necessary to examine courses in arithmetic, since these were found to discuss problems of ballistics.

In place of the suspended courses, current events were discussed and, where receivers were available, discussions were supplemented by radio lessons. A correspondent describes a lesson of this kind in a senior primary school class. Some of the principal problems of Japan were described on the radio and the teacher asked the children if a new Japan could emerge in these circumstances and what measures should be taken. Each of the children was expected to reply in one sentence.[2] It was apparently exactly the type of lesson the Japanese have always had. Many text-books required changes on so many pages that they could not be revised simply by excision. In some cases passages were crossed out in red ink, but it seems to have been found that this defeated its object by stimulating the children's interest in them.[3]

In March an American educational mission visited Japan. They had a friendly reception and found Japanese educationists very

[1] Excerpts quoted from *New York Times*, 10 February 1946.
[2] *New York Times*, 22 February 1946.
[3] *Christian Science Monitor*, 6 February 1946.

ready to co-operate. Their report proposed great changes, but seemed to underestimate the practical difficulties. Decentralization was advised so that teachers might escape the regimentation that restricted local initiative in the past. It is likely, however, that the Japanese would now like nothing better than local freedom to maintain in the schools the principles which the Allies and the collaborating Government are trying to suppress from the centre. Their report, in fact, seemed to recognize the impossibility of trusting local authorities, when it proposed the stationing of Allied observers in the prefectures to make sure the central Government's principles are observed. Some of the proposals would cost a good deal of money. It is rather hard on the Japanese to advise them to provide better medical examination, instruction in nutrition, replacement of equipment, and so on, when every facility of education has to be improvised. High standards of teacher training and a great extension of free library facilities were also tantalizingly suggested. The proposal to replace the Japanese script by a phonetic, preferably Roman, script for most purposes caused most discussion. This has long been as familiar a topic of discussion in Japan as the proposed adoption of the metric system or simplified spelling has been in Great Britain. It was pointed out by the mission that an excessive amount of time was spent in learning to read and write in Japan, and that the use of the Roman script would make Japanese more accessible to foreigners. It was already known that the Allied occupation authorities were considering this far-reaching problem. The Japanese objections were based partly on the argument that a phonetic script would lead to extreme ambiguity because of the great number of homonyms in the language, and partly upon considerations of tradition, sentiment, and aesthetics.

Some members of General MacArthur's staff appear to have been so impressed by the advantages of a phonetic script that they advised a directive on the matter before the new text-books were prepared. As an alternative the Japanese proposed a drastic limitation of characters for popular reading. This again was no new suggestion, but committees were set up by the Education Department to re-examine it, as well as to review the proposals of the United States education mission. There is not much doubt that the drawbacks to a phonetic script greatly outweigh the advantages, and the proposal is unlikely to be adopted. Some of the American arguments for the change were based on an exaggerated criticism

of Japan's claim to literacy, it being suggested that most Japanese knew only a few hundred characters. The education mission returned under the misconception that 'two thirds of the characters used in the newspapers are unintelligible to great masses of people.'[1] Dean Virginia C. Gildersleeve, a member of the mission, said that, 'after six years study many Japanese children are unable to read a daily paper.' This may well be so far as the newspapers are concerned, but the fact remains that the output of popular reading matter in Japan before the war was comparable with that of any country. It is undeniable, however, that the difficulties presented by the script retard Japanese education and place undue strain upon the student.

The control of education after the surrender had to be be carried out by decisions upon particular issues which could not immediately be co-ordinated into an educational plan. Indeed a plan cannot be developed until it has been determined how far traditional Japanese culture is to be tolerated. Military training was of course abolished in the schools and the sports of *judo* and fencing (but not apparently archery) seem to have been discouraged. Possibly, however, this has not gone beyond the freeing of schoolboys from compulsory practice of *judo* and fencing. National sports are certainly entwined with the worst in Japanese tradition, but they are also connected with much the loss of which would impoverish Japanese culture. Though the Japanese will not readily abandon their national sports, they will be glad enough to indulge in base-ball, basket-ball, and tennis, which were very popular in pre-war days.

A number of miscellaneous measures have been taken to contribute to the re-education of Japanese youth, and it is hard to foresee all the consequences. For example, the imperial portrait has been removed from schools. This will cause great grief and resentment, which will be quickened every time the Japanese look at the empty alcove. It might have been wiser to direct that the picture should remain, but that the curtain should always be drawn open to expose it. This would have dissipated the sense of mystery by permanently confronting the students and staff of the schools with the very commonplace picture which had previously been surrounded by awe. A decision which may have great value has been

[1] Memorandum from the Assistant Secretary of State in transmitting the report to Mr James F. Byrnes, 19 April 1946.

to entrust the education of the Crown Prince, now fourteen years of age, to an American tutor. It is difficult to enter fully into the hope of the United States Assistant Secretary of State that the appointment of this lady may produce 'a symbolic crystallization of the move towards reorientation by the Japanese',[1] but it should subject the heir to the Throne to good teaching and influence. Another constructive proposal is the opening of the Peers' School to more commoners. It is to be hoped that the premises and equipment will be used solely for children who enter on their merits. In the past the spirit of this important school was not satisfactory, and its teachers, who had the privilege of sending their own sons to the school, often preferred to send them elsewhere, rather than have them in an ambiguous position among the sons of peers. Another important step has been the political screening of teachers. The result up to the end of September 1946 was the elimination of ten per cent of teachers.

While the re-education of the children can be dealt with mainly through the education system, the ideas of the rest of the population have to be adjusted through every agency that influences them. Great attention has been given to the press. Domei, the official news agency, was dissolved in the early days of the Occupation and replaced by two news agencies, Kyodo and Jiji, which are euphemistically described in the official American report as independent. The press required a good deal of discipline. It had to be instructed not to criticize the Allied Powers and to give coverage to developments which it would have preferred to touch on lightly. The press was especially directed to interpret and amplify S.C.A.P. directives which it had hitherto published without comment. Particular pressure had to be exerted to induce the press to discuss war guilt and the position of the Emperor. When war trials began in Yokohama in 1945, Allied Headquarters were dissatisfied with the press coverage. Editors were called to a conference and urged to publish adequate reports. This press conference was given front page publicity, possibly to indicate that the improved coverage which followed reflected the insistence of Allied Headquarters and not the sympathies of the newspapers. When the International Military Tribunal met in the summer of 1946, it seems that the metropolitan press, which treated the trial fully, was under better control than the local press, which gave it little space. One local paper pointed

[1] op. cit.

out that the trials were simply an instance of the victor trying the vanquished. The press was used to reach Japanese prisoners under American control outside Japan, nearly 50,000 copies of a four-page weekly being distributed in China, Korea, Okinawa, the Philippines, and Saipan.

The radio is, of course, easy to control and is a valuable channel of Allied propaganda. On Pearl Harbour Day, 1945, the first instalment of the history of the Pacific War was broadcast. The merits of democracy were described to various audiences, including children. One successful programme, 'The Truth Box', consisted of questions and answers on the war and its causes. The war trials were given good publicity, and the success of the 1946 general election in arousing wide interest and attracting a high poll was largely due to the use of the radio. Broadcasting was used both for party appeals and for impartial exhortation to the people to appreciate their civic responsibilities.

Important decisions had to be made about religion. Before the end of 1945, the Government was ordered to withdraw support from State Shinto. Weakened by defeat, by Allied control of education, and by the reformed status of the Emperor, the Japanese national religion is now denied countenance or financial support from any official body. School, national, or civic observances are no longer permitted, but the sects and private individuals can continue to worship the national gods and, if they wish, the nation itself or its Emperor. Indeed State and Emperor-worship is almost sure to be nourished by organized but unofficial groups. There is no satisfactory way of avoiding this danger. Here, as in so many fields, the change of heart may come slowly, induced by patience and understanding.

All official hindrances to Christianity have been removed and foreign missionaries are returning. The number of adherents is said to be now double the pre-war figure of 240,000, there is an appreciable Christian group in the Diet, and the new Premier, Tetsu Katayama, is himself a Christian. From time to time there have been newspaper references to the Emperor's interest in Christianity, and if he were to become a Christian his conversion would probably have very important consequences.

The theatre proved a difficult vehicle for re-education. The *Kabuki* drama has a strong traditional appeal to the Japanese, but the themes and ethics of the plays are uncongenial to Allied policies.

In December 1945 it was announced that over five hundred *Kabuki* plays had been examined, and that those which emphasized militarism, the code of the warrior, blind devotion to feudal lords, and the superiority of man over woman would be withdrawn. Censorship on these principles would in effect destroy the foundations of the *Kabuki* drama. Five modern plays, all designed to exemplify progressive thought, were produced before the end of 1945. Western plays, including *A Midsummer Night's Dream, Abraham Lincoln, The Doll's House,* and *Watch on the Rhine,* were also performed in Tokyo. The paper theatre, a simple entertainment in which a story-teller uses a number of crude pictures, was sent to rural areas with approved subjects.

There has been a gradual recovery in the Japanese film industry, and a number of approved Japanese films have been made both as simple entertainment and for educational purposes. American feature films have reappeared and are extremely popular. Mobile units carry documentary films to rural areas. The number of cinemas, which had fallen to 850 at the time of the surrender, had, by April 1946, already risen to 1,200.[1]

One of the most promising efforts has been the establishment of an American library in Tokyo. Although not yet a large venture considered against the huge problem of re-educating Japan, it is growing and the intention is to open similar libraries elsewhere. It is to be hoped that this precedent will be followed by other nations, since the existence of foreign libraries in the capital and provincial centres with qualified and sympathetic staffs would be the most effective medium in helping the Japanese to acquire the Western knowledge for which they have always shown a keen desire.

The results of American influence will be measured by Japan's success or failure in achieving democracy as that term is understood in the West. The question is often posed whether the Japanese are capable of democratic social organization; or alternatively whether the imposition of these alien standards may not produce a superficial imitation of democratic forms; the old culture patterns being uprooted and the new ones misunderstood. If this were to happen, the price of creating a 'safe' Japan might be the demoralization of a people of great potential value to the world. History, however, has many instances of a beneficient revolution in the social and political life of peoples.

[1] There were 2,000 cinemas in 1939 and 2,500 in 1943.

An important reason for taking a hopeful view of the prospect in Japan is that Western influence is being focused on it through the personality of General MacArthur, who is determined to leave Japan a democratic nation. In his mind democracy is linked with Christianity, as essential to the full development of human dignity.[1] He believes that in advancing democracy he is laying the foundation for a Christian Japan, and his political and religious conviction unite in giving coherence and purpose to his work for Japan. Democracy is not being offered Japan as a new system of formal behaviour, but as a new outlook which can refresh the old social pattern without damaging that which is valuable in it.

It is easy for those inclined to disparage the achievements of the occupation authorities to point to numerous instances of governmental ineptitude, or of public inertia, since the military and political collapse of 1945. Nevertheless, S.C.A.P. has felt justified in recommending the early conclusion of a peace treaty, and thereafter the replacement of the present military Occupation by some form of United Nations supervision. This recommendation was evidently designed as a demonstration of confidence in the Japanese, in the belief that lack of independent responsibility deters the Government from the efficient and public-spirited execution of its functions. Only as the Japanese themselves resume the real responsibilities of government can the prospect for democracy be revealed, and the success of the American experiment in re-education assessed.

[1] 'Democracy is, I believe, here to stay, and this will be followed by the spread of Christianity, to which democracy is second'; General MacArthur, reported in *The Times* and the *Daily Telegraph*, 18 March 1947.

CHAPTER XVIII

War Guilt

THE new light thrown on the forces behind Japanese aggression by the trial of war criminals in Tokyo and the recent publication of statements and memoirs, throws into relief both the arrogance of the militarists and the pusillanimity of civilian statesmen. It confirms the impression that the less aggressive politicans were apprehensive of military usurpation of government; and that they would, had they dared, have frustrated the policy of war both against China and the Western democracies. There is no evidence, however, that any one of them was influenced by moral scruples. They were concerned, at the best with Japan's interests, and at the worst with their own.

The most interesting revelations came from the memoirs of Prince Konoye.[1] In July 1937 Konoye became Premier and he reveals his own ignominious position. 'I was in the dark as to how and where army opinion was formed. The Cabinet moved at the beck and call of the intangible shadow of the military command.' The position of Konoye in this respect was strictly consonant with that of his predecessors. Reijiro Wakatsuki, Premier in 1931, testified at the Tokyo trial that he was kept unaware where responsibility lay for the attack on Manchuria.[2] Kijuro Shidehara, a post-surrender Premier and Foreign Minister in 1931, while admitting that the Government knew the Kwantung Army intended to attack Manchuria, affirmed that it had no authority to inquire into the plans.[3] Tsuyoshi Inukai, Premier in the decisive months between December 1931 and May 1932, was constrained to appeal to the Emperor to order the suspension of the Manchurian operations.[4] He had tried to treat with the Chinese through a secret envoy, but the coded messages to Tokyo had been

[1] Most of the quotations in this chapter derive from these memoirs. It should be remembered that they were put into final form at a moment when the Prince was faced with indictment as a war criminal, and constitute in fact an *ex parte* attempt to justify his political record. For a note on the memoirs, see p. 118, footnote 2.

[2] *New York Times*, 29 June 1946.

[3] *New York Times*, 27 June 1946.

[4] *New York Times*, 29 June 1946. This evidence was given by Ken Inukai, the son and secretary of the murdered Premier.

intercepted and deciphered by the Army and the plan frustrated.[1]

The attack on China, which took place immediately after Konoye became Premier, surprised not only him but also apparently the War Office. 'I little dreamed then that the China problem had been so aggravated as to call for an appeal to arms, nor was the War Office itself any wiser. The whole affair was the result of the machinations of the Japanese military authorities on the spot.'

The insolence of the militarists passed belief. Konoye was not unnaturally anxious to know the extent of the Army's proposed operations in China. In characteristic Japanese fashion, he avoided putting the direct question himself, preferring to depute a colleague to interrogate the War Minister in Cabinet. The War Minister refused to reply, but the Navy Minister,[2] much to his military colleague's indignation, blurted out that Imperial Headquarters had agreed to stop operations at the Yungting-Paoting line. Konoye thereupon went to the Emperor and submitted that he could not carry on the administration without knowing the Army's intentions. The Emperor sent for the War Minister, who contended that the Army could not disclose plans of military operations at a Cabinet meeting at which party Ministers were present. The Emperor promised to pass on the plans to Konoye and the Foreign Minister. It is interesting that the Emperor, according to this account, did not give Konoye the information with permission to reveal it to the Foreign Minister and others at his discretion.

By accepting the premiership in the humiliating circumstances described above, Konoye did the militarists a great service, for he permitted his deserved reputation for moderation and good-will to be used to reassure opinion both in Japan and abroad.

The defence pleaded by Japanese political leaders was that they disapproved of militarist policy and tried to hinder it. Once the die was cast, however, many politicians felt that they must do everything to bring the adventure to a successful conclusion. The day after the Manchurian Incident, the Japanese Consul-General at Mukden sent three telegrams to Shidehara, asking the Government to check the aggression of the Kwantung Army. Yet two months later Shidehara could say without a blush: 'When the Chinese attacked, the Japanese troops could not but perform the

[1] *New York Times*, 28 June 1946.
[2] Admiral Mitsumasa Yonai, an enlightened naval officer.

duty for which they were there—to repel the attack and prevent its repetition.'[1] Even after his country's defeat, Shidehara had the hardihood to persist in this type of special pleading, contending that the war against China was caused by a number of 'minor incidents', particularly ill-treatment of Japanese citizens by the Chinese police.[2]

There are many examples of similar illogical thought in Masuo Kato's book *The Lost War*. This typical Japanese 'liberal' with an American university education covered the Washington negotiations preceding the outbreak of war. Like Admiral Kichisaburo Nomura and Saburo Kurusu, he longed for a peaceful outcome, but was baffled by the refusal of American statesmen to achieve it by the betrayal of China. In one ingenuous passage, he writes:

> 'The men dealing with Far Eastern affairs in the American State Department were divided between pro-Chinese and pro-Japanese opinion, with Dr Stanley Hornbeck as a leader of the former group. Hornbeck's theories won out. He was a man who thought in a very theoretical and academic way without much relation to reality; he believed in formulas and in sticking to them, and there was little elasticity to his views.'[3]

It is clear that what the Western liberal would call a principle, the Japanese liberal calls a formula. This is the explanation of the incessant complaints of 'legalistic thinking' levelled against the democracies by the Japanese political leaders between 1931 and 1942.

Nomura and Kurusu involved themselves in such a web of prevarication that it is evident that they too were actuated by a narrow sense of moral obligation. They knew, or strongly suspected, that they were being used to provide cover for the preparation of a treacherous blow, which is the traditional Japanese technique in beginning war. 'Am I being used as a smoke screen?' asked Kurusu in Kato's hearing.[4] Indeed Nomura appears to have asked to be recalled in October because he disliked 'this hypocritical existence'.[5] Asked recently to explain this, he said: 'I wished to convey to my Government the idea that I did not want to deceive the Japanese people by staying in Washington.' Yet on returning to Japan Nomura and Kurusu made speeches, albeit

[1] Quoted by *New York Times*, 26 June 1946. [2] *New York Times*, 10 October 1945.
[3] op. cit., p. 34. [4] ibid., p. 35. [5] *New York Times*, 12 July 1946.

half-heartedly, attaching responsibility to America for the failure to find agreement.

The depressing aspect of Japan's guilt is this unawareness of any moral obligation beyond the tribal level. Even in Germany there was much more regard for international good faith in principle than in Japan. The background of Japanese policy is not merely one of bad faith but also (as in Germany) of dark criminality. It is difficult to be sure of the value of all the testimony given, but the Japanese record in China is such that where there is a motive for villainy, there the crime may be expected. The former puppet Emperor of Manchukuo, Pu Yi, is reported as stating that the Japanese poisoned his wife, in order to try to procure his marriage to a Japanese, and would have killed him also had he told the Lytton Commission the truth. He now protests that he took the throne of Manchukuo under threats from General Itagaki.[1] Pu Yi evidently feared arraignment as a war criminal and his evidence is not worth very much, but there is nothing far-fetched in the story he told. Major-General Tanaka,[2] another witness of questionable value, also contributed to the lurid picture of criminal aggression in 1931. Whether such testimony is true or not, it so fits the known character of Japanese militarist politics that it cannot be regarded as improbable.

The main current of events carrying Japan into war was as follows. The Tripartite Pact, associating Japan with the Axis, was signed in September 1940, Konoye being Premier and Matsuoka Foreign Minister. In April 1941, Matsuoka, on his way back to Japan from Berlin, where his reception had been stage-managed to make the strongest appeal to his vanity, signed a neutrality pact with Russia. In May a struggle was waged in the Japanese Cabinet between those who wanted to put before America a proposal that could be the basis of hopeful discussion, notably one containing the provision that Japan should withdraw her troops from all China except Manchuria, and Matsuoka who wished to carry his Axis policy to its logical end of war. On 8 May Matsuoka told the Emperor that if the United States entered the war, a clash between Russia and Germany was likely, whereupon Japan ought to attack Siberia. According to Konoye, even the service chiefs were at this period in favour of a conciliatory approach to the United States, but Matsuoka contrived to dominate the Cabinet.

[1] *New York Times*, 17 and 20 August 1946. [2] See Chapter on 'War Trials', page 180.

In these circumstances, Konoye decided to discard Matsuoka. Instead of asking him to resign, however, Konoye preferred the oblique method of first tendering his own resignation and then reconstituting the Cabinet without Matsuoka. This might have made a favourable atmosphere for pursuing negotiations with the United States, had not the Japanese chosen this moment to march into French Indo-China. On 17 July, Japanese naval and military dispositions became so threatening that Lord Halifax warned the Ambassador in London of British concern. There followed formal Japanese demands on the Vichy Government regarding Indo-China, followed by the freezing of Japanese assets by Great Britain and America. One of Konoye's most revealing admissions is that the invasion of Indo-China was intended to mollify that faction in the Army which wanted an attack on Russia. 'The main object of the Imperial Conference', he writes, referring to a conference in July 1941, 'was to restrain the army concentration in Manchuria, which was ready and eager to launch an attack against the Soviet Union at any time. In consequence, more or less as a way of compensation to the Army, we agreed to the occupation of French Indo-China.'

After this Admiral Nomura's instructions were such as could not afford a useful basis for discussion. On 6 August, the only concessions suggested by the Japanese were promises not to advance beyond Indo-China and not to attack the Philippines. A month later withdrawal from China, but not from Indo-China or Manchuria, was proposed as a bait to obtain the restoration of commercial relations with the United States. At this time the Japanese must have envisaged the possibility of a Russian collapse, whereupon they would have invaded Siberia. It seems, however, that the Army would in any event have resisted a settlement conditional upon withdrawal from China, for in October Konoye was trying without success to get them to agree to a face-saving formula whereby withdrawal would have been made dependent upon American agreement to subsequent Japanese re-occupation of key positions in China. In the late summer and autumn of 1941, Konoye advocated a meeting between President Roosevelt and himself, and the leading militarists favoured the idea since they desired to bring matters to a head. The United States diplomats were not satisfied that the Japanese proposals would make a basis for discussion, and the project fell through. Konoye himself says he was considering

making sweeping concessions at the meeting with the President and reporting the agreement direct to the Emperor as a *fait accompli*. To defy the extremists at this stage, however, would have needed great courage on the part of Konoye and the Emperor, and full agreement between them. Neither condition obtained.

Konoye's memoirs make it plain that the war was embarked upon as a gamble. The economic embargo of July 1941 faced the Japanese with three alternatives: withdrawal from China; concentration at huge expense on the production of substitute materials; or fighting. It seems probable that the recalcitrant and dominant militarists would have disregarded orders to withdraw from China. Konoye appears to have regarded the second alternative, if economically feasible, as manifestly preferable to war with Great Britain and the United States, but gave way when confronted by militarist opposition.

With the eclipse of Matsuoka, General Tojo came into the open as the avowed advocate of the war policy. He said the Army required either an acceptable diplomatic agreement, or an early war. One of the chief naval anxieties related to oil, but the Army was willing to do every thing possible to meet their needs in return for support of the war policy. The Navy shrewdly forecast the course of events. For example, Admiral Yamamoto, Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Fleet, told Konoye at some time in the closing period of his Premiership: 'We could put up a good show for six months or a year, but if it were to last for two years, or three, we have no confidence at all.'

At a conference in the presence of the Emperor on 6 September, it was decided to continue the diplomatic negotiations, with the understanding that a decision to resort to war would be adopted early in October if no headway had been made by then. The Emperor insisted, however, that primary importance should continue to be attached to the diplomatic approach. On the previous day there had been a revealing discussion between the Emperor, the Chiefs of Staff, and Konoye. The Emperor asked the Army Chief of Staff how long a war would last. Sugiyama answered: 'So far as the South Seas are concerned, we intend to finish it in approximately three months.' The Emperor bitterly reminded the Chief of Staff that he had promised to end the China war in a month. Sugiyama went into a long explanation of the difficulties arising from the size of China.

'Hereupon His Majesty raised his voice and said to him, "If you say the interior of China is very vast, is the Pacific not even vaster? On what grounds are you now confident in saying three months?" The Chief of Staff only lowered his head, and had no words to reply. Then the Chief of Staff of the Navy came to his rescue, saying, "If I may speak to Your Majesty as a representative of the Supreme Command on the main issue, it is like this: the present Japanese-American relation is like a patient at a critical point when it is a question of whether he needs an operation or not. If he is left unoperated on, it is feared he may get weaker and weaker, while if the operation takes place, though dangerous, it is not without hope . . . The Supreme Command desires the success of the negotiations. If that fails, however, it believes that it should boldly go through with the operation."'

The struggle within the highest councils moved to the inevitable decision. On 12 October (his fiftieth birthday) Konoye called a small meeting at his house in a fresh attempt to persuade Tojo to make concessions which would give a chance of success to the diplomats. The group on whom this terrible responsibility rested was composed of only five men, the Premier, the Foreign Minister, the War and Navy Ministers, and the President of the Cabinet Planning Board.[1] The Navy Minister (lacking the courage to express his own apprehension) endeavoured to pass responsibility to the Premier, while the War Minister opposed continued negotiation unless there was a prospect of prompt agreement. The Foreign Minister considered that negotiations could succeed only if the Army would make concession on the issue of withdrawal of troops from China.

Tojo opposed such a concession, and he admitted to Konoye that he was apprehensive of the effect of a withdrawal from China upon the discipline of the Army. This was Konoye's last effort. There was, by his account, an influential opinion in both Services against war, but nobody would be first to expose himself by honestly advocating a peaceful policy. On the night of 14 October, the War Minister sent the Director of the Cabinet Planning Board with a message to Konoye which began by deploring the ambiguity of the Navy Minister's advice. If the Navy wished to modify the

[1] Prince Fumimaro Konoye, Admiral Teijiro Toyoda, General Hideki Tojo, Admiral Koshiro Oikawa, and Lieutenant-General Teiichi Suzuki, respectively.

decision reached at the Imperial Conference of 6 September, then the resignation of the Ministry was unavoidable. A member of the imperial family, preferably Prince Higashikuni, should head a new Government. 'Although it is very hard for me to ask you to resign, the situation leaves me no alternative.' The Cabinet thereupon resigned, and a new Ministry, headed not by an imperial prince but by General Tojo himself, was installed on 18 October.

From this moment, the only important decision was when to strike. Tojo's attitude after he became Premier was extremely disingenuous. With hints that the Army might agree to concessions justifying further diplomatic efforts, he persuaded Shigenori Togo, one of Japan's most experienced diplomats, to become Foreign Minister. There is little doubt that the latter, no less than Nomura and Kurusu in Washington, hoped for peace upon the basis of some genuine Army concessions. The consequence was that he assisted Tojo to maintain an atmosphere in which the immediacy of the war threat was obscured. The formal decision to strike was made on 1 December at an Imperial Conference.[1] This gathering apparently ratified a decision of the Supreme Command, for the fleet, after weeks of preparation, had already sailed on its mission against Pearl Harbour. It had been decided that the attack should be made at a week-end, since the American fleet was likely then to be most vulnerable. The decision of 1 December accordingly implied an attack on 8 December (Japanese time).

Meanwhile, the envoys in Washington were continuing the gestures of diplomacy. On 20 November they set before the American Government proposals for a suspension of freezing measures, and the discontinuance of American aid to China. On 26 November, almost exactly when the Japanese fleet set out for Pearl Harbour, the Americans presented their counter-proposals in a strongly worded note, which the Japanese propaganda afterwards tried to represent as an ultimatum. In fact, it contained no such implication, and Nomura was actually instructed to reply thirty minutes before the attack on Pearl Harbour.

Since the gathering of Japanese forces in Indo-China at the end of November had been causing disquiet to the United States and Great Britain, President Roosevelt asked the Japanese Government to explain their actions in that area. Replying under instructions on 5 December (United States time), Admiral Nomura said

[1] *New York Times*, 26 September and 2 October 1946.

that threatening movements of the Chinese had necessitated reinforcement of the northern Indo-Chinese border; and that this in turn had caused troop movements in the south which had been exaggerated by the press. The next day the President addressed a message to the Emperor of Japan. It was thought that this was withheld from the Emperor, but it is now certain that the latter saw it, and it seems that he was advised to ignore it, and accepted this advice.[1] Late in November, Kurusu had tried to arrange through Marquis Kido direct communication between the Emperor and the President, but Tojo frustrated the plan.[2]

The accused in the war trials at Tokyo showed anxiety to avoid incriminating the Emperor. It is evident that he was party to the major decisions of aggression, and were he brought to trial, he could only escape conviction as one of the principal war criminals by pleading that he was an impotent puppet. From this dilemma the Japanese have been saved by an Allied (or American) political decision in the Emperor's favour. Mr Joseph B. Keenan, chief prosecutor for the United States in Tokyo, announced at a news conference that the decision had been made not to try the Emperor.[3] Another threatened embarrassment was removed in April 1946 when Prince Nashimoto, the only member of the imperial family to be arrested, was released after four months' detention.[4] The Japanese are trying to keep the Emperor's name out of the war guilt discussion, and where this is impracticable they fall back upon the defence that he was misled. Thus in an interview a month after the surrender, Prince Higashikuni said that the Emperor was deceived by the militarists.[5] The Emperor himself is alleged to have affirmed to an American newspaper correspondent that the Imperial War Rescript had been misused by General Tojo.[6] This report was sharply questioned by the Japanese after its publication in the *New York Times*, but the accuracy of the correspondent was fully established. Nevertheless, the Emperor knew that a treacherous attack was impending, and that his rescript would be used at the appropriate moment to arouse the enthusiasm of his people.

Had the Emperor the power to avert war? Great influence he

[1] Marquis Koichi Kido, Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal, made a statement to this effect. *Christian Science Monitor*, 9 July 1946.
[2] *New York Times*, 18 June 1946.
[3] ibid.
[4] ibid., 14 April 1946.
[5] *New York Herald Tribune*, 19 September 1945.
[6] *Nippon Times*, 22 October 1945.

certainly had, and it has been divulged that on several occasions statesmen tried to induce him to employ it in a pacific interest. For instance, Inukai urged him to prevent the Manchurian invasion; Kurusu endeavoured to circumvent the militarists by direct appeal to him in the final pre-war crisis; and, when disaster overtook Japan in 1945, it was the Emperor, admittedly with his hand enormously strengthened by events, who stopped the war. Konoye felt keenly the loss of his access to the Emperor, with whom he had no audience from his resignation in October 1941 until February 1945.[1] He says:

> 'Kido and Tojo did their best to prevent me from submitting my view of the situation to the Emperor. They might, of course, argue in defence that it was not proper for men in no responsible position to approach the Throne often and submit their personal views to the Emperor. His Majesty himself appeared to prefer not to hear the opinions of men other than those holding responsible positions.'

Konoye avers that the Emperor was kept in ignorance of current events by Tojo:

> 'In the days when the press was not muzzled His Majesty could learn much from the newspapers, but after the Tojo Cabinet was formed, no criticism of Government was allowed. Under this rigorous control of the press, what the Government reported to the Throne tallied exactly with what appeared in the newspapers . . . In the circumstances it was rather difficult for the Emperor to get at the truth of the situation actually prevailing.'

This would imply that, although the international situation was obscured by censorship and false propaganda up to the autumn of 1941, it was still possible for the Emperor to have some glimpse of the truth; thereafter he knew little or nothing that Tojo did not wish him to know. He was indeed less well informed than any peasant, since the latter could at least observe some of the discrepancies between the propaganda of victory and the intensification of hardship. Nevertheless, in spite of the inherent limitations of his position, it is probably reasonable to assume that he could

[1] At this audience Konoye states that he told the Emperor that defeat was certain and that the war should be ended at the earliest moment to preserve the Throne and prevent a communist revolution.

have secured less prejudiced channels of information. Marquis Kido, his most influential adviser, is alleged by Konoye to have been optimistic until the spring of 1945, and he no doubt inspired the Emperor with confidence that even after the loss of Saipan, the invasion of the Philippines, and the fearful air attacks on the homeland, a tolerable settlement was obtainable, even though the hope of victory had faded. When, however, it became clear that Germany was about to collapse, even Kido recognized that Japan's attempt to subjugate Asia must also end in catastrophe. Deprived of the last hope that the villainy of his country would even partially succeed, the Emperor lent all his influence to the achievement of a peace that would preserve the imperial institution.

CHAPTER XIX

War Trials

JAPAN'S crime has two aspects, responsibility for the war and responsibility for atrocities. Both these aspects of guilt have been documented by a number of fresh revelations, particularly at the trial of twenty-six Japanese war leaders before the International Military Tribunal for the Far East sitting at Tokyo, and at local trials, organized by individual members of the United Nations, of men accused of atrocities; but little has been added to the picture of Japanese policy and war conduct that has been consistently presented by honest students of Japan since the attack on Manchuria in 1931. There has been ample corroboration but little new light.

Before the end of 1945, trials had taken place in a number of areas and death sentences were passed by an Australian court at Labuan in Borneo, Morotai in the Moluccas, and Rabaul in New Britain; and by United States military commissions at Kwajalein in the Marshall Islands, and Manila, while the first of a large number of atrocity trials at Yokohama had also been started in a court of the American Eighth Army. In 1946, other courts were set up elsewhere, and sentences of death were passed at Batavia, Guam, Kuala Lumpur, Nanking, Port Darwin, Shanghai, and Singapore. Murder or brutality was proved beyond question at all these trials. By the beginning of December 1946, of nearly 1,500 accused who had been tried by United States, United Kingdom, and Australian courts, some 1,200 had been found guilty.[1] There were 457 death sentences, 735 sentences of imprisonment, and 276 acquittals. There was no attempt to exact an eye for an eye. The first man convicted at Yokohama had beaten an American prisoner to death, but he was sentenced to life imprisonment only. For causing the death of 800 Australian and United Kingdom prisoners, two Japanese were executed in January 1947 by order of an Australian court. Similarly, for causing over a hundred deaths, two Japanese were sentenced to death in Manila. In one trial at Morotai, 93 Japanese were accused of causing the death of over 400 Australians, and 57 of them were acquitted. For the deportation of 236 Anda-

[1] *The Times*, 18 December 1946.

man Islanders, almost all of whom died, a Japanese naval commandant was hanged in Singapore. Trivial sentences of imprisonment passed at Port Darwin caused an outcry in Australia. For the execution of 83 innocent civilians in the Nicobar Islands, 16 Japanese were indicted and 6 were sentenced to death. Occasionally, several Japanese were sentenced for a crime against one man, but this was rare. One example was the execution in Shanghai of the Japanese governor-general of Hong Kong and his chief of staff, and the sentence of three others to life imprisonment, for the execution of one American airman; in another case five men were sentenced to death and twelve others to short terms of imprisonment for the murder of three American airmen at Hankow. There were, inevitably in view of the different nationalities of the local courts and the different procedures followed, some inconsistencies in the sentences. For example, four officers found guilty at Shanghai of the execution of three airmen captured after the Doolittle raid, were sentenced only to imprisonment, three for five years and one for nine years. The president of the commission said: 'The evidence shows that high government officials were responsible for the Enemy Airmen's Act and for the special orders for the maltreatment and execution of prisoners. These are unusually strong mitigating circumstances.'[1] On the other hand, an Australian court condemned to death a Japanese officer who, having treated an Australian prisoner well for some months, eventually complied reluctantly with superior orders to shoot him, but treated his remains with respect.[2]

The reactions of the Japanese to the accusation of criminal behaviour varied. Suicides included General Shigeru Honjo, Commander of the Kwantung Army at the time of the Mukden Incident of 1931, General Chikahiko Koizumi, member of Tojo's 1941 Cabinet, Field Marshal Gen Sugiyama and his wife, and the War Minister, General Anami, who shot himself at the time of the surrender. By far the most important civilian suicide was that of Prince Fumimaro Konoye, who poisoned himself, leaving a note to say that he could not face trial as a war criminal. General Tojo's abortive attempt at suicide did not prevent his appearance before the International Tribunal. Of the 1,200 persons actually indicted up to the beginning of October 1946, however, only sixteen committed suicide. An instance of dignified submission is seen in the

[1] *New York Times*, 16 April 1946. [2] ibid., 16 January 1946.

arrest of Admiral Shigetaro Shimada, Navy Minister at the time of Pearl Harbour, of which an account is given by an eye-witness:

> 'The Admiral called out an order and one of his daughters, a bare-footed girl with hair in pig-tails, brought his shoes . . . His wife brought him a small leather suit-case. Another daughter appeared and the three women knelt behind Shimada. The girls wept silently and all touched their heads reverently to the mat. The Admiral spoke to them, then marched out with Major Kraus into the quiet lane.'[1]

Sometimes there was defiance. A rear-admiral, before receiving the death sentence for the massacre of ninety-six civilian employees of Pan-American Airways at Wake Island in 1943, said: 'I would like to request that the people who planned and carried out the dropping of the atomic bomb on Japan should be regarded in the same light as we.'[2] Two Japanese, hanged at Rabaul for being primarily responsible for the death of 3,000 British and Indian prisoners, shouted *Banzai* for the Emperor before dying, and one of them managed to bite an Australian officer on the scaffold. From some came protestations. For example, the former commander of Sasebo prison, before being sentenced to death at Yokohama, pleaded that he had done his best for the prisoners and had been criticised by the gendarmerie for doing so. Accused at Guam of the execution of prisoners, a captain wept and said he had recommended they should be sent to Japan, but had been obliged to obey his superior, Vice-Admiral Koso Abe. The latter, in turn, maintained that his proposal to send the prisoners to Japan had been thwarted by staff officers who demanded the death sentence. Both the Admiral and his subordinate were hanged.[3] Many, of course, pleaded innocence. One of the most brazen cases was that of General Iwane Matsui, commander in China at the time of the Nanking massacre. He denied responsibility for 'the isolated incidents' which took place there and said: 'My sincere desire is to make the Japanese people see the mistake of the invasion of China. I hope for future friendship between China and Japan.'[4] Signs of remorse were seldom reported. One lieutenant made an abject appeal to General MacArthur, writing: 'You are my only god and saviour; I will do anything you ask if you will save me from the

[1] ibid., 13 September 1945.
[2] ibid., 26 December 1945.
[3] ibid., 26 May 1946.
[4] *New York Herald Tribune*, 19 July 1946.

death penalty.'[1] A Korean camp guard, sentenced to death for brutality on the Burma-Siam railway, said he was haunted by the ghosts of his victims.

Since the procedure improvized for these trials must necessarily leave them open to criticism when they are impartially surveyed by future historians, it is essential to emphasize the brutality and injustice perpetrated by the Japanese. The evidence at the trials showed that not only were great numbers of Allied servicemen and civilians made the victims of outright murder, but that even where the killing took place under superior authority, orders were frequently issued summarily and without proper investigation. The victims sentenced by tribunals were often treated more barbarously than those shot out of hand. An American airman, who participated in the Doolittle raid on Tokyo, described the court-martial of himself and seven companions. It lasted twenty minutes, after which they left the court. The accused were left in ignorance of the charges preferred against them, and deprived of legal representation. It was not until some time later that five of them were told that they had been sentenced to death, but that this had been commuted to life imprisonment through the clemency of the Emperor. They did not know even then that their other three comrades had been executed.[2]

Another sidelight on the peculiar Japanese mentality was revealed by the official attitude towards war crimes. On 18 September 1945, at a press conference, Prince Naruhiko Higashikuni, then Premier, is reported as stating that the Government wished to punish their own war criminals, and had already begun to do so.[3] A few weeks later the Premier said:

> 'With respect to outrages against native inhabitants in the occupied areas, most strict supervision was exercised for enforcement of military discipline, but unfortunately numerous offences were committed . . . It is assumed that a considerable number of offenders have been duly punished.'[4]

For the ill-treatment of prisoners on the Siam-Burma railway, one Japanese had been sentenced to three years' imprisonment and three others had been suspended from duty. This was the scale of

[1] *New York Times*, 20 January 1946.
[2] *New York Herald Tribune*, 19 March 1946.
[3] *New York Times*, 19 September 1945.
[4] *New York Herald Tribune*, 9 October 1945.

retribution apparently thought appropriate to crimes costing tens of thousands of lives.[1] General Iwane Matsui, already mentioned as largely responsible for the Nanking massacre of 1937, testified that while the discipline of his troops was excellent, their behaviour was not.[2] He had, he declared, taken severe measures, and one officer was executed and three soldiers imprisoned for rape. An American professor of Nanking University estimated that 20,000 women were raped. A Chinese witness said that the philanthropic organization of which he was vice-president alone buried 40,000 bodies at Nanking.

The first war criminal to be tried was General Tomoyuki Yamashita, commander in Malaya and later in the Philippines, for atrocities in the latter theatre. The trial is of considerable interest both from the Japanese point of view and from our own. In Japan the trial attracted much attention, since the 'Tiger of Malaya' was one of their principal popular heroes. The trial was important because it suggested precedents on questions of procedure and justice; and because, in the sequel, a foreign enemy commander was put to death after judicial process for the first time in Anglo-Saxon history since the martyrdom of Joan of Arc. The court was set up by the Commander of the United States Army in the Western Pacific, and consisted of five American generals, none of whom was a lawyer. They conducted the trial on the basis of twenty-two rules drawn up by General MacArthur's legal staff. These rules gave the defendant the right to be told the charges before the trial, to select his own counsel, to call witnesses, and cross-examine prosecution witnesses. Every description of testimony was admitted, including hearsay, letters, and affidavits. General Yamashita was strenuously and skilfully defended by six legal officers of the American army. He could also have been represented, had he so desired, by Japanese counsel. A further advantage was conceded to the defence in permitting Yamashita's chief of staff and assistant chief of staff to assist the defence in court, although these two men were also under arrest as war criminals. Yamashita was charged with responsibility for crimes committed by the forces under his command, the number of victims exceeding

[1] It is not generally known that Asiatic losses on this railway were even greater than those of Europeans. Colonel Wild, War Crimes Liaison Officer with the Allied Forces, South East Asia, estimated that 100,000 Asiatics had died. Proved deaths of Asiatic labourers numbered 60,000.

[2] *Summation of Non-Military Activities in Japan* (General Headquarters Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers) (to be referred to hereafter as *Summation*), Aug. 1946, p. 54.

60,000. Mass atrocities were easily proved. The basis of the defence was that Yamashita was not accused of having ordered the atrocities, and that the evidence linking him directly with the crimes was too untrustworthy to influence the court. The defence also questioned General MacArthur's authority to set up a court in the Philippines.

The worst of the crimes were committed early in 1945 by the rear-guard of marines left in Manila, and these, though tactically directed by Yamashita, were not under his effective control. Important evidence was given by Vice-Admiral Denshichi Okochi, naval commander in the South-West Pacific, who stated that the responsibility for the discipline of the 20,000 marines involved rested with himself. He further testified that Yamashita had ordered the evacuation of Manila before the bulk of the atrocities were committed, but that the destruction of transport had prevented it. Answering charges of starving prisoners, Yamashita's chief of staff said that the Japanese army was on short rations and military hospitals in Manila were crowded with malnutrition cases. The blockade and the activities of guerillas made provisioning difficult. Giving evidence on his own behalf, Yamashita pointed out that a few days after his arrival in the Philippines in October 1944, he had to deal with an imminent American landing at Leyte, and was intensely occupied. He added: 'My troops were inferior and their morale was low. They were scattered and Japanese communications and transport were very poor.' He added: 'I found myself completely out of touch with the situation. I was unable to make a personal inspection and co-ordinate the units under my command.'[1] In summing up, one of the defending counsel asked: 'If General Yamashita did not order the atrocities, what is he charged with? Failure to punish 20,000 dead troops left in the town after the battle?' The prosecution pointed out that though the worst incidents took place in Manila, atrocities occurred throughout the Philippines over a period of seven months, and that Yamashita must have been aware of them. On 7 December Yamashita was found guilty and sentenced to be hanged. The Commission found that:

> '. . . where murder and vicious, revengeful actions are widespread offences, and there is no effective attempt by a commander to discover and control criminal acts, such a commander

[1] *New York Times*, 1 December 1945.

may be held responsible, even criminally liable, for the lawlessness of his troops, depending upon the nature and circumstances surrounding them.'

While the trial was in progress, petitions were filed in the Supreme Courts for the Philippines and the United States. In this appeal Yamashita claimed:

'There being no martial law, no military government of occupied territory and no active hostilities in the Philippines at the time of the appointment of the Commission, there is no authority to appoint the Commission and it is without jurisdiction.'[1]

The petitions were refused by both Courts. In the United States Supreme Court the vote was six to two. One of the dissenting Judges, Justice Murphy, referred to the fifth amendment to the Constitution 'guaranteeing due process of law to any one, victor or vanquished, whatever may be his race, colour, or beliefs, who was accused by the Government.'[2] A Japanese petition received much popular support and it was hoped that General MacArthur would at least permit Yamashita to be shot or to commit suicide, but the sentence was nevertheless confirmed and a plea for mercy was rejected by President Truman. Had Yamashita's sentence been modified, application might have been made by the British Government for his extradition to answer similar charges in Singapore.

The trial of General Masaharu Homma took place immediately after that of Yamashita. The main charge was responsibility for the 'death march of Bataan', in which 17,000 Americans and Filipinos died. The defence was that the Japanese themselves suffered great losses from sickness and shortage of supplies, that their meagre transport facilities were inadequate for transportation of prisoners, and that Homma knew little about the terrible march, though it was admitted that his headquarters was only a few hundred yards from the road along which the prisoners passed. In the light of the decision that Yamashita was responsible for the conduct of his troops, Homma had little chance of escaping the capital penalty. Unlike Yamashita, he was sentenced to be shot. An appeal was made to the United States Supreme Court, and again Justices

[1] ibid., 4 December 1945. [2] ibid., 5 February 1946.

Murphy and Rutledge dissented from the majority decision. Homma was shot on 3 April 1946.

The international trial in Tokyo of Japanese leaders changed the emphasis from particular atrocities to major offences against world peace. The court was constituted of eleven judges nominated by the eleven nations which had taken part in the war against Japan, and appointed by General MacArthur. The countries represented were Australia, Canada, China, France, India, the Netherlands, New Zealand, the Philippines, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and the United States. The President was Sir William Webb, Chief Justice of Queensland. The prosecution was led by Mr Joseph B. Keenan, Assistant Attorney-General of the United States.[1]

The accused were arraigned on 3 May 1946, with two hundred reporters, photographers, and newsreel men operating under sixty floodlights to keep the world abreast of the court's achievements. An immediate objection was entered against Sir William Webb's presidency of the court on the ground that his investigation of war crimes in New Guinea for the Australian Government might have prejudiced him. This was overruled. After an interval to allow prosecution and defence to prepare their respective cases, the trial began on 13 June. The proceedings have been inordinately prolonged and some observers have commented unfavourably upon their efficiency and dignity.

The wide range of evidence accepted varied from the extremely valuable testimony of such men as Admiral Nomura, and Wakatsuki, to inconsequential irrelevancies. Major-General Ryukichi Tanaka, upon whose sanity the defence was subsequently able to cast some doubt, gave entertaining evidence about the attack on Manchuria. He said the War Minister, General Minami, had sent Lieutenant-General Yoshitsugu Tatekawa to stop the expected attack on Manchuria, but that the conspirators had locked him up with *geisha* on the critical night of the Mukden Incident. Affidavits were freely received, the oddest being that of a White Russian, Lieutenant-General Gregori M. Semenov, recently executed by the Soviet authorities, which was presented by the Soviet prosecutor. In accepting the affidavit, the President observed: 'What effect we may give it is another matter. We may be influenced by the fact that the deponent was executed by the Government which

[1] A list of the twenty-eight accused appears at the end of this Chapter.

presents this affidavit, and thus was prevented from even being interrogated here at all.'[1] There was little of the technical skill in overcoming legal inconsistencies which contributed so much to the prestige of the Nuremburg trial. Discussing procedure in response to defence protests early in the Tokyo trial, Sir William Webb is reported as saying: 'We are not bound by the strict rules of evidence. We can get little guidance in this case from such rules. We must use our own sound common sense.'[2]

The defence of General Tojo and the other accused was opened on 24 February 1947, by the former's counsel, Dr Ichiro Kiyose, one of Japan's outstanding lawyers. The case for the defence is that Japanese policy was one of legitimate self-defence, and in the interests of East Asian peace. It is in fact the full Japanese thesis as presented to the world between 1931 and 1945. Some defendants, Mamoru Shigemitsu among them, dissociated themselves from part of this contention.

Obviously these trials are full of anomalies, and the Japanese are sooner or later going to point this out with some vigour and build up many unfortunate theories upon them. At the same time, the immense underlying difficulties arising from the differing Japanese mentality, problems of language and custom, and the inclination of the Japanese to make martyrs of thugs, should not be overlooked.

LIST OF WAR CRIMINALS

1. General Baron Sadao Araki, War Minister from December 1931 to January 1934, and probably the most widely publicized of the fire-eating militarists.
2. General Kenji Doihara, reputed to be Japan's most unscrupulous and skilful politico-military agent in Manchuria and North China.
3. Colonel Kingoro Hashimoto, responsible for sinking the U.S.S. *Panay* in December 1937. He became powerful in Japan's war-time political structure.
4. Field Marshal Shunroku Hata, a War Minister (August 1939 to July 1940), who was Commander-in-Chief of the Japanese armies in China from February 1941 to November 1944.

[1] *New York Times*, 9 October 1946. [2] ibid., 19 June 1946.

5. Baron Kiichiro Hiranuma, an aged ex-premier who had once been considered an extreme nationalist.
6. Koki Hirota, Prime Minister when the Anti-Comintern Pact was signed, and the alleged protégé of Mitsuru Toyama.
7. Naoki Hoshino, Chief Secretary of Tojo's Cabinet, October 1941 to July 1944.
8. General Seishiro Itagaki, War Minister from May 1938 to August 1939, and a leading militarist.
9. Okinori Kaya, Finance Minister from June 1937 to May 1938 and from October 1941 to February 1944.
10. Marquis Koichi Kido, Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal from June 1940 until after Japan's defeat, and one of the principal advisers of the Emperor.
11. Lieutenant-General Heitaro Kimura, Vice-Minister for War under Tojo till 1943, and commander in Burma from August 1944.
12. General Kuniaki Koiso, Governor-General of Korea, May 1942 to July 1944, and Prime Minister from then till April 1945.
13. General Iwane Matsui, Commander-in-Chief in China, September 1937 to February 1938, one of the founders of the Great Asia Society in 1933, and a leading expansionist.
14. Yosuke Matsuoka, Foreign Minister responsible for the Tripartite Alliance (September 1940) and the Soviet-Japanese Neutrality Pact (April 1941). He died after the trial began.
15. General Jiro Minami, War Minister, April to December 1931, and Governor-General of Korea, 1936 to May 1942.
16. Lieutenant-General Akira Muto, Chief of Staff to General Yamashita in the Philippines and an influential militarist.
17. Admiral Osami Nagano, Chief of the Naval General Staff, April 1941 to February 1944. He died in January 1947.
18. Vice Admiral Takazumi Oka, who held numerous important naval posts.
19. Shumei Okawa, a leading figure in Japan's Manchurian aggression. After the beginning of the trial, he was removed to a mental hospital, and on 9 April 1947 the indictment against him was dismissed on the ground of insanity.
20. Lieutenant-General Hiroshi Oshima, Ambassador in Berlin from October 1938 to October 1939 and from November 1940 till the defeat of Germany.

21. Kenryo Sato, former Major-General, and Director of the Military Affairs Bureau of the War Ministry from 1942 to December 1944.
22. Mamoru Shigemitsu, Ambassador to London (1938) and other important capitals. Foreign Minister in 1941 after the fall of the Konoye Cabinet and again in the Tojo Cabinet (1943) and the Koiso Cabinet (1944). Cabinet Minister privileges granted by the Emperor in April 1945, and in August 1945 he once more held the post of Foreign Minister in the Higashikuni Cabinet.
23. Admiral Shigetaro Shimada, Navy Minister from October 1941 to July 1944.
24. Toshio Shiratori, a leading diplomat and extreme nationalist.
25. Lieutenant-General Teiichi Suzuki, President of the Cabinet Planning Board, July 1941 to November 1943.
26. Shigenori Togo, Foreign Minister in Admiral Suzuki's Cabinet, April to August 1945.
27. General Hideki Tojo, Prime Minister from 18 October 1941 to 18 July 1944. He was War Minister from July 1940 to July 1944, the post (with several others) being held concurrently with the premiership.
28. General Yoshijiro Umezu, Vice-Minister of War, 1936–8; Commander of the Kwantung Army, 1939 to July 1944; Chief of the Army General Staff from July 1944 to the surrender, of which he was a signatory.

CHAPTER XX

Japan's Economy In Defeat

JAPANESE economy was shattered by the damage of war and by the exhaustion of its material and human resources. The task of reconstruction has been undertaken under the burden of every kind of uncertainty. The currency, the social and political outlook, and the Allies' economic intentions are nearly as doubtful in the summer of 1947 as in the autumn of 1945. The note issue is soaring and the Allies have not defined their reparations plan or begun seriously to consider the peace treaty.

In August 1946, after a year of peace, some industrial comparisons were made with the monthly average for 1930 to 1934.[1] These showed that manufacturing and mining had fallen to one-third,[2] metals to a quarter, textiles to one-sixth, chemicals to two-fifths, printing, glass, and cement to one-third, beer and *sake* to one-fifth, and vehicles to seven-tenths.[3] The one commodity rising slightly above the 1930–4 level was lumber, the product of the saw-mills. Coal is fundamental to recovery, but the exodus of Koreans, the dilapidation of equipment, and the inadequacy of food kept production low. The number of miners in the autumn of 1946 was about the same as pre-war, but production, 1,700,000 tons a month,[4] not much more than one-third the 1940 figure and half the 1936 figure. There was also, before the war, an important import of coking coal from North China. The Allied Council for Japan discussed nationalization of coal mines but were unable to reach a conclusion.

The Japanese Government has taken special measures to promote the recovery of the cotton industry. At the beginning of 1946 only just over 2 million spindles were installed, and only half these were

[1] *Summation*, October 1946.

[2] In the chart for manufacturing and mining combined, individual indices were weighted by the average employment in the base period. This of course gives only a rough comparison since the emphasis of employment has changed.

[3] This last category is composed of a curious combination of bicycles and railway rolling stock and is consequently not very revealing.

[4] *New York Times*, 5 September 1946, and *Summation*, November 1946. It was hoped in the last quarter of 1946 and the first quarter of 1947 to average two million tons a month.

operable.[1] This compares with an equipment of 12 million spindles before the war. The number increased during 1946 as some were repaired and others brought from store, and in August 1946 there were 2·5 million operable spindles. The difficulties of fuel, labour, and material, however, continued to prevent more than half of these from working.[2] The number of spindles can be increased by Japan's large and efficient textile machinery industry, if this is not seriously affected by reparations. Early in 1946 the figure of a million new spindles in 1947 was thought feasible.[3] The first task, however, is the repair and reconditioning of old installations.

By the end of August 1946 over half a million bales of poor quality cotton had been imported from America.[4] It is not the intention of the Japanese, however, to produce low quality goods longer than is necessary. They know that such textiles will be produced extensively by countries with less experience of the industry, millions of their own spindles, for instance, having been left in China, including the Kwantung Leased Territory and Manchuria. In 1938 and 1939 production of cotton cloth (apart from narrow cloth for Japanese dress) averaged 250 million square yards a month.[5] By February 1947 the output had only recovered to 48 million square yards.[6]

In wool, too, the story is of slow reconstruction of an industry that may prove once more of high value to Japan and to Asia. This industry developed in Japan later than cotton, but was already a serious competitor with the British industry before the injurious repercussions of Japan's aggression against China were felt. In 1935 production of woollen and worsted yarn had been 5 million lb. a month and in 1939 it was 12 million lb. In September and again in October 1946 production was 2·75 million lb. but decreased somewhat in January and February 1947. In 1939 roughly 10 million square yards of woollen cloth and serge were produced monthly,[7] whereas only 2 million square yards in the category 'woollen and worsted cloth' are reported for September and again for October 1946, and this fell off considerably at the beginning of 1947.[8]

[1] *Report of the Textile Mission to Japan*, January to March 1946 (London, H.M. Stationery Office), p. iv.
[2] *Summation*, September 1946, pp. 100 and 105.
[3] *Report of the Textile Mission*, p. v.
[4] *Summation*, September 1946, pp. 100–1.
[5] *Far East Year Book*, 1941, p. 373.
[6] *Manchester Guardian*, 21 April 1947.
[7] *Far East Year Book*, 1941, p. 380.
[8] *Manchester Guardian*, 28 December 1946.

Only a small beginning had been made by the autumn of 1946 in re-establishing the staple fibre and rayon industries, but much hope was placed on raw silk, which probably presents Japan's most anxious post-war economic question. Although eighty-five per cent of silk reeling machinery was lost (largely scrapped in the reckless war-drive for metal), and cocoon production reduced to a quarter, the Government has encouraged farmers to extend mulberry acreage, which had fallen to less than half the pre-war level. The Government hopes that reeling facilities will be ready by the time, three or four years hence, that the newly cultivated mulberry fields become productive.[1] The farmers, however, have not responded well, since they would have had to sell cocoons at controlled prices, whereas if they produced rice, a substantial proportion could be withheld for the black market. Another anxiety has been caused by a fall in the quality of cocoons. The Japanese know that they must improve even on their high pre-war quality if competition with nylon is to be effective, and much research is being conducted to this purpose.

At the beginning of 1946, America was receiving 3,000 bales of silk a month. This had risen to 10,000 by November and averaged 7,000 bales a month throughout the year. Exports in 1947 are likely to exceed this.[2] The silk has not been disposed of easily in the United States market, but this difficulty may be overcome when the preposterous over-valuation of the yen is corrected.[3] The average export for 1936, 1937, and 1938 was 40,000 bales a month.[4]

One of the hopeful features in production has been the improvement in the food situation, in which Japanese efforts have combined with the practical humanity of America's supply policy. In the spring and early summer of 1946 there was extreme hardship in the cities, and at one time nine starvation deaths a day were reported in the Tokyo area. The summer crops of wheat, barley, and Irish potatoes were disappointing[5] and by the beginning of September S.C.A.P. had imported nearly 700,000 tons of relief supplies,[6] an effort that earned Japanese gratitude and a great deal of criticism

[1] *Manchester Guardian*, 6 and 9 April 1946.

[2] *Manchester Guardian*, 27 January 1947.

[3] 15 yen to the dollar until 11 March 1947, and then 50 yen to the dollar. The greater part of the silk was held unsold at the end of 1946 by the United States Commercial Company, *New York Times*, 9 January 1947.

[4] *Far East Year Book*, 1941, p. 304.

[5] *Summation*, November 1946.

[6] *New York Times*, 2 September 1946.

from those who felt that Japan should be 'at the end of the queue'. S.C.A.P.'s response to protests was that he must have the food imports or a larger occupation force, and this argument proved decisive with the American Government. The Japanese did their part, making good the shortage of artificial fertilizer with natural and other available fertilizer, and by using an ample labour supply. Weather conditions were also favourable and the rice harvest was equal to a satisfactory pre-war year, while the potato crop of 6 million tons was a record.[1] A release of 50,000 tons of imported food in October 1946 was expected to be the last for the year,[2] but big shipments of maize are due in 1947.[3] On 1 November 1946 an encouraging step was taken in raising the daily ration of staple food from 2·1 *go* (300 grammes) to 2·5 *go* (360 grammes) and the proportion of rice in this ration has increased. The supply of rationed goods, moreover, has become more dependable. The improvement brought food consumption to 1,500 calories only,[4] so that there was still suffering among those who could not find means of adding to their legal rations. It was estimated in November 1946 that the Japanese would have 1,580 calories in 1947, compared with 2,300 before the war and nearly 2,000 during the war.[5] A great deal of smuggling of rice in small boats from Korea has taken place, but it is impossible to say whether this has been on such a scale as to affect the black market supply appreciably. The authorities tried hard, in the interests of domestic supplies in Korea, to check what was for Japan a useful trading enterprise. About 2·4 million tons of fish were caught in 1946 compared with over 5·5 million tons in 1938.[6]

The distribution of food, and also of manufactured goods, through illegal channels made it difficult to measure Japan's real hardship, and in 1947 the United States became plainly impatient with a state of affairs in which she was expected to make good food shortages which were at least partly due to the Japanese failure to distribute their own resources rationally. On 22 March 1947, S.C.A.P. sent a long and strongly worded letter to the Premier. 'Aid to Japan', he wrote, 'cannot be expected on a scale sufficiently

[1] *Summation*, November 1946.
[2] *New York Times*, 16 October 1946, and *The Times*, 2 November 1946.
[3] *Yorkshire Post*, 7 December 1946.
[4] *New York Times*, 25 October 1946.
[5] An estimate of the United States Department of Agriculture, quoted by *Stars and Stripes* (Tokyo), 4 November 1946.
[6] *Summation*, November 1946, and *Far East Year Book*, 1941, p. 311.

great to overcome the maldistribution and inflation within Japan.'[1] Mr Yoshida accepted the rebuke patiently, and promised more effective measures, but it is doubtful, in view of rural, social, and political influence, if much could be done before the elections. At the beginning of April 1947, S.C.A.P. asked the advice of the Allied Council about the disquieting economic situation, and Mr MacMahon Ball observed that the real problem was one of finding Japanese leaders willing and able to control the economy.[2]

The import of American food and raw cotton represented one side of an attempt to resume trade. The export of raw silk has already been mentioned, and other substantial exports, both to America and Asia, are likely to develop. In the first year after defeat Japanese exports exceeded £40 million and provided her with a favourable balance of £6 million. Nearly half the value of the exports was in raw silk.[3] A great variety of commodities was exported, often in such small lots as to be more in the nature of samples than of commercial exports. In the first nine months of 1946 Korea received half a million tons of coal and China 150,000 tons, besides minor exports,[4] and these countries sent various minor shipments—e.g. of graphite and salt—to Japan, but the United States was of overwhelming importance, both as a supplier and as a market. She received 67 thousand bales of raw silk, besides such minor exports as 3 million lb. of tea and 1·5 million Christmas electric light bulbs. Imports from the United States in this period included 700,000 tons of food, nearly 2 million barrels of fuel oil, nearly 500,000 bales of raw cotton, and 40 thousand tons of phosphate rock. It is therefore clear that, while a large number of trade feelers had been made in other markets, the real dependence is on the United States. In the first year after surrender the United States supplied nearly all Japan's imports and received two-thirds of her exports.[5]

The only practical method of lightening the United States burden in meeting Japan's adverse trade balance would be by broadening the channels of supply to Japan, for instance by sending raw cotton from India and wool from Australia. The possible pattern of future trade may be inferred from a report that Australia will

[1] *New York Times*, 29 March 1947.
[2] *New York Herald Tribune*, 3 April 1947.
[3] *Observer*, 29 December 1946.
[4] Japan's imports and exports are carefully itemized in the *Summations*.
[5] *Manchester Guardian*, 8 November 1946.

send £3 million worth of wool to Japan in 1947, and that a large part of the material manufactured from it will go to Hong Kong, Malaya, and other Asiatic countries.[1]

Japan's economic future will be drastically influenced by Allied policy,[2] and this depends on a number of factors which are difficult to adjust to each other. There is the demand for security and reparation, and there is also a feeling that Japan should be punished and that her trade should be controlled in the interests of competitors. Sir Stafford Cripps, President of the Board of Trade, made a statement in the House of Commons on 28 October 1946, which dealt with the problems of security and competition.[3] On the first point he said:

> 'The Japanese steel industry, heavy industry, chemicals, shipping, aircraft and metals industries will, on security grounds, undergo at least severe reduction . . . There will be reductions in other industries consequential on the above, so as to leave Japan with a balanced economy.'

On the matter of competition, which caused anxiety to many members representing industrial constituencies, Sir Stafford made it clear that no one-sided action against Japan to control 'unfair competition' was contemplated. Sir Stafford said:

> 'It is in any case to be hoped that Japan herself is in course of being set on to new economic paths, and that the forcible breaking up of the oligarchic corporate system of industry which previously held power there will clear the way for the development of the country on more democratic lines, with the rising standards of wages and living that that implies.'

On the root issue of the competitive advantage arising from low wages, Sir Stafford was firm, as the following exchange shows.

> 'Mr Oliver Stanley: Are we then to understand that the export of Japanese textiles will be allowed to be resumed before anything has been done to raise their standard of wages?

[1] *News Chronicle*, 10 February 1947.

[2] A policy decision of the Far Eastern Commission, approved on 23 January 1947 and issued to the press on 18 April 1947, laid down the principle that 'the peaceful needs of the Japanese people should be defined as being substantially the standard of living prevailing in Japan during the period of 1930–34' (*Department of State Bulletin*, Vol. XVI, No. 409, 4 May 1947, p. 806).

[3] 428 House of Commons Debates, 5s., col. 269.

'Sir Stafford Cripps: We hope that Japanese textiles will be available very shortly, because there is such a great dearth of them throughout the Far East which can be supplied from nowhere else.'

There has been a great deal of confused thought about competition based on Japan's low wage standards. The country's poverty, accentuated by the various penalties of defeat, makes it inevitable that wages will for years be even lower than before the war. If Japan ever achieves a wage level such as is enjoyed by Western industrial nations, the implication is that she will have become as prosperous and influential as the latter.

There is, however, a way in which Japanese competition in certain commodities might, without profit to herself, become genuinely unfair. Japan may be forced into a position where an undue and, in normal circumstances, uneconomic proportion of her brains, energy, and capital is directed to a very limited range of enterprise for lack of other outlets. The head of the Textile Division of S.C.A.P. has suggested that eighty per cent of Japan's future exports may be textiles.[1] Such a plan would carry the double implication that production would be given immense impetus along a particular channel, and that the standard of living, and consequently of wages, would be chronically low. Little margin of foreign exchange would be left available for imports other than textiles, raw materials, and food. The value of Japan's exports and re-exports in 1927, 1936, and 1939 was about 2,000, 2,700, and 3,600 million yen respectively, of which textiles[2] accounted in each year for 1,300 million.[3] The proportion of textiles to total exports was accordingly 65 per cent, 48 per cent, and 36 per cent in the three years. It is proposed, therefore, that the proportion of textile exports should be larger even than in 1927, in spite of the fact that well over half the value of textile exports in that year was accounted for by raw silk, an export asset the future of which is now obscure.

Japan's reparation obligations are still undetermined. One reason for the delay has been a dispute over the removal of plant

[1] *Manchester Guardian*, 27 January 1947.

[2] Raw silk, cotton, wool, rayon, and silk tissues; cotton blankets and towels, cotton yarn, silk handkerchiefs and knitted goods.

[3] Individual categories of textile exports fluctuated widely in those three years, but by coincidence the total value of textile exports was in each year approximately the same.

from Manchuria by Russia. The Soviet view is that this is legitimate war booty, unrelated to the reparation issue, whereas the United States considers that the immense amount of equipment lost to China by the Soviet removals should be set against Russian reparation claims. The United States has to weigh other considerations favourable to Japan. The depletion of Japan's resources through reparations will delay her recovery and lengthen the period during which she will be a burden on the United States; moreover, the actual transfer of machines may require American shipping, and finally it is not certain that receiving countries will have the skill and ability to make good use of the plant. Nevertheless, in April 1947, the United States attempted to break the deadlock by directing S.C.A.P. to distribute immediately some of the industrial facilities earmarked for reparations. In the first allocation, China was to have half and the other half was to be distributed among the Philippines, the Netherlands East Indies, and British Far Eastern territories. This decision had a cool reception in the Far Eastern Commission.

For many months a long list of industries has been held ready for reparations. Mr Edwin W. Pauley, the United States Reparations Commissioner, had already made drastic recommendations at the end of 1945, and in the following June his interim report was substantially endorsed by the Far Eastern Commission, though no definite decision was made. Mr Pauley's final report was completed in November 1946, and submitted to the President.[1] The report proposed the total removal of munitions plant, large-scale removals in electric power plant, iron and steel plant, machine tools, electrical machinery, communications equipment, transport equipment (including rolling stock), shipping, etc. Textile machinery was in a category on which decision was postponed. Industries to be excluded from the reparations field included coal, pearl culture, silk, light electrical appliances, cement, and ceramics. Mr Pauley advised against forced labour, the exaction of reparations from current production, and seizure of stocks or of securities carrying title to Japanese commercial enterprises. He considered that the countries needing reparations had, in the main, a labour surplus,[2] while recurring reparations would tend to revive Japanese war

[1] *New York Times* and *New York Herald Tribune*, 17 November 1946; *New York Times*, *New York Herald Tribune*, and *Christian Science Monitor*, 29 November 1946. The *New York Times* of 11 November 1946 had an interesting letter from Mr Pauley answering criticisms.

[2] Mr Pauley was evidently thinking of unskilled labour.

potential and unduly strengthen her position in competitive exports. The aim of the plan was 'to effect the industrial disarmament of Japan, but at the same time to make it possible for the Japanese people to establish a reasonable economy, under which they can live at peace with all nations.' Mr Pauley thought that security would be achieved by the double process of reducing the industry of Japan and reinforcing that of other Asiatic countries, such as China and the Philippines. These countries would then be 'like sentinels watching Japan from near by'.

These proposals will almost certainly be modified, since the United States is concerned on humane, political, and economic grounds alike that Japan shall pay her way; while Great Britain would, on every count, deplore the creation of a situation in which the energies of the country would be forced into two channels: agriculture, with its low production value and living standards; and selected light industries, in which the export of a limited range of products, almost regardless of cost, would be a matter of life and death to Japan's workers. China and India must balance their need for Japanese manufactures against the interests of their own rising industries.

Japan's recovery will necessarily be slow, and the Allies could delay it indefinitely from confused motives of security, reparation claims, and fear of competition. If they do so, one of the most promising sources for the advancement of Asia's standard of living will be choked. A statement made by General MacArthur at a press conference on 17 March 1947 showed how far his opinion has moved in the direction of modifying demands on Japan. 'You cannot squeeze blood from a turnip,' said S.C.A.P., and added, 'We do not wish to remove from Japan what the United States taxpayer will have to pay for in two or three years' time.'[1] A few days later the United Kingdom Political Representative in Tokyo said it would be inadvisable to remove so much from Japan as to make reconstruction impossible.[2]

[1] *The Times*, 18 March 1947.
[2] *The Times*, 22 March 1947.

CHAPTER XXI

Social and Economic Adjustment

THE measure of the Government's weakness has been its inability to stabilize prices, for without such stabilization revenue cannot be effectively collected, nor money disbursed, and what is worse, it is impossible for industry to set a money wage which will keep most of the people steadily at work. The problem of controlling prices, difficult in the closing stages of the war, became insoluble with defeat. The system of forced saving and exaction of goods, especially of food, crumbled, and runaway inflation followed, though the gravity of the ensuing crisis was probably not realized and certainly not admitted. During January 1946 the note issue expanded by 150 million yen a day, and at the close of the month was almost 60 thousand million yen, which was double that at the date of surrender.

In February 1946 the Government made its big effort. A banking moratorium was declared, and currency notes recalled for conversion by March into a new issue. Withdrawals thereafter were to be limited according to the size of the family. As a cure for inflation this conversion scheme bore the hall-mark of the amateur. With a famine of goods and no confidence in the future value of the blocked yen, prices and note issue rose as soon as the loop-holes in the freezing scheme became evident. Additional withdrawals were permitted for school fees, medical, wedding, and funeral costs, political campaign expenses, and for some business expenses. Notes of five yen or less were exempt from conversion and soon disappeared from circulation. The measure was accompanied by a threat of severe penalties if food were not yielded, and by the proposal of heavy taxes on profits. Obviously, however, threats against the farmers were futile without a strict enforcement of sanctions for which the available police establishment was inadequate. Similarly assessment of business resources for taxation, even had the Government a genuine intention of mulcting the class which supported it, could not be successfully undertaken till measures for liquidating illegal hoards and freezing liquid balances had restored a calculable value to the currency.

When the conversion took place, the farmers not only drew their ration of currency from the banks, but continued to attract the townsmen's yen. Though the note issue was momentarily quartered, the price of black market rice did not fall; and before long the note issue was advancing as fast as ever. By the end of May it was 36 thousand million yen, and at the beginning of November it had risen to the record figure of 70 thousand million. The year 1947 opened with an issue of well over 90 thousand million yen. In June 1946 the wage-earners' cost of living was forty times that of 1937 and sixteen times that of 1945. The heaviest price increase had been in food, which stood at fifty and twenty times the 1937 and May 1945 levels respectively.[1]

Black marketing was of course general, one of the most notorious instances being the traffic in American stores. By the middle of 1946 the remittances to the United States (apart, that is, from the great quantity of souvenirs shipped) exceeded the total pay of the occupation forces.[2] In July an attempt was made to deal with this by issuing special yen called 'A' yen, which the Japanese were supposed not to use or even possess. The 'A' yen was to be the only medium of purchase at army sales stores and post exchanges, and only these 'A' yen were to be convertible into dollars. The black market in American stores had thereafter to be sustained mainly by the cumbrous method of barter, and the drain on the dollar resources of the occupying authorities was checked. The special yen were replaced by military dollars in the autumn. Nevertheless, illegal possession and counterfeiting became so serious that all occupation scrip had again to be called in on 10 March 1947.[3]

The tremendous emission of currency in the latter part of 1946 did not have the effect on prices that would be expected. There was a satisfactory rice harvest and an improvement in the ration of staple food. Probably the chief factor steadying prices was the huge amount of currency hoarded by the farmers. The Government chose to represent this as evidence of the farmers' confidence in the currency, but it is not at all likely that Japan's farmers are as simple as that. A more probable explanation is that they were collecting money to buy their land under the agrarian measure passed by the autumn Diet. Strong efforts to persuade them to deposit their

[1] *Summation*, August 1946, p. 189. [2] *New York Times*, 26 June and 18 July 1946.
[3] *Christian Science Monitor*, 10 March 1947.

money in savings accounts were a failure, and the hoarded currency remained a threat to the frail price structure. In spite of fiscal helplessness, the Government frequently made budgetary gestures, mentioning various large sums it proposed in some not clearly specified way to obtain from the people to balance expenditure. In practice, however, the Government had to rely on the printing press.

This background of financial chaos lends itself to developments which may result in an extensive redistribution of wealth, both between classes and between individuals. There is likely to be a capital levy, a writing off of assets, a dispersal of Zaibatsu wealth, and an expropriation, virtually without compensation, of landlords.

In November 1945 S.C.A.P. instructed the Government to impose a hundred per cent tax on war profits and a capital levy rising to seventy per cent. The Government was, moreover, told to suspend the policy of indemnifying industrialists for war losses. These measures by S.C.A.P. were intended both to point the moral that war does not pay and to help stabilize Japan's finance. There was considerable resistance to the order to repudiate the Government's promise to indemnify industrialists for war losses. The claims covered air-raid damage, the cost of conversion of plant for specialized war purposes, and the cost of dispersing industry. In other words, the Government was precluded from keeping a promise to finance on the capitalists' behalf (and necessarily at the expense of the rest of the nation) the reconversion of industry. This repudiation of war claims dislocated the books of Japan's financial institutions at least as much as those of the industrialists. From May 1942, under the system of 'designated banks', each industry had gone to a particular bank for loans, these loans being guaranteed by the Government. The financial institutions consequently had made loans upon collateral of a government guarantee, which was now repudiated. As long as the Government's promises were credited, everybody's book-keeping position was satisfactory, though the country was ruined. The account books now had to be adjusted to the situation, and the large figures relating to repudiated guarantees and capital levies had no importance except in so far as they did or did not imply a surrender of production potential.

The discussion resulted in the passage through the autumn Diet,

with the approval of S.C.A.P., of a Bill which drew together the various threads of national bankruptcy, the disposal of the Zaibatsu being treated separately. Under this Bill, war claims against the Government (e.g., for the restoration of a bombed plant) and war claims guaranteed by the Government (e.g., loans made to industry by a 'designated bank' on government guarantee) were repudiated. This was expected to reduce governmental obligations by 66 thousand million yen.[1] With this measure of repudiation went a graduated capital levy on fortunes exceeding 100,000 yen. On the first 10,000 yen over this figure the levy would be 2,500 yen. The levy, however, was to rise to 90 per cent on fortunes of 15 million yen and over, and was expected to bring in over 40 thousand million yen.

S.C.A.P. assented to an extensive plan of economic reorganization. This plan contemplated the achievement of solvency through obligatory composition under which interests were to be written down or written off in order of priority. After drastic treatment, a company could apply to a new reconstruction finance authority for working capital, but the resources of this authority could only meet a small fraction of the demand. It is too soon to judge how far these measures will force sale of assets and a wider distribution of industry. Japan's small-scale enterprises have shown the utmost tenacity, and they will now emerge at least temporarily independent of the larger interests which partially controlled them in the past. The latter, however, may also pass through their ordeal without great changes in ownership. The financial reorganization is in practised hands, the Government sympathetic, and the impact of the capital levy cushioned by inflation; so the future of Japanese industry may remain with men not unlike those who moulded its past, reinforced by the class which has manipulated successfully the markets of defeat. The repudiation of the Government's promise of compensation may delay reconversion, and may loosen the close-knit design characteristic of Japanese industry, but it is hard to foresee exactly how far the concentration of control will be found to be relaxed when a measure of political and economic equilibrium is reached.

While these measures to combat national bankruptcy may not have a lasting influence on the structure of Japanese industry, the radical attack on the Zaibatsu problem ensures some modification

[1] The National Debt in August 1946 was 220 billion yen.

of economic concentration. The practical argument for the Zaibatsu is that their leaders constituted an irreplaceable source of organizing ability in the national economy. An American Mission on Japanese Combines reported in the spring of 1946,[1] and discussed the twin problems of finding new owners and the necessary managerial ability for the Zaibatsu concerns. The report concedes that it may not be immediately possible, in view of the long domination of industry by the Zaibatsu, to find appropriate successors; but it also suggests that in the co-operative movement, and among the small and medium businessmen, and those holding responsible positions in the Zaibatsu firms, are individuals and corporations capable of making a good start in absorbing the holdings and undertaking the managerial functions hitherto held by men coming under the Allied ban.

It is, however, exceedingly difficult to foresee who will emerge as business leaders. While the new men may be drawn from groups considered by the Mission to be most eligible, it seems just as likely that a new-rich class of racketeers will emerge from inflation and the black market. Such men will, judging by past experience, be very respectable indeed, and will take their place with the survivors of the older business class in all the organs of public service. In this connection, it is most important that a vacuum is being created in local government as well as in the upper ranks in commerce, and the bearing of this on business control may be direct. A new 'purge' enforced by the Government at the beginning of 1947 comprehends practically every one who ventured on a public utterance between July 1937 and December 1941. The trend of administrative control, local and national, is bound to be linked with the trend of business control. A great many experienced men are to be excluded from both, and those who take their place will not necessarily, because their past has been unobjectionable through obscurity, be of high political or business principles.

It is impossible to assess the essential commercial value to Japan of Zaibatsu brains because, as the Report shows, they obtained their dominating position, not merely by business ability, but by application of the pressure available through their commanding position in finance and government. From 1935 in particular,

[1] *Report of the Mission on Japanese Combines* (a report to the U.S. Department of State and the War Department). (Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, March 1946.)

many small competitors were eliminated by methods extending beyond the scope of free competition.[1] The Report shows again that the Japanese Corporation Law and system of taxation assisted the creation of the great conglomerations of interlocking businesses. A technical discussion of Japan's Corporation Law opens with the observation that: 'The absence of certain restraining provisions, and the failure to enforce others, permitted the Zaibatsu to develop in a fashion which other countries, facing similar problems, have succeeded in avoiding or limiting.'[2] On taxation it is stated that: 'A study of the different tax laws leads one to the conclusion that in their drafting considerable care was used to insure against their bearing too hardly upon the corporations and individuals of greatest means.'[3]

The data concerning the resources of the Zaibatsu are of unequal value, but the Mission concluded that fifteen Zaibatsu concerns had spread over every phase of economic life, producing, for example, half the country's coal, paper, pulp, aircraft, and synthetic dyes; nine-tenths of the steam engines, 70 per cent of aluminium, one-third of copper, and 35 per cent of explosives.[4] Every field of finance—savings banks, ordinary banks, trust companies, insurance—was also under Zaibatsu influence. Eleven Zaibatsu banks at the end of 1945 accounted for 70 per cent of all loans and advances.[5]

The form of control exerted by the monopolies varied. The Mitsui pattern is described as follows:

> 'Mitsui is an example of the single holding company type. Its *Honsha* holds from ten per cent to all of the capital stock of about ninety companies; thirty-six of these ninety companies hold from ten per cent to all of the stock of some 285 companies; and there are forty more companies in which ten per cent or more of the stock is scattered among various subsidiaries and sub-subsidiaries of the *Honsha*. The holding company is thus the point at which the power of control over more than three hundred companies is concentrated.'[6]

Another interesting type was that of Aikawa's Nissan Combine, the great 'new Zaibatsu' firm:

[1] ibid., p. 104. [2] ibid., p. 21. [3] ibid., p. 33. [4] ibid., p. 9.
[5] ibid., p. 36. [6] ibid., p. 3.

'Aikawa served as an adviser to the Kwantung Army, and with the aid of the army authorities and the co-operation of the Manchurian and Japanese Governments undertook extensive industrial developments in Manchuria. These industries were principally financed by the Manchurian Government and by capital secured from Japanese life insurance companies through government intercession. Voting rights were concentrated in a small per cent of the total stock issued, and Aikawa was president of the company holding this voting stock.'[1]

On the consequences of war the Report observes that: 'While the uncertainties are obvious, no sufficient reason appears to believe that the damage by bombing and the effectuation of the Pauley Mission recommendation will substantially reduce the relative power of the Zaibatsu.'[2]

After the surrender the Zaibatsu made various proposals for relaxing their control and for the resignation of the predominant directors, but S.C.A.P. was not to be fobbed off by small gestures, and in November 1945 the Government was induced to prepare a more adequate plan. It proposed to set up a Holding Company Liquidation Commission, under the supervision of S.C.A.P., to dissolve the cores of the trusts. This was to take over the assets of the holding companies, and replace them with non-negotiable ten-year bonds ineligible as collateral. In the state of government credit, this was not far removed from expropriation without compensation. The members of the Zaibatsu were not to be permitted to buy back any securities, priority in the purchase of which would be given to the employees of the various companies.

Except for the withdrawal of the great industrialists from management, little could be done in the confused conditions of finance and industry to implement this policy, and it was not until August 1946 that the Holding Company Liquidation Commission was finally established. Until this time the great holding companies remained in formal existence, though the Zaibatsu had exercised no effective control since the previous autumn. Mitsui, Mitsubishi, and Yasuda dissolved at the end of September 1946, but Sumitomo postponed this step. A news item of interest at the end of 1946 announced the dissolution of the Mitsui family council. This was a council of the heads of the eleven

[1] ibid., pp. 6–7. [2] ibid., p. 12.

branches of the Mitsui family, which had been in existence for three hundred years. In November 1946 the measures against the trusts were extended to a number of minor Zaibatsu. Forty firms were named as holding companies to be liquidated, and the upshot was that some 1,200 companies were detached from them. As in the case of the major Zaibatsu, employees were to have priority in buying shares, and also those living in the towns where an enterprise was situated. At the end of November 1946, a further step by S.C.A.P. emphasized the determination to root out the influence of the great plutocrats. He ordered that all assets, not merely corporate assets, of the ten major Zaibatsu[1] should be changed into the ten-year non-negotiable bonds. The capital levy and a proposed inheritance tax might well be expected to complete the ruin of the Zaibatsu.

The achievement of land reform offered fewer technical difficulties than reform in the control of industry. In the first place, the competence of the incumbent farmers in the management of their land is not questioned as is that of the workers and managers in industry; in the second place, the property has not been damaged, though handicapped by minor factors such as shortage of manure and labour during the war; thirdly, agriculture is safe from the uncertainties of labour unrest, reparations claims, and strategic restrictions; fourthly, the farmers, by selling a proportion of their crops on the black market, have liquidated most of their hitherto chronic indebtedness, while the inflation lightens any remaining obligation.[2]

In the middle of the war thirty per cent of farmers rented all or almost all their land, while an additional forty per cent rented some of their land.[3] From the beginning of the occupation, S.C.A.P. attached importance to the abolition of the tenant relationship which had traditionally placed the farmer in an impoverished contractual position. A tentative measure passed the Diet at the end of 1945, whereby a landowner possessing, but not working, more than about twelve and a half acres might, in certain circumstances, be required to sell for ultimate purchase by tenants. Commissions representing all interests were to study terms of transfer,

[1] Mitsui, Mitsubishi (Iwasaki), Yasuda, Sumitomo, Aikawa, Asano, Furukawa, Fuji (Nakajima), Okura, and Nomura.

[2] The farm debt in yen at the end of the war was one-third what it had been in the late nineteen-thirties.

[3] *Summation*, December 1945, p. 48.

and a ceiling price for land was to be fixed by the Government. This measure being clearly inadequate, the Government was directed to submit a fresh programme of land reform by 15 March 1946. These new proposals, when they appeared, were an advance on the earlier measure, but still permitted landowners to retain seven and a half acres of leased land, and in May S.C.A.P. asked the Allied Council for advice about land reform. The Council produced a plan which would have practically eliminated the non-cultivating landlord, and limited the holding of the working farmer to a maximum of about seven and a half acres, except in Hokkaido where, much land being pastoral, the maximum was about thirty acres. A feature of the Allied Council's discussion was the rejection of an ingenious proposal of the Russian member for dealing with compensation. He suggested full compensation for the first eight acres, half compensation for the next eight acres, and confiscation above that. Mr George Atcheson, however, carried the majority of the Council with him in objecting on principle to confiscation. He said that it would be undemocratic to ignore the rights of property. 'That certain men are rich in property is no justification for depriving them of property without compensation . . . To give the stamp of approval to any proposal thus destructive of the right of ownership and possession would be to discriminate against one class in favour of another.'[1] This opinion is worth quoting for the light it throws on the dilemma felt by those responsible for the redistribution of wealth in Japan. In the American view, it was necessary, in the interests of social justice and international security, to deprive the rich of a great deal of their property; but it was equally necessary to make no concession to the philosophy of socialism. The solution was found in making the gestures of compensation. Industrial property was rewarded with almost worthless bonds, and agricultural property with payments based on the controlled prices of agricultural produce.

In August a Japanese proposal for land reform was put before the Diet, and was later cordially accepted by S.C.A.P., who appears to have ignored the recommendations of the Allied Council. The proposal was to set up local, prefectural, and national land commissions upon which tenants, landlords, and peasant proprietors, elected through their associations, would be represented.[2] The area

[1] *New York Times*, 18 June 1946. [2] *Summation*, August 1946, pp. 61–2.

which could be cultivated by a working proprietor was, as a rule, to be limited to seven and a half acres, but this provision was subject to the discretion of the commissions.[1] Exceptions were made in favour of larger holdings in the Hokkaido. Rentals were to be paid in cash and were not to exceed twenty-five per cent of crop value. The price for irrigated rice land was to be about 3,000 yen per acre, so that a holding of two and a half acres would cost only about 7,500 yen. This could be paid over thirty years, but in practice the farmers were so prosperous that they would hardly require much time to find this small sum. The landlord would get a little more than the above amount as the Government was willing to pay a subsidy of nearly 900 yen per acre, raising the price to the landlord to nearly 4,000 yen per acre. The average value of land in the years 1930 to 1936 inclusive was about 1,650 yen per acre,[2] so that the landlord's compensation was less than two and a half times that figure. With food prices in the summer of 1946 fifty times pre-war, this differed little from expropriation without indemnity. The Japanese Government claimed that, as a result of this measure, barely one-fifth of farmers, and only one-tenth of arable land, would remain under tenancy.[3] The intention was to complete the land transfer in two years.

The measure was sharply criticized by the Russian and British Commonwealth members of the Allied Council. Mr Derevyanko objected in particular to the payment of a subsidy in addition to purchase price, to the local discretion about the area a man may own and work, and to the provision that a landlord might still hold two and a half acres under tenancy. Mr MacMahon Ball thought that the measure was full of loopholes which would be exploited by the local commissioners. The reply of the Minister of Agriculture was unconvincing. He explained that the area an owner-cultivator may retain will depend on how much he can efficiently cultivate.[4] It was admitted that a man might buy more land than he could cultivate and then let some of it, but this, the Minister maintained, would not happen because it would be 'against the spirit of the bill'. He was told that the Farmers' Union, a body of predominantly social-democratic sympathies, feared the tenants would be subservient to the local commissions and

[1] The measure seems vague about the extent of this discretion.
[2] *Japan-Manchoukuo Year Book*, 1938, p. 336.
[3] *Christian Science Monitor*, 4 September 1946.
[4] *New York Times*, 30 August 1946.

responded: 'Then it is the responsibility of the Farmers' Union to educate tenants so that they will not be dominated.'[1]

The peasants do, in fact, appear to have been given their opportunity. There seems no reason why, in the present political circumstances of Japan, they should submit to local intimidation. They have achieved an undreamed of material security, they can express their views, and the instruments of oppression are, at least for the time being, broken. Outwardly the country's tendency is democratic, and the decision to make local government officials elective, together with the extensive purges of the old officials, further strengthens the peasants' position. Moreover, the British and Russian representatives on the Allied Council, by calling attention to the possible loopholes in the Act, have made them more difficult to exploit.

The claim for radical redistribution of wealth in Japan has been contested in four principal fields. These were the Government's obligation to finance the reconversion of industry, the status of the Zaibatsu, the claim of peasants to the land they cultivate, and the demand for workers' control of industry. The first three issues were determined, in the main, against the interests of property owners, though not so decisively as to preclude the possibility of their recovery; the last issue was determined in their favour. Not only large capitalists but small ones were threatened by the revolutionary claim of workers to take over an industry which did not provide satisfactory conditions. In the test case of the *Yomiuri* newspaper, S.C.A.P.'s voice was on the side of the owners. It is hard to see how anything but chaos could have followed a concession to the extreme working-class leaders on this question.

The workers successfully organized large unions and they naturally wanted to get solid concessions. They were unwilling to face the hard truth. Production was low and potential overseas liabilities far in excess of any imports that could be hoped for, so that real wages had necessarily to remain very low, whatever accommodation with capital and management might be arrived at. The hope that they might escape the logic of economics was encouraged when, in July 1946, Mr Derevyanko put forward in the Allied Council a twenty-two point labour programme. This called for a forty-eight hour week, payment for overtime, holidays with pay, medical treatment in case of injury, and other benefits. On the

[1] *New York Herald Tribune*, 1 September 1946.

question of workers' control, he proposed that if minimum wages fixed by the Government in agreement with labour were not paid, or if redundant workers were not paid satisfactory retiring allowances, and a strike followed, the workers should take control. As in the case of the Russian agrarian proposals, Mr Atcheson took exception to this programme as a violation of the rights of property.[1] His criticisms involved him in a strong attack on communism which, in the light of S.C.A.P.'s great prestige in Japan, was of political importance. He spoke of minorities which mislead and regiment workers, and added: 'The term "regimentation" includes both communist and fascist regimentation.'[2]

At the 1947 Session of the Diet, a basic labour law was passed which seems to secure much improved conditions for Japanese labour. This concedes the forty-eight hour week, equal pay for equal work, holidays with pay, prohibition of juvenile labour under fifteen, and protection for women and young workers. National minimum wages are to be fixed for each industry by a joint committee of management, labour, and independent interests.[3] The Labour Relations Law passed at the previous session was of a different character.[4] It aimed at developing machinery for industrial conciliation, and a provision which, in pre-war conditions would have had a sinister ring, was that the committee acting as mediator in a dispute should secure support for its views by mobilizing public opinion. An award was to become compulsory only where both parties had previously bound themselves to acceptance. Freedom to strike was restricted in the case of police, firemen, and some other essential groups. In public utilities a 'cooling off' period of thirty days was required. This measure was passed in the autumn when the country was swept with labour disputes.

Amalgamations in August 1946 had resulted in two main federations of unions, the National Federation of Labour Unions and the National Congress of Industrial Unions. The titles indicated a characteristic Japanese impulse to follow a foreign model, but the principles of the unions had no particular connection with those of the great American federations, except that C.I.U. was more aggressive than F.L.U. Politically, the former was independent, though under communist influence, whereas the latter supported

[1] *New York Times*, 15 July 1946. [2] ibid., 11 July 1946. [3] ibid., 1 April 1947.
[4] *Summation*, September 1946, pp. 147–8.

the Social-Democratic Party. C.I.U. was the larger with a membership of 1·5 millions, but the early tests showed that control over decisions of member unions was uncertain. F.L.U. had nearly a million members. A number of unions remained outside the federations, and the total of union members on 1 July 1946 was about 3·75 millions, of which the remarkably high proportion of twenty-five per cent were women.[1] Women had, in fact, much to gain by collective bargaining. In October 1946, although women's wages had increased more in proportion, they were still only about half those of men.[2] This undoubtedly exaggerated the difference between the potential output of the sexes.

The widespread autumn strikes and threats of strikes were sometimes directed against the dismissal of redundant workers, and sometimes aimed at reducing the gap between wages and the cost of living. There would have been more stoppages had not S.C.A.P. forbidden any strike impeding the Occupation. It is an interesting sidelight, both on the respect in which the Americans are held and on Japanese regard for authority, that no gesture of disobedience to a directive from S.C.A.P. has been reported. In February 1947 a general strike was stopped at the last moment by intervention of S.C.A.P. The seamen struck successfully in the autumn of 1946, but were careful not to hinder repatriation and other tasks important to the Occupation. The electrical workers were held back from a large-scale strike by the need of supplying the occupation authorities with electricity. Their dispute, however, proved exceedingly embarrassing to the Government. It was the first test of the new arbitration measure. The award favoured the men to such purpose that its implementation would have provoked irresistible wage claims from most other unions. The Government at first rejected the verdict of the mediation committee, but in December a settlement was reached which in the main endorsed it, bringing fresh claims from other hard-pressed workers and officials. The Government's handling of the strike situation gave impetus to the demand, supported by many small businessmen as well as the workers, for its resignation.[3] Another successful strike was that of the Hokkaido miners, but the C.I.U. had a significant set-back when it tried to bring out its newspaper and radio workers. The former decided not to strike, and the latter were left to fight an obstinate and un-

[1] *Summation*, August and September 1946, under 'Labour'. [2] ibid., October 1946.
[3] *Christian Science Monitor*, 4 December 1946.

successful contest unaided. This was not the only example of the limitation of C.I.U. authority over the member unions.

Throughout this period of industrial confusion the figure for unemployment was enormous. There were said to be 700,000 unemployed in Tokyo alone,[1] but of course a large proportion of these were voluntarily unemployed. The rewards of casual labour, legitimate or otherwise, were often greater than regularly earned wages. Furthermore, under-nourishment often interfered with regular work, or compelled workers to take much time off to seek food. Evidently there was need to bring an element of order into the collapsed society of Japan, and under strong encouragement from S.C.A.P. an Economic Stabilization Board was set up during the autumn of 1946. This Board was given such extensive powers of initiating public works that it acquired an authority overriding that of some Cabinet Ministers. It is hard to see how the Board can, within constitutional limits, generate the ruthless drive necessary to bring Japan out of the morass. Men will not readily work for a currency that commands no confidence, and the large appropriation for the Board may well prove just another inflationary factor.

As the year 1947 unfolds, only a faint outline of the future social pattern is discernible. The peasants will probably overcome attempts at obstruction by local committees and get their land, but the holdings will still be small, and probably the position of the peasant will again be inferior to that of the townsman once rice can be freely imported. In industry and commerce the old employer-worker relationship, both in its better and worse aspects, is disappearing. New relationships have to be sought which will reconcile Japan's need for the utmost production and capital reconstruction, the workers' disinclination to make sacrifices conceived to be in capitalist interests, and the employers' desire to retain managerial prerogatives. Even a partial and temporizing accommodation of these conflicting interests depends largely upon currency stabilization, and this is at least as much a political as a monetary or economic problem.

[1] According to Reuter; such a calculation can only be a rough one.

CHAPTER XXII

The Future of Japan

OUR approach to the problem of the delinquent nation, as to that of the delinquent individual, tends to become more rational. In the case of Japan the Allies, under the leadership of the United States (which in turn reflects the strong personality of General MacArthur), have decided on a policy designed to bring her once more into unfettered international intercourse. The decision to introduce in Japan the full practice of democracy is proof of a conviction that she is not incorrigible. The Allied policy derives its coherence from the assumption that she can be transformed into a free, peaceful, and valuable country. No one can be sure of the success of this unparalleled experiment in educational administration, but everything possible should be done to strengthen the hands of those attempting it.

The constructive effort is complicated by our concern about security. We want to be assured that Japan will have neither the military power nor a system of ideas which would again threaten us. Military security against the resurgence of a defeated enemy has become, theoretically at least, a simple matter since August 1945. In the case of Japan, it would seem that this could be effectively assured, after the withdrawal of the occupation forces, by the institution of some form of long-distance air-control from surrounding Allied bases, operated in conjunction with a commission within Japan of political, military, and technical experts, responsible to the Security Council of the United Nations. In practice, however, everything would depend upon the maintenance of unity of purpose among the Great Powers, since it seems apparent that Japan could not, within a reasonable period, become once more a menace to the general security unless she were to gain powerful patronage.

A problem of far greater difficulty than that of preventing military recovery is the encouragement in Japan of a political climate which will contribute to her own permanent welfare and hence to that of the world. The façade of basic agreement in the United Nations has long ago worn too thin to conceal a dangerous division of the victorious nations into two camps, each of which

thinks the other radically unfree. It is therefore extremely hard to see how agreement can be achieved about the basic ideas and principles which should be encouraged in Japan, and a situation might arise in which each side sought the political adherence of the Japanese. If the Americans soon reduce their responsibilities in Japan, as General MacArthur thinks desirable, she will become one of the most important fields in Asia for the conflict of ideas. This serious possibility is obscured by the preponderance of the United States' present influence. She occupies the country, supervises the administration, sustains the rudimentary foreign trade, and enjoys high prestige. The Japanese left wing has freedom of organization and publicity, but is, in the last resort, subject to immediate restriction if its activities seem to S.C.A.P. to hinder the Occupation. While most labour unrest and strikes have been considered responsible decisions of the Japanese, several stoppages—notably the general strike timed for the beginning of February 1947—have been forbidden. Thus, when a particular issue arises between the conservatives and the left wing, it is dealt with by an *ad hoc* decision of S.C.A.P. A harder test will come when the basic stresses out of which the particular incidents arise have to be resolved. It is often charged that S.C.A.P. has weighted the scales in favour of conservatism by administrative decisions or by the constitutional and institutional changes that have taken place under his guidance, but this is a misapprehension. The left wing has full scope for industrial and political organization and for the propagation of ideas. The American vision for Japan can be fulfilled only by granting her freedom to reject the American example. S.C.A.P.'s policy has been a consistent acceptance of this challenge. Such restrictions as have been applied have weakened the right and centre much more than the left.

The weight of responsibility has fallen the heavier on S.C.A.P. because Japan has lost much of her old leadership. The agrarian reform must for the time being reduce the stature of local rural leaders; the destruction of the great monopolies shakes out the cement which held together the pyramid of industry and finance; the militarists, as well as many trained business and political leaders, are under ban. In place of these, Japan has a lively and varied political party and trade union system, while business is largely in the hands of men who have newly arisen or who were in the past too obscure to take a noticeable part in public life. These men are

without either the competition or support of the Zaibatsu, and in every social, political, and industrial field there is for the moment a dearth of experience and a lack of unity.

Differences of interest among the Japanese are likely to become sharper as soon as the political and industrial outlook is clarified. At present, with inflation almost beyond control and Allied intentions for the peace treaty largely undisclosed, the overwhelming concern is with food, shelter, clothing, and the relative acceleration of prices and wages. With a Government commanding full support, stable prices, and knowledge of the probable impact of Allied demands, class and group interests will gain clearer definition and every phase of domestic dispute will have greater importance, and consequently greater acerbity, than at present. In other words class and group bitterness and disunity may flare up just when the circumstances seem most propitious for united and constructive effort. When S.C.A.P. speaks of an early reduction of American authority, he may have given too little weight to this probability.

One of the first revelations of a fundamental conflict of interest may arise, with the stabilization of currency, from the discrepancy between the workers' claims and the wages employers feel able or willing to pay. The special difficulty will arise from the urgency for capital accumulation. The method of accumulation normal to countries rapidly expanding their industry is to have a big profit margin, wages being kept well below the rate which a full exercise of bargaining strength would exact. It is evident that a far-reaching dispute may be expected on the issue of who is to possess the title to the accumulation made by this national abstinence. The three leading examples of America, Russia, and Great Britain will each suggest solutions with an appeal both to the sentiment and to the solid interest of different sections of the Japanese community. Of the three broad courses of free enterprise, social democracy, and communism, the first is, in spite of the high prestige of the United States, least likely to be adopted. It would be undesirable, since it would lead to the development of new monopolies in private hands, and impracticable since it would be unacceptable to workers, organized, conscious of their value, and protected in their trade union effort by the new constitutional framework. A temporary solution may be sought in the payment of high wages on the understanding that a large proportion will, by one incentive or another,

be invested instead of spent. Thrifty as the Japanese are, however, they are not likely to save on a great scale without compulsion for a very long time, and the workers would look askance at a plan for compulsory saving which gave them no share of management, and which would do little to prevent the re-emergence of monopoly organization in the forcing house of rapid capital development. In these circumstances, whatever may be thought of nationalization in principle, the State ownership of Japan's principal industries will have to be given most earnest consideration. If the chief industries were nationalized, factors favourable to peace in the remaining area of the economy would be found in the disposition expressed by working class leaders to co-operate in the national interest with small and medium business men, in the likelihood that Japan's central and local administrations will probably tend to become in time more representative of progressive opinion, and in the rural stability that should follow agrarian reform.

The influence of one or more of the Great Powers is bound to be strongly felt in Japan, but in the long run the new social, economic, and political pattern will have to be adjusted to the traditional basis of Japanese culture. Yet Japanese culture is, even more than that of most countries, pervaded with martial sentiment. For example Buddhism, Shinto, poetry, drama, the pine, the bamboo, and the cherry blossom have associations with romantic militarism. The alternative to toleration of this militarized culture would be to encourage Japan in the imitation of foreign models, which she would understand only at a superficial level. If this course were followed Japan would be spiritually impoverished and would have little to contribute to world culture.

If Japan is to be allowed a large measure of freedom in the retention and development of her culture, it will become essential to bring home to her a realization of the mischief wrought by her military tradition. The fallacy that the war was caused by economic stress resulting from density of population, lack of markets, and of raw materials, should be thoroughly exposed. The war was not caused by economic stress (had there been more ample economic scope for Japan, the war would probably have come earlier), but by an age-old military sentiment, intensified during the last two centuries until it provided the energy for a powerful national upsurge. It will test the wisdom of the Allies to the utmost to adapt this powerful force to benevolent international ends, yet without

such adaptation there can be no true reformation in Japan. A promising start has been made in particular measures, such as the disbandment of the armed forces, removal of reactionaries from positions of influence, encouragement of trade unionism, enfranchisement of women, planned redistribution of land, and the change in the position of the Emperor. This is, however, but a beginning. The critical moment will come when the present confusion and *malaise* dissolves to disclose the pattern of the future. We are dealing with a brave, energetic people, with an impelling, though often distorted sense of duty, with capacity for organization and common effort, and with powerful patriotic feeling. If the energies underlying these qualities can be released, and can be associated when released with a wise and humane outlook, a cultural flowering may take place which will give Japan a high place in the society of nations. If this happens, there need be no more apprehension about the martial sentiment of Japan, for with the dissolution of a feeling of inferiority this sentiment will no longer exhibit itself as aggressive militarism.

How can all this be brought about? Perhaps the most important single measure, additional to the ones already taken by S.C.A.P., would be to give the Japanese a strong incentive to constructive national effort. Japan needs a goal, the effort to reach which will call out her energies and bring a measure of unity to her inexperienced leaders. A major goal will be the more imperative if, as has been suggested here, the period of political and economic stabilization reveals profound differences of class interest. The necessary incentive might be created by undertakings severally given by the Powers represented upon the Far Eastern Commission to support a Japanese application for admission to the United Nations, after a defined period and subject to her achievement of satisfactory progress. This prospect of eventual international rehabilitation, put before Japan by the Far Eastern Commission, would hold out an inducement to unity and effort which might carry her successfully over the anxious period confronting her.

In education a vast work is called for in Japan, and it can be accomplished only under Japanese direction. The breakdown of her cultural isolation must be completed, and the world's religious and philosophical thought, literature, radio, and cinema made available to her. One of the most important contributions would be the teaching of English. Its strong encouragement would be no

imposition on the Japanese since they are anxious to learn, knowing that it is vital to their understanding of the world they live in and to their progress. The militarists always understood the importance of English teaching and deplored its subversive effect. A contributor in *Chuo Koron* in June 1943, to take a typical instance, lamented:

> 'The chief monument to-day to enemy culture is the compulsory teaching of English in our middle schools. English is the chief medium for the introduction of hostile thought, feeling, and general culture . . . Herein lies the root of Japan's intellectual, spiritual, and cultural dependence on America and Britain . . . When it is impressed on innocent young minds through English text-books that everything Anglo-Saxon is good, it is clear that these minds will incline to admire and depend on Britain and America.'

The experience gained since the war will enable the Japanese to acquire much more efficiently both the English language and the liberal thought which can be approached through it. It is to be hoped that, instead of dispersing the foreign teachers through the higher schools, they will work, under Japanese direction, in institutions combining the functions of library and community centre, and will concentrate on helping Japanese teachers and on adult education.

An important part of the educational work will be associated with Christianity. There are already reports of a great number of converts to Christianity, though the quality and motive of such conversions remains to be tested, and it is conceivable that Japan will prove an unexpectedly fruitful field. The combination of scientific scepticism and material distraction which has weakened religion in the West may apply with less force in Japan. To thoughtful women, in particular, realizing the importance of the new responsibilities and opportunities offered them, the inspiration and consolation of Christianity may have a poignant appeal. The link it offers with the West may also influence younger people in its favour. The churches in Japan are aware of their opportunity. The work of the Catholic missions has continued uninterrupted and the Anglican Church (Nippon Sei Ko Kwai), though weakened by dissension and poverty during the war, is now combining for a new effort. A mission of British, American, and Canadian

ecclesiastics brought much encouragement in 1946, and it is expected that foreign missionaries will resume their activities in Japan.[1]

The radio will bring Western music, every form of which is appreciated, before the Japanese, but the educational importance of radio will be enhanced if successful English teaching brings a large number of Japanese into lingual contact with the outside world. The foreign cinema, on the other hand, will certainly have immediate importance, and there must be some anxiety about the standards of art and behaviour which this powerful medium may present to the Japanese. There is a most useful opportunity for films of the quality and sentiment of the best produced in Great Britain in recent years, and it is to be hoped they will be presented. Another most valuable vehicle of re-education will be Western literature. Educated Japanese have always provided an eager reading public of catholic tastes, and it is desirable, since piracy of copyright and translation rights will presumably be checked, that permission to translate and publish foreign books should be granted on lenient terms.

The evident assumption of S.C.A.P. is that the Japanese are capable of taking their place among the world's most advanced nations, and with abundant good-will, applied with sympathetic insight, this high aim can succeed. Some Japanese, however, will undoubtedly prove irreconcilable, and there is need for vigilance. If the Allies offer a constructive, dignified, and honoured future to the Japanese, the irreconcilables may never again become politically or culturally important. If, on the other hand, Japan should face a future of frustration, humiliation, poverty, and disunity, then not only would reaction develop a renewed appeal, but it would attract many among the romantic and spirited men and women who are Japan's most valuable people. Japan is in population the fifth nation on earth and can only be disregarded at the peril of international society as a whole. Her success and happiness, if brought about through the charity and insight of her conquerors, will be a sign of health and wisdom in the world.

[1] *The Church in Post-War Japan*, report of the Anglican Commission to Nippon Sei Ko Kwai, May-July 1946 (London, published for the Missionary Council of the Church Assembly by the Press and Publications Board).

GLOSSARY

BUSHIDO	The way of the warrior. Chivalry.
CHOKUNIN	The grade to which a Japanese official belongs who is appointed by the Emperor through his advisers. The second of the four principal grades of officials.
ETA	A member of the class regarded as outcasts in feudal Japan, whose social disabilities were abolished in 1871.
GENRO	An elder statesman. A member of the Genroin (Council of Elder Statesmen), established by the Meiji Emperor in 1875, and remaining in existence until 1891.
HANNIN	The grade to which a Japanese official belongs who is appointed at the discretion of his superior. The lowest of the four principal grades of officials.
HONSHA	Head office.
JUDO	A form of wrestling, the principle of which is to win by pliancy rather than exertion of strength.
KABUKI	Popular drama originating in the feudal era.
KAMI	A god. A spirit of the deceased. (Lit. 'above; superior'.)
KAMIDANA	Domestic shelf for Shinto tablets. (Lit. 'god-shelf'.)
KEMPEITAI	Military police.
KOJIKI	Records of Old Events. Records of Antiquities. (The oldest Japanese historical record, officially dated at 713 A.D.)
KOKU	Measure of capacity, equivalent to 4·96 bushels, or 180 litres.
KOKUTAI	National polity.
MACHI	A small township.
MINSEITO	One of the two major pre-war political parties. (Lit. 'popular government party'.)
MOBO	Short for 'modern boy'. A term used contemptuously of young Japanese men who ape Western manners.
MOGA	Short for 'modern girl'. The female counterpart of the 'Mobo'.
MURA	A village.

NIHONGI	Records of Japan. (Officially dated in the eighth century A.D.)
NO	Lyrical drama originating in the feudal era.
SAKE	Wine made from fermented rice.
SAMURAI	The retainer of a feudal lord. A member of the social grade superior to the common people, and entitled in feudal times to bear arms. (Lit. 'one who serves'.)
SATORI	Enlightenment.
SEPPUKU	Suicide by disembowelment. (Lit. 'belly-cutting'.) Equivalent of *harakiri*.
SHI	A city.
SHINNIN	The grade to which a Japanese official belongs who is directly appointed by the Emperor. The highest of the four principal grades of officials.
SONIN	The grade to which a Japanese official belongs who is appointed by his superior with the approval of the Emperor. The third of the four principal grades of officials.
WAGAKUSHA	A scholar of the pure Japanese, as opposed to the Sino-Japanese, school.
ZAIBATSU	Finance. Financial circles. The great commercial and industrial firms.

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